In terms of necessity, each input assigned to an RFID protocol can be acquired from computations that can only be conducted by parallel RFID tags partaking in the evidence (Peris-Lopez et al., 2011, p. 843). This ability will assure the interconnection of the tokens produced in the course of the evidence, which only the verifier can terminate within a given period. RFID tags should entail different, untraceable, and masked identifiers during every protocol implementation process (Srivastava, n.d., p. 4). Including arbitrary figures appears suitable for developing privacy-secured identifiers although it does not assure immunity against privacy hacks for suggested RFID protocols.
RFID protocols should have supreme matching capabilities. For instance, when RFID tags are unable to authenticate their fitting in a certain group, separate tags can be members of a proof. As a result, only the verifier would detect the tags’ failure when sent the evidence (Peris-Lopez et al., 2011, p. 843). RFID protocols should also use encoded versions of timestamps. Verifiers should compute secure timestamps using their abiding secret input. I think a future that employs these potentials of RFID protocols will see a rise in “smart” products and smarter electronics. For instance, RFID protocols that reach these potentials should be able to tag smart clothes or machines at a store (Srivastava, n.d., p. 9).
Peris-Lopez, P, Orfila, A, Hernandez-Castro, JC, van der Lubbe, JCA 2011, ‘Flaws on RFID grouping-proofs. Guidelines for future sound protocols,’ Journal of Network and Computer Applications, vol. 34, pp.