Security Breach at Target

 

In this assignment, you will read the article, “

Teaching Case: Security Breach at Target

.” Then you will write a 3-4 page case analysis in which you:

1. Outline the security breach at Target.
2. Describe how Target became aware of the security breach.
3. Examine the security breach’s impact on Target’s customers.
4. Recommend security controls that could have been implemented to prevent the data breach from occurring.
5. Research how the data breach at Target affected Target’s and other companies’ security practices.
6. Go to Basic Search: Strayer University Online Library to locate and integrate into the assignment at least three quality, peer-reviewed academic resources, written within the past five years.

   Include your textbook as one of your resources.
   Wikipedia and similar websites do not qualify as quality resources.

   Save Time On Research and Writing

   Hire a Pro to Write You a 100% Plagiarism-Free Paper.

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Teaching Case

Security Breach at Target

Miloslava Plachkinova
Department of Information and Technology Management

University of Tampa
Tampa, FL 33606, USA
mplachkinova@ut.edu

Chris Maurer

McIntire School of Commerce
University of Virginia

Charlottesville, VA 22903, USA
maurer@virginia.edu

ABSTRACT

This case study follows the security breach that affected Target at the end of 20

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and resulted in the loss of financial data for
over 70 million customers. The case provides an overview of the company and describes the reasons that led to one of the biggest
security breaches in history. It offers a discussion on Target’s vendor management processes and the vulnerability at Fazio
Mechanical Services that was among the main causes of the breach. Further, the case introduces the incident response plan
implemented by Target and discusses the aftermath of the attack. The lessons learned describe some of the steps the company
took to mitigate risks in the future and to strengthen its security posture. While the breach had a significant impact on Target, the
organization was able to fully recover from it and develop best practices that are now widely implemented by other retailers. The
case is suitable for both undergraduate and graduate students enrolled in information security or information systems courses that
discuss vendor management, security incident response, or general security program administration topics.

Keywords: Information assurance & security, Cybersecurity, Case study, Teaching case, Experiential learning & education

1. INTRODUCTION

There are numerous definitions of information security, but
many of them revolve around achieving confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of the information and/or systems
(Anderson, 2003; Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000; Sumra,
Hasbullah, and AbManan, 20

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; Von Solms and Van Niekerk,
2013). These goals are important, as they provide trust and
guarantee the safety of data in motion and data at rest.

Within the retail industry, information security is critical
as it ensures that the organizations follow best practices and
can protect the personal and financial information of the
customers. As Greig, Renaud, and Flowerday (2015) point
out, a focus on employee behavior is vital since an
“organization’s success or failure effectively depends on the
things that its employees do or fail to do” (Da Veiga and Eloff,
2010). Security culture has the potential to play a significant
role in this respect (Vroom and Von Solms, 2004). A strong
and effective security culture is in place when every employee
performs daily tasks in a secure manner and such secure
behavior is considered to be ‘the norm’ (Von Solms, 2000).

Demonstrating a strong security posture is especially
important for retail companies because they rely on having
positive brand recognition and gaining the customers’ trust. A
security breach at a big retail company can also have a domino
effect and potentially impact many other corporations in a
negative way. Thus, understanding the critically important
factors in building a strong security culture and following best
practices is essential for any retail company.

2. MOTIVATION

The authors’ motivation to write this case study comes from
the need to incorporate real world examples into the
cybersecurity curriculum. While it is important for students to
master terminology and have solid foundational knowledge,
the authors believe they should also be able to apply the
knowledge to actual organizational settings where information
security issues arise. There has been a myriad of breaches
affecting a wide range of companies and individuals (Home
Depot, JP Morgan Chase, Ashley Madison, the Office of
Personnel and Management, eBay, Sony, and Hillary Clinton),

Journal of Information Systems Education, Vol. 29(1) Winter 20

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mailto:mplachkinova@ut.edu

mailto:maurer@virginia.edu

but there are relatively few case studies developed solely for
use in the classroom with accompanying learning objectives
and teaching notes. Thus, the authors wanted to explore the
recent security breach at Target due to the abundance of
information available and the various angles from which the
students can approach the topic.

3. EVALUATION

After drafting the case text, it was distributed to students in an
information security principles course at a medium-sized,
private university in the US. Thirty eight undergraduate
students were presented with the case text and reflection
questions (provided in the teaching notes). Students’ analyses
of the case and reflection questions were collected as part of a
graded assignment and were evaluated using rubrics to
determine whether students exceeded, met, or did not meet
expectations across various learning objectives. The authors
also provided students with a paper survey that included
several open-ended questions. The authors asked them to
describe what they liked and disliked about the case, whether
any additional information should be provided, whether they
have any suggestions for improvement, and what sources they
used when preparing their analyses. Overall, students provided
very positive feedback on the case write-up. Students
expressed some concern over the discussion of vendor
management processes, and therefore additional detail around
the vendor management processes was added to the case.

In terms of performance against leaning outcomes, the
average grade students received on this assignment was 94%,
which exceeds expectations. More specifically, 1 student did
not meet the expectations (<65%), 9 students met the expectations (65-89%), and 28 students exceeded the expectations (>90%). These results indicate that students were
able to successfully perform the case study analysis,
understand and interpret the main issues, and provide feasible
and adequate solutions for improving the security practice at
Target Corp. The authors evaluated the students’ writing
skills, as well as their ability to support their statements with
additional resources, readings, and integrate previous course
content in their analysis. The authors used TurnItIn to avoid
any plagiarism on the assignment, and the grading rubrics
were adapted from the University’s College of Business
recommended rubric for problem solving.

4. CASE SYNOPSYS

At the end of 2013, amid the holiday shopping season, Target
became a victim of a security breach affecting over 70 million
customers. Their personal and financial data was stolen
through a vulnerability in one of Target’s vendors – Fazio
Mechanical Services. The breach was first reported by the
security journalist Brian Krebs, and Target’s official response
came shortly after the announcement. While slightly late, the
company’s incident management was still successful as they
were able to regain the customers’ trust and maintain their
status as a successful retailer. After the attack, Target
implemented several steps to mitigate any future breaches.
The company created a Cyber Fusion Center, provided free
credit card monitoring for its customers, and implemented
POS terminals with chip readers. These steps demonstrate

Target’s efforts to improve its security and minimize the risk
of other attacks in the future.

The structure of the presented case study is as follows:
Target’s company profile, the timeline of the events, the
company’s business processes before and after the breach
(including vendor management and incident response), the
investigation, the fallout, and lessons learned.

5. CASE TEXT

5.1 Company Profile
With its first store opening in Roseville, Minnesota, on May 1,

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62, Target aimed to differentiate itself by providing many
features of traditional department stores but provide low prices
typically associated with discount retailers. The name Target
was chosen purposefully as Stewart Widdess (Director of
Publicity) states “As a marksman’s goal is to hit the center
bulls-eye, the new store would do much the same in terms of
retail goods, services, commitment to the community, price,
value and overall experience” (Target, 20

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). The company
went public on October 18, 1967, (under the name “Dayton
Corporation”) and began expanding across the country.
Through various acquisitions and expansions into new areas of
the country, Target has become the second-largest discount
retailer in the United States (behind Walmart). As of February
1, 20

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, Target operated 1,793 retail store locations in the
United States, employed approximately 360,000 employees,
and had annual revenues of $72.6 billion (Statista, 2015).

Target’s slogan of “Expect more. Pay less.” embodies
their corporate mission of providing great value to its
customers while maintaining an exceptional shopping
experience. A key component of Target’s strategy for creating
an exceptional experience for both customers and employees
is to always behave ethically and with integrity. Their efforts
to be a responsible corporate citizen have earned various
awards such as inclusion on Fortune Magazine’s “20 Most
Generous Companies of the Fortune 500” and “World’s Most
Admired Companies” lists (Target, 2017).

While Target has worked diligently to position itself as a
leading retailer in the United States with prominent charitable
values, they have certainly experienced hardships throughout
their long history. Notably, in 2013, they suffered a massive
data breach that exposed sensitive financial information for
millions of customers. While the data breach significantly
affected Target’s operations, the company has recovered and
has learned many valuable lessons on the importance of
protecting sensitive information.

5.2 Before the Breach
Like many corporations, Target employed a staff of dedicated
security professionals to implement safeguards to protect
sensitive data. As part of their ongoing security efforts, Target
successfully passed a compliance audit for the Payment Card
Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS) in September of
2013 (Riley et al., 2014). PCI audits involve a review of
critical security controls and systems configurations to verify
that best practices for protecting payment card information on
computer systems is maintained. Target also completed the
implementation of a $1.6 million malware detection tool
developed by the cybersecurity company FireEye in 2013
(Riley et al., 2014). Their security operations center, with

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teams of personnel in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Bangalore,
India, provided round-the-clock monitoring of cybersecurity
threats on the network. While there is no method for ensuring
complete protection against cybersecurity threats, Target
appeared to be following industry best practices and had
reasonable security controls in place.

5.3 Breach Notification and Initial Response
On November 30, 2013, security operations personnel in
Bangalore, India, received a notification from their malware
detection software that some potentially malicious activity was
recorded on the network. The alert was shared with security
personnel in Minneapolis, but no further action was taken.
Another alert was raised on December 2, 2013, but again no
action was taken (Riley et al., 2014). It was not until
December 12, 2013, when the U.S. Department of Justice
contacted Target about a possible data breach on their
network, that Target began investigating the issue in earnest.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Secret
Service joined the investigation as well. While no public
disclosure was made at the time, the independent security
researcher and blogger, Brian Krebs, posted information
regarding a possible breach of the Target network on
December 18, 2013. On December 19, 2013, Target issued the
following public statement on the matter:

Target today confirmed it is aware of unauthorized
access to payment card data that may have impacted
certain guests making credit and debit card purchases
in its U.S. stores. Target is working closely with law
enforcement and financial institutions, and has
identified and resolved the issue.

“Target’s first priority is preserving the trust of
our guests and we have moved swiftly to address this
issue, so guests can shop with confidence. We regret
any inconvenience this may cause,” said Gregg
Steinhafel, chairman, president and chief executive
officer, Target. “We take this matter very seriously
and are working with law enforcement to bring those
responsible to justice.”

Approximately 40 million credit and debit card
accounts may have been impacted between Nov. 27
and Dec. 15, 2013. Target alerted authorities and
financial institutions immediately after it was made
aware of the unauthorized access, and is putting all
appropriate resources behind these efforts. Among
other actions, Target is partnering with a leading third-
party forensics firm to conduct a thorough
investigation of the incident.

Initially, Target denied that debit card PIN numbers had

been stolen, but reports confirmed that encrypted PIN numbers
had indeed been stolen (Finkle and Henry, 2013). Another
update (Target, 2014) on the breach was provided by the
company a month later, on January 10, 2014, outlining the fact
that personal information (names, addresses, phone numbers,
and email addresses) were also taken in this breach. While
there were some critiques about the fact that the company
delayed its response after initially identifying the breach,
Target Chairman and CEO Gregg Steinhafel defended the
decision:

Sunday (Dec. 15) was really day one. That was the
day we confirmed we had an issue and so our number
one priority was … making our environment safe and
secure. By six o’clock at night, our environment was
safe and secure. We eliminated the malware in the
access point, we were very confident that coming into
Monday guests could come to Target and shop with
confidence and no risk.

Day two was really about initiating the
investigation work and the forensic work … that has
been ongoing. Day three was about preparation. We
wanted to make sure our stores and our call centers
could be as prepared as possible, and day four was
about notification. (Quick, 2014)

In addition to the public response, Target sent out an email

to its customers (Appendix A) on January

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, 2014, offering
one year of free credit monitoring. The company provided
them with information about protecting themselves and
staying safe. However, the email was sent to many individuals
who never had conducted business with Target, which raised
speculation as to how the retailer obtained the data. One
possible explanation is that perhaps the email addresses were
from Amazon, a remnant from the old Amazon-Target
partnership. However, when consumers asked where Target
obtained email addresses for people who are not now and have
never been customers of the retailer, the spokeswoman simply
said, “The information was obtained by Target through the
normal course of our business” (Quirk, 2014). Instead of
retaining its customers and solidifying their trust with the
offered incentives, Target opened another door for
speculations on its processes for collecting and handling
customer data.

5.4 The Investigation
As part of the incident response process, Target commissioned
security professionals at Verizon to assist in the investigation
into how the breach occurred. A detailed security audit was
performed from December 21, 2013, to March 1, 2014, and
served two primary purposes: 1) identify the root cause of the
breach and 2) identify opportunities to improve the security of
Target’s infrastructure. While the report issued by Verizon has
remained confidential, various media outlets claimed to have
received information stemming directly from the report. The
findings presented below have not been confirmed by Target,
but have been reported by several reputable security
researchers and media outlets.

The initial point of entry appears to have stemmed from
hijacked credentials stolen from Fazio Mechanical Services, a
third party service provider. Fazio, a supplier of refrigeration
devices and services, began working with Target to support
the expansion of fresh food offerings across stores in the
United States. As with many other vendors and suppliers of
Target, Fazio was provided access to Target’s systems to
handle “electronic billing, contract submission, and project
management.” Fazio Mechanical did not, however, “perform
remote monitoring or control of heating, cooling, or
refrigeration systems for Target” (Fazio Mechanical Services,
2014).

In the fall of 2013, Fazio Mechanical Services was the
“victim of a sophisticated cyber-attack operation” despite

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stating that their “IT system and security measures are in full
compliance with industry best practices” (Fazio Mechanical
Services, 2014). Industry experts believe the breach involved
an infection of the ‘Citadel’ malware that can be used to steal
logon credentials from computer systems. Despite a claim that
Fazio was in compliance with “industry best practices,” it has
been alleged that Fazio relied on the free, non-commercial
version of Malwarebytes Anti-Malware software, which does
not provide real-time protection. It is not clear whether Target
enforced any ongoing security reviews of its vendors to ensure
compliance with security best practices.

While this attack did not appear to have an immediate
impact on Fazio, it is likely that account credentials for
accessing Target systems were stolen during the Fazio breach.
Access to Target’s systems granted to Fazio would not have
allowed attackers to access customer data, however, so
additional vulnerabilities inside the Target network must have
allowed attackers to escalate their account privileges, traverse
the network, and obtain over 40 million customer card
numbers.

Further investigation revealed that there were no major
obstacles to accessing point of sale (POS) terminals across the
entire network once inside the internal Target network. This
lack of network segmentation could allow any malicious user
the ability to traverse the network and attempt to access
various devices ranging from point of sale terminals to
mission critical back-end systems. To illustrate the lack of
segmentation, the Verizon audit team supposedly accessed a
cash register after they compromised a deli counter scale that
was located in a different store (Krebs, 2015).

The audit team also found significant problems with
enforcement of password policies. Target maintained a
password policy that included industry-standard practices,
however investigators found multiple files stored on Target
servers that included logon credentials for various systems.
According to Brian Krebs, the audit report revealed that

The Verizon security consultants identified several
systems that were using misconfigured services, such
as several Microsoft SQL servers that had a weak
administrator password, and Apache Tomcat servers
using the default administrator password. Through
these weaknesses, the Verizon consultants were able
to gain initial access to the corporate network and to
eventually gain domain administrator access. (Krebs,
2015)

The use of weak passwords was apparently rampant within the
Target infrastructure, and the security investigation team was
able to crack over 500,000 passwords, representing 86% of
identified accounts, to various internal Target systems.

Investigators also identified significant issues related to
the maintenance and patching of systems. Again, Brian Krebs
claims:

For example, the Verizon consultants found systems
missing critical Microsoft patches, or running outdated
[web server] software such as Apache, IBM
WebSphere, and PHP. These services were hosted on
web servers, databases, and other critical
infrastructure. These services have many known

vulnerabilities associated with them. In several of
these instances where Verizon discovered these
outdated services or unpatched systems, they were
able to gain access to the affected systems without
needing to know any authentication credentials.
Verizon and the Target Red Team exploited several
vulnerabilities on the internal network, from an
unauthenticated standpoint. The consultants were able
to use this initial access to compromise additional
systems. Information on these additional systems
eventually led to Verizon gaining full access to the
network – and all sensitive data stored at on network
shares – through a domain administrator account.
(Krebs, 2015)

Given the previously stated vulnerabilities, the attackers

were able to access point of sale terminals and install malware
directly on all machines across the network. Given the timing
of the alerts triggered by Target’s anti-malware software in
late November and early December, it is likely that the
malware was installed on the terminals at this time.

The malware contained memory-scraping functionality
that allowed the attackers to intercept cardholder information
before it was sent for processing by a payment processor. The
PCI-DSS specifically requires payment card processors to
“encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open, public
networks” (Security Standards Council, 2016). However, the
configuration of point of sale terminals at Target did not
provide the ability to immediately encrypt cardholder data
upon registering a card swipe. Because of this, card data
remained in plain text within the POS terminal’s memory.
This data was only encrypted upon preparation for transit to
external card processing systems (as required under PCI-
DSS). Since the malware was installed directly on POS
terminals and allowed the ability to scrape data from memory
of these machines, the attackers were able to intercept
unencrypted cardholder data for all card swipes registered in
Target stores.

5.5 The Fallout
Target has claimed that up to 70 million individuals may have
been impacted by this data breach (Target, 2015a). At the
time, this was one of the top ten largest data breaches recorded
(Quick et al., 2016). In the aftermath of the breach, consumer
confidence in Target was impaired significantly. According to
Kantar Retail, a consulting group researching consumer
spending behaviors, the percentage of U.S. households
shopping at Target in January 2014 was 33%. This was down
from 43% for the same month the preceding year (Malcolm,
2014). In Target’s annual report filed with the SEC on March
14, 2014, the company stated:

We believe the Data Breach adversely affected our
fourth quarter U.S. Segment sales. Prior to our
December 19, 2013, announcement of the Data
Breach, our U.S. Segment fourth quarter comparable
sales were positive, followed by meaningfully
negative comparable sales results following the
announcement. Comparable sales began to recover in
January 2014. The collective interaction of year-over-
year changes in the retail calendar (e.g., the number of

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days between Thanksgiving and Christmas), combined
with the broad array of competitive, consumer
behavioral and weather factors makes any
quantification of the precise impact of the Data Breach
on sales infeasible. (United States Securities and
Exchange Commission, 2014)

While it is difficult to quantify the exact impact of the

breach on Target’s financials, the company experienced a 1%
decrease in revenues from 2012 to 2013, and its net income
decreased 34.3% in that same time period. The large impact to
net income was largely attributable to the additional costs
associated with investigating and remediating the security
breach.

The financial impacts were not limited to the few months
following the breach, however. Over the course of the next
two years, Target continued to incur costs related directly to
the security breach. According to Target’s 10-Q and 10-K
filings with the SEC, the company has incurred $291 million
in cumulative expenses related to this breach. Of this,
approximately $90 million was offset by insurance coverage,
leaving Target with a total direct cost of just over $200 million
(United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 2016).
The breakdown of costs reported by Target for each quarter
from the announcement of the breach to May 2015 are
displayed in Figure 1:

Figure 1: Cumulative Costs Related to Security Breach, by

Quarter

5.6 Lessons Learned
Even though Target experienced one of the biggest data
breaches in history, it is still a successful business with almost
1,800 stores in North America in 2015 (Target, 2016). While
the attack did impact the company, there are some key factors
that had a positive impact on Target’s image. For example,
customer loyalty is something that builds over time and even
such a massive security flaw could be overlooked by the most
devoted and dedicated individuals who associate themselves
with the company. Some of them even perceived Target as a
victim of the attackers and sympathized with the company
during the hard times it was experiencing.

On Target’s end, the company invested heavily in
improving its cybersecurity operations, and in 2015 created
the first Cyber Fusion Center, which is dedicated to preventing
similar attacks from happening again. Brian Cornell, chairman
and CEO of the company, said:

Data security is a top priority at Target, so we
continue to invest heavily in top talent, as well as
technology, and focus on continually evaluating and
evolving our processes as the landscape changes. It’s
an important part of the $1 billion Target plans to
invest in technology and supply chain this year.
(Target, 2015b)

Brad Maiorino, Target’s Chief Information Security

Officer, added:

We’ve got teams of Cyber Security analysts working
round the clock. They use a mix of human
intelligence, analytics and state-of-the-art technology
to detect, investigate and contain threats to our
business. Much of the work they do takes place in our
newly opened Cyber Fusion Center (CFC). (Target,
2015b)

Another improvement that Target made was adding chip

readers with PIN codes for customers. In fact, Target became
the first major U.S. issuer to use chip and PIN credit cards in
2015 (DiGangi, 2015), even as most card issuers in the United
States were issuing less secure chip and signature cards. The
addition of an EMV chip makes a card more difficult and
more expensive to counterfeit. However, adding a PIN code
on top of the EMV chip makes it even less likely that card
information can be stolen and used to make unauthorized
purchases.

Last but not least, the attack impacted Target’s profits and
caused some top management turnover. Target’s CEO at the
time of the breach, Gregg Steinhafel, a 35-year employee of
the company with the last 6 at the helm, resigned in May
2014. The CIO was also replaced with Bob DeRodes, an
executive with a very strong background in information
security. The Target board of directors was also under
significant pressure. A proxy firm, Institutional Shareholder
Services, had recommended that investors oust seven board
members. The firm said the board failed to protect the
company from the data breach. The board members were able
to convince shareholders to re-elect them, however, although
the message to them was clear that future data security
breaches were considered to be their responsibility (Basu,
2014). The full press release from Target regarding the
managerial changes is available in Appendix B.

Although Target never shared directly any lessons learned,
the examples above illustrate the company’s ambition to
improve its security practices and offer more protection for its
customers. Taking responsibility for the breach at the highest
level was something that is still uncommon in organizations of
such scale. Overall, the breach enforced many new rules and
practices with regards to information security, as both retailers
and customers were now aware of the consequences of such
an attack.

6. CONCLUSION

While the security breach at Target impacted a single
corporation, it is important to note that such breaches have
now become part of our everyday lives. It is not a matter of if,
but when a breach will occur. Thus, the authors believe that

Journal of Information Systems Education, Vol. 29(1) Winter 2018

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the lessons learned from Target are valid and can be
generalized to other organizations as well. For instance, the
breach stimulated other retailers such as Wal-Mart and Home
Depot to install chip readers on their POS terminals. Such best
practices show that others realize the importance of
strengthening their security posture and providing better
protection against individuals with malicious intents. Further,
Target demonstrated that they have the capacity to recover
from such serious events due to having up-to-date disaster
recovery/business continuity plans. These best practices
should be followed by others who want to prepare themselves
for the inevitable.

In conclusion, this case study provides an objective view
of the events surrounding the 2013 Target breach and outlines
both the adequate and inadequate actions taken by the
corporation. The authors’ goal is to increase students’
knowledge on how major organizations are impacted by such
attacks, what can be done to limit these breaches in the future,
and how to be better prepared to respond when they happen.
The case study adds value to the cybersecurity curriculum as it
requires students to put into practice the knowledge they
gained from the classroom and apply it to a real world
scenario. The case study reveals the complexity of the security
breach and its impact on the business processes and customer
trust – factors that any business professional should
understand before going to the industry.

7. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Research reported in this publication was supported by the
Sykes College of Business Faculty Collaboration Grant at the
University of Tampa for the 2016-2017 academic year.

8. REFERENCES

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Quirk, M. B. (2014). Non-Target Customers Wondering how
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Riley, M., Elgin, B., Lawrence, D., & Matlack, C. (2014).
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AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES

Miloslava Plachkinova is an Assistant Professor of

Cybersecurity in the Sykes College of
Business at the University of Tampa,
FL. She holds a Ph.D. in Information
Systems and Technology from
Claremont Graduate University, CA.
She is a Certified Information Systems
Security Professional (CISSP), a
Certified Information Security Manager
(CISM), and a Project Management

Professional (PMP). Dr. Plachkinova’s research focuses on
information security and healthcare. She investigates how
human behavior leads to data breaches, and her work in the
healthcare field investigates security and privacy issues in
mobile health (mHealth) and electronic health records (EHR)
on the cloud. Dr. Plachkinova also has extensive industry
experience working for both the private and the public sectors.

Chris Maurer is an Assistant Professor in the McIntire

School of Commerce at the University
of Virginia. He received his Ph.D. from
the University of Georgia and was
previously an Assistant Professor at the
University of Tampa. His research
interests include cybersecurity controls,
the impact of cybersecurity breaches,
enterprise systems, and IT-business
alignment. His previous research has

appeared in journals and conference proceedings including
MIS Quarterly Executive, the International Conference on
Information Systems, the Americas Conference on Information
System, and the Hawaii International Conference on System
Sciences.

Journal of Information Systems Education, Vol. 29(1) Winter 2018

17

APPENDIX A – Email to Target Customers

Source: https://consumermediallc.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/targetemailgrab , Accessed on January 31, 2017.

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https://consumermediallc.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/targetemailgrab

APPENDIX B – Target Press Release

“Today we are announcing that, after extensive discussions, the board and Gregg Steinhafel have decided that now is the right
time for new leadership at Target. Effective immediately, Gregg will step down from his positions as Chairman of the Target
board of directors, president and CEO. John Mulligan, Target’s chief financial officer, has been appointed as interim president
and chief executive officer. Roxanne S. Austin, a current member of Target’s board of directors, has been appointed as interim
non-executive chair of the board. Both will serve in their roles until permanent replacements are named. We have asked Gregg
Steinhafel to serve in an advisory capacity during this transition and he has graciously agreed. The board is deeply grateful to
Gregg for his significant contributions and outstanding service throughout his notable 35-year career with the company. We
believe his passion for the team and relentless focus on the guest have established Target as a leader in the retail industry. Gregg
has created a culture that fosters innovation and supports the development of new ideas. Under his leadership, the company has
not only enhanced its ability to execute, but has broadened its strategic horizons. He also led the company through unprecedented
challenges, navigating the financial recession, reacting
to challenges with Target’s expansion into Canada, and successfully
defending
the company through a high-profile proxy battle. Most recently, Gregg led the response to Target’s 2013 data breach.
He held himself personally accountable and pledged that Target would emerge a better company. We are grateful to him for his
tireless leadership and will always consider him a member of the Target family. The board will continue to be actively engaged
with the leadership team to
drive Target’s future success and will manage the transition. In addition to
the appointments of the
exceptional leaders noted above, we have also retained Korn Ferry to advise the board on a comprehensive CEO search. The
board is confident in the future of this company and views this transition
as an opportunity to drive Target’s business forward
and accelerate the company’s transformation efforts.”

Source: http://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/2014/05/05/target-ceo-gregg-steinhafel-resigns-in-wake-of-data-breach-
fallout/#6abeced46e61, Accessed on January 31, 2017.

Journal of Information Systems Education, Vol. 29(1) Winter 2018

19

http://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/2014/05/05/target-ceo-gregg-steinhafel-resigns-in-wake-of-data-breach-fallout/#6abeced46e61

http://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/2014/05/05/target-ceo-gregg-steinhafel-resigns-in-wake-of-data-breach-fallout/#6abeced46e61

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