since there is no evidence that Joe retained a reversionary interest in the home.1 In Lohia v Lohia, it was established that by virtue of Section 60(3) of the Law of Property Act 1925, a resulting trust will no longer be inferred in the case of a voluntary conveyance.2 A declaration of trust can be created by word of mouth “or even inferred from conduct.”3 There were no words or conduct on Joe’s part that can be construed to represent an intention on his part to create a trust. The voluntary conveyance of the home will therefore be construed as an absolute gift to Jack which does not form a part of Joe’s estate and likewise Daisy will have no legitimate claim to it.
The disposition of the shares in Dotcom plc to Eddie was a bare trust and as such will devolve with Joe’s estate. Eddie assumed the role of trustee and likewise treated Joe as the sole beneficiary of the trust during his lifetime. This is evidenced by Eddie leaving the share certificate with Joe and paying over dividends from the shares to Joe. Moreover, Eddie himself acknowledged that he was merely holding the shares upon trust for Joe. There is no escaping the conclusion that the manner in which the shares in Dotcom were purchased, held and treated was consistent with the requisite three certainties of a trust. These certainties are certainty of subject matter, intention as well as objects. The subject matter is the trust property, intention is words and conduct capable of defining the intent by the donor to create a trust and the objects are the intended beneficiaries.4 The presumption is that Daisy be the sole beneficiary of the shares in her role as heir to Joe’s estate.
Joe’s gift to Jack for Emily’s medical problems appears to be a discretionary trust. However, the validity of this kind of discretionary trust can be challenged on the grounds that Joe’s words do not impose upon Jack a legally binding obligation.