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LiteratureReview Basics
In this class, you will conduct a literature review on a very basic level. You will use the provided Literature Review Example and
to guide you in a way that makes your review fit the needs of your final project.
Full Literature Reviews
If you were doing a full literature review, you would choose six to 12 research articles on your topic of interest. Normally, you would use the articles to either examine a controversy more closely or make a point that is supported by research. In this class, rather than choose all of the studies on your own, you will be provided with several studies and will also be expected to choose a couple of studies on your own. You will use these studies to identify a gap in the research that you can fill with a study you design.
The research you are being provided with in this class is somewhat broad to give you some freedom in your topic choice. If you were conducting a traditional literature review, you would look for a narrow scope of studies pertaining to a topic you would already have chosen. The Shapiro Library has a number of psychology-related databases you could use for your research.
In a typical literature review, you would start with the theme of your topic or the point that you plan to make with the literature. These are the typical points you would include:
Your research question and how it relates to the studies you have chosen
A brief outline of the way you have organized your review
Detailed descriptions of each study, including your evaluation of each study’s strengths and weaknesses
What the studies show and what you believe this means
Adapted Literature Reviews for This Class
You will not go to that level of depth in this class. Instead, you will fill out the Literature Review Template (using the Literature Review Example as a guide), which has sections that directly relate to the final project rubric. However, if you are pursuing a degree in psychology, you will eventually do formal literature reviews. The exercise in this class will give you a foundation in the basics that you can build on in your future studies.
To fill out the template, you will read the three articles provided for your chosen track and the two articles you selected in the same way that you would read articles for a traditional literature review.
As you read, make sure to identify the following:
The research question/purpose and specific hypothesis
What factors and influences were studied
What other studies found
What type of research design was used and if the research was conducted ethically
Pay particular attention to the abstract, introduction, results, and discussion to quickly locate these elements.
Fill out the template using information from the article and applying concepts you learned in the text to successfully complete your literature review.
Literature Review Example
What is the title of the article? Provide a citation for the article in APA format.
de Haan, A. D., Deković, M., & Prinzie, P. (2012). Longitudinal impact of parental and adolescent personality on parenting. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102(1), 189–199. doi: 10.1037/a0025254
What is the purpose of the article and how does the purpose relate to personality development?
This study tried to add to existing knowledge about how personality shapes behaviors by studying Big Five characteristics and specific parenting behaviors. The study also looked at the influence of difficult versus easy adolescents and parental and adolescent gender.
What is the hypothesis of the study? In other words, what claims do the authors make in the article?
The authors expected that more extraverted and autonomous parents would use less overreactive discipline and that extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness in parents would be correlated with more warmth. The authors expected agreeable and emotionally stable adolescents to evoke less overreactive discipline from parents. The authors also concluded that when adolescents have easy personalities, parental personality should not be as influential to parenting outcomes.
What variables (factors) are being looked at as an influence on personality? How are these factors assessed or measured in the article?
The variables being looked at in this study were parental Big Five characteristics and adolescent Big Five characteristics using the NEO-PI-R. The variables of parental control and support were also examined. Using the The Positive and Negative Perfectionism Scale (PANPS), the authors also included the variables of temperament and gender of both parents and adolescents.
If these variables or the relationship between these variables have been studied before, what have other studies found? This shows historical significance. How does the view of personality in this article compare with historical views of personality?
In previous studies looking at Big Five traits, extraversion in children has been correlated with more supportive behaviors from parents but also more overreactive discipline. Agreeable children have been found to elicit more warmth, as well as less overreactive discipline. The trait of conscientiousness in children has been linked to less overreactive discipline, while emotional stability in children has been associated with more overreactive discipline.
What type of research design is used in the study? What instruments or measures did the researchers use to collect data?
Parental and adolescent personality characteristics, as well as warmth and overreactivity, were measured using self-report questionnaires. The results were then statistically analyzed using correlation coefficients to identify associations between the variables.
Do you think the research in this article was conducted in an ethical manner? Why or why not? In relation to the article, how have ethical considerations in personality psychology research changed over the years?
Yes, only questionnaires were used, which do not pose any harm to participants. Consent forms were completed by all participants and the study was approved by an ethics committee. These safeguards uphold the established ethical standards that protect participants.
Literature Review Template
Article One
What is the title of the article? Provide a citation for the article in APA format.
What is the purpose of the article and how does the purpose relate to personality development?
What is the hypothesis of the study? In other words, what claims do the authors make in the article?
What variables (factors) are being looked at as an influence on personality? How are these factors assessed or measured in the article?
If these variables or the relationship between these variables have been studied before, what have other studies found? This shows historical significance. How does the view of personality in this article compare with historical views of personality?
What type of research design is used in the study? What instruments or measures did the researchers use to collect data?
Do you think the research in this article was conducted in an ethical manner? Why or why not? In relation to the article, how have ethical considerations in personality psychology research changed over the years?
Article Two
What is the title of the article? Provide a citation for the article in APA format.
What is the purpose of the article and how does the purpose relate to personality development?
What is the hypothesis of the study? In other words, what claims do the authors make in the article?
What variables (factors) are being looked at as an influence on personality? How are these factors assessed or measured in the article?
If these variables or the relationship between these variables have been studied before, what have other studies found? This shows historical significance. How does the view of personality in this article compare with historical views of personality?
What type of research design is used in the study? What instruments or measures did the researchers use to collect data?
Do you think the research in this article was conducted in an ethical manner? Why or why not? In relation to the article, how have ethical considerations in personality psychology research changed over the years?
Article Three
What is the title of the article? Provide a citation for the article in APA format.
What is the purpose of the article and how does the purpose relate to personality development?
What is the hypothesis of the study? In other words, what claims do the authors make in the article?
What variables (factors) are being looked at as an influence on personality? How are these factors assessed or measured in the article?
If these variables or the relationship between these variables have been studied before, what have other studies found? This shows historical significance. How does the view of personality in this article compare with historical views of personality?
What type of research design is used in the study? What instruments or measures did the researchers use to collect data?
Do you think the research in this article was conducted in an ethical manner? Why or why not? In relation to the article, how have ethical considerations in personality psychology research changed over the years?
1.6 Literature Review Articles Literature review articles (or narrative literature review articles) provide narrative summaries and evaluations of the findings or theories within a literature base. The literature base may include qualitative, quantitative, and/or mixed methods research. Literature reviews capture trends in the literature; they do not engage in a systematic quantitative or qualitative meta-analysis of the findings from the initial studies. In literature review articles, authors should define and clarify the problem; summarize previous investigations to inform readers of the state of the research; identify relations, contradictions, gaps, and inconsistencies in the literature; and suggest next steps in solving the problem. The components of literature review articles can be arranged in various ways—for example, by grouping research on the basis of similarity in the concepts or theories of interest, methodological similarities among the studies reviewed, or the historical development of the field.
2.4 Title The title should summarize the main idea of the paper simply and, if possible, in a way that is engaging for readers. For research papers, it should be a concise statement of the main topic of the research and should identify the variables or theoretical issues under investigation and the relationship between them. Although there is no prescribed limit for title length in APA Style, authors are encouraged to keep their titles focused and succinct. Research has shown an association between simple, concise titles and higher numbers of article downloads and citations (Hallock & Dillner, 2016; Jamali & Nikzad, 2011). Include essential terms in the title to enhance readers’ ability to find your work during a search and to aid abstracting and indexing in databases if the work is published. Avoid words that serve no purpose; they increase the title length and can mislead indexers. For example, the words “method” and “results” do not normally appear in a title, nor should such phrases as “a study of” or “an experimental investigation of.” Occasionally terms such as “research synthesis,” “meta-analysis,” or “fMRI study” convey important information for potential readers and are included in the title. Avoid using abbreviations in a title; spelling out all terms helps ensure accurate, complete indexing of the article and allows readers to more readily comprehend its meaning. When an animal name—for example, “Rat”—is in the title, also include the scientific name in italics and parentheses—(Rattus norvegicus). See Table 2.1 for examples of effective versus ineffective paper titles. Table 2.1 Effective and Ineffective Paper Titles Effective title Ineffective title Rationale Effect of Depression on the Decision to Join a Clinical Trial A Study of the Effect of Depression on the Decision to Join a Clinical Trial More direct: Unnecessary words have been cut. Why and When Hierarchy Impacts Team Effectiveness: A Meta-Analytic Integration Hierarchy and Team Effectiveness More precise: The relationship between variables has been clarified; the type of research (meta-analysis) has been specified. Closing Your Eyes to Follow Your Heart: Avoiding Information to Protect a Strong Intuitive Preference Closing Your Eyes to Follow Your Heart More informative: A creative title has been balanced with a substantive subtitle. Format. The paper title should be in title case (see Section 6.17), bold, centered, and positioned in the upper half of the title page (e.g., three or four lines down from the top margin of the page). Move the title up to accommodate a longer author note if necessary. If the title is longer than one line, the main title and the subtitle can be separated on double-spaced lines if desired. Note that the paper title also appears at the top of the first page of text (see Sections 2.11 and 2.28).
2.5 Author Name (Byline) Every paper includes the name of the author or authors—the byline. The preferred form of an author’s name is first name, middle initial(s), and last name; this form reduces the likelihood of mistaken identity (e.g., that authors with the same first and last names are the same person). To assist researchers and librarians, use the same form of your name for publication throughout your career when possible; for example, do not use a middle initial on one paper and omit the initial on a different paper. Determining whether, for example, Marisol G. Rodríguez is the same person as M. G. Rodríguez can be difficult, particularly when citations span years and institutional affiliations change. If you change your name during your career, present your new name in a consistent form as well. Omit all professional titles (e.g., Dr., Professor) and academic degrees or licenses (e.g., PhD, EdD, MD, MA, RN, MSW, LCSW) from the byline. Format. Write the byline on the title page after the paper title. Include one blank double-spaced line between the paper title and the byline. Follow these guidelines for byline formatting: If the paper has one author, write the author name centered and in standard (i.e., nonbold, nonitalic) font. If the paper has multiple authors, order the names of the authors according to their contributions. Write all names on the same line (flowing onto additional lines if needed), centered, and in standard font. For two authors, separate the names with the word “and”; for three or more authors, separate the names with commas and include “and” before the final author’s name. For names with suffixes, separate the suffix from the rest of the name with a space, not a comma (e.g., Roland J. Thorpe Jr.). See Table 2.2 for examples of how to set up author bylines and affiliations. Table 2.2 Examples of Author Bylines and Affiliations Variation Example One author, one affiliation Maggie C. Leonard Department of Psychology, George Mason University One author, two affiliations Andrew K. Jones-Willoughby School of Psychology, University of Sydney Center for Behavioral Neuroscience, American University One author, no institutional affiliation Isabel de Vries Rochester, New York, United States Two authors, shared affiliation Mackenzie J. Clement and Talia R. Cummings College of Nursing, Michigan State University Two authors, different affiliations Wilhelm T. Weber1 and Latasha P. Jackson2 1 Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany 2 College of Education, University of Georgia Three or more authors, shared affiliation Madina Wahab, DeAndre L. Washington Jr., and Julian H. Lee School of Public Health, University of California, Berkeley Three or more authors, different affiliations Savannah C. St. John1, Fen-Lei Chang2, 3, and Carlos O. Vásquez III1 1 Educational Testing Service, Princeton, New Jersey, United States 2 MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge, England 3 Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge
2.27 Heading Levels APA Style headings have five possible levels: Level 1 headings are used for top-level or main sections, Level 2 headings are subsections of Level 1, and so on. Regardless of the number of levels of subheading within a section, the heading structure for all sections follows the same top-down progression. Each section starts with the highest level of heading, even if one section has fewer levels of subheading than another section. For example, in a paper with Level 1 Method, Results, and Discussion headings, the Method and Results sections may each have two levels of subheading (Levels 2 and 3), and the Discussion section may have only one level of subheading (Level 2). Thus, there would be three levels of heading for the paper overall. Headings in the Introduction. Because the first paragraphs of a paper are understood to be introductory, the heading “Introduction” is not needed. Do not begin a paper with an “Introduction” heading; the paper title at the top of the first page of text acts as a de facto Level 1 heading (see Figure 2.4). For subsections within the introduction, use Level 2 headings for the first level of subsection, Level 3 for subsections of any Level 2 headings, and so on. After the introduction (regardless of whether it includes headings), use a Level 1 heading for the next main section of the paper (e.g., Method). Figure 2.4 Use of Headings in a Sample Introduction Full Description. Number of Headings in a Paper. The number of levels of heading needed for a paper depends on its length and complexity; three is average. If only one level of heading is needed, use Level 1; if two levels are needed, use Levels 1 and 2; if three levels are needed, use Levels 1, 2, and 3; and so forth. Use only the number of headings necessary to differentiate distinct sections in your paper; short student papers may not require any headings. Do not label headings with numbers or letters.2 Format. Table 2.3 shows how to format each level of heading, Figure 2.4 demonstrates the use of headings in the introduction, and Figure 2.5 lists all the headings used in a sample paper in correct format. The sample papers at the end of this chapter also show the use of headings in context. Table 2.3 Format for the Five Levels of Heading in APA Style Level Format 1 Centered, Bold, Title Case Heading Text begins as a new paragraph. 2 Flush Left, Bold, Title Case Heading Text begins as a new paragraph. 3 Flush Left, Bold Italic, Title Case Heading Text begins as a new paragraph. 4 Indented, Bold, Title Case Heading, Ending With a Period. Text begins on the same line and continues as a regular paragraph. 5 Indented, Bold Italic, Title Case Heading, Ending With a Period. Text begins on the same line and continues as a regular paragraph. Note. In title case, most words are capitalized (see Section 6.17). Figure 2.5 Format of Headings in a Sample Paper Full Description.
Trait Theories of Personality: Allport, Eysenck, and Cattell Questions to be Addressed in this Chapter A View of the Trait Theorists Trait Theory’s View of the Person Trait Theory’s View of the Science of Personality Trait Theories of Personality: Basic Perspectives Shared by Trait Theorists The Trait Theory of Gordon W. Allport (1897–1967) Identifying Primary Trait Dimensions: Factor Analysis The Factor‐Analytic Trait Theory of Raymond B. Cattell (1905–1998) The Three‐Factor Theory of Hans J. Eysenck (1916–1997) Major Concepts Review Chapter Focus Chris has just graduated from college and started a job in a new city. He feels lonely and wants to meet some new people. After some hesitation, he decides to place a personals ad. He stares at his blank computer screen—what should he write? What kinds of personality characteristics would you choose to describe yourself? He chooses “Unconventional, sensitive, fun‐loving, happy, humorous, kind, slender graduate, 22, seeks similar qualities in sane soulmate.” Somebody who can be described this way may indeed be a desirable date! The personality characteristics that Chris has described are what are known as personality traits. Personality traits are psychological characteristics that are stable over time and across situations; it’s a good bet that somebody who is sensitive and kind today will also be sensitive and kind a month from now. This chapter is about traits, defined as broad dispositions to behave in particular ways. Specifically, in this chapter, you will learn about three personality trait theories and their associated research programs. Two of these theories—those of Hans Eysenck and of Raymond Cattell—attempt to identify the basic dimensions of personality traits, that is, basic characteristics that everyone shares to a greater or lesser degree. The two associated research programs rely on a particular statistical procedure, factor analysis; this statistical procedure is used to identify the most basic individual differences in personality traits. Historically, the trait approach has been popular in American and British psychology and, in the field’s recent era, in personality psychology in Europe as well. Part of this popularity reflects the methodological sophistication of factor‐analytic research methods and the relatively consistent research results that they yield. Part of this popularity is also rooted in the commonsense nature of trait theory; the scientific theories of personality traits have an intuitive appeal because their basic units of analysis—personality traits—are similar to simple nonscientific, “folk” understandings of personality.
Questions to be Addressed in this Chapter What are the main ways in which individuals differ from one another in their feelings, thoughts, and behavior? How many different traits are needed to adequately describe these personality differences? Does every person have a unique set of personality traits, or is it possible to identify a set of traits that is universal and that can serve as a taxonomy of individual differences? If individuals can be described in terms of their characteristic traits, how are we to explain variability in behavior across time and situations? We now introduce a third main perspective on personality, that of the trait theories. The trait theories differ strikingly from the Freudian and Rogerian perspectives you learned about in previous chapters. As you will see, the differences involve not only the substantive claims of the theories but also the scientific database on which the theories rest. Trait theorists emphasize that a central feature of the sciences is measurement. In the history of the physical sciences, scientific advances often could occur only after the development of tools for measuring physical phenomena precisely. If Galileo and Newton had not had relatively precise measures of time, mass, and other physical properties, they could not have verified that the motion of physical objects was lawful. If contemporary physicists did not have precise instruments for detecting the presence of subatomic particles, their science would be relatively speculative. Scientific progress often rests on precise measurement. Contrast this emphasis with the approach of Freud and Rogers. Freud’s work was virtually devoid of objective scientific measurement. He inferred the presence of mental structures of varying strength while providing no tools for measuring them. Freud relied merely on case study reports, which are more interpretative and thus more subjective than traditional scientific measurement. Rogers was more attentive to measurement principles. Yet, some of his central theoretical constructs (e.g., the self‐actualization motive) were not accompanied by measurement principles. (Rogers never provided a measure of individual differences, or intraindividual variations, in self‐actualizing tendencies.) Surveying this scene, the trait theorists asked, Could these prior thinkers be said to have made truly scientific progress? Their answer: no. The work of “Jung and Freud … amounted scientifically almost to a disaster” concluded the trait theorist Raymond Cattell (1965, pp. 16–17). Trait theorists called for a new approach to the study of personality, one whose measures of psychological attributes were as objective and reliable as those found in the physical sciences. This chapter and the next review the progress they made.
A View of the Trait Theorists In our previous chapters, we introduced theoretical perspectives by reviewing the life of the primary theorist (Freud in Chapter 3 and Rogers in Chapter 5). Our approach to the trait theories is different. The difference reflects the nature of the theories and theorists. There simply is no single individual—no one dominant figure, no prime mover—in the trait theories of personality, in the way that there was in the psychodynamic and phenomenological traditions. In the 20th century, the foundations for trait psychology were laid by three investigators whose work is of particular significance: Gordon Allport, Raymond Cattell, and Hans Eysenck. Their contributions are reviewed in the present chapter. In the contemporary 21st‐century field, much investigation centers around a theoretical perspective that endeavors to capitalize on the best aspects of the contributions of Allport, Cattell, and Eysenck. This approach, the five‐factor model of personality, is reviewed in Chapter 8. Rather than providing biographical information for all these individuals right now, we include such information when introducing their respective contributions in the following sections. Although the various trait theorists have made distinct contributions, their work features many common themes. There is a coherent “trait perspective” on personality. As you’ll now see, it is a perspective that will seem immediately familiar. The trait theorist’s main scientific constructs are quite similar to the words and ideas you use to discuss people in your everyday life. Trait Theory’s View of the Person People love to talk about personality. We can spend hours discussing people’s characteristics: Our boss is grumpy; our roommate, sloppy; our professor, quick witted. (Well, we hope your professor is quick witted rather than sloppy and grumpy.) We even discuss the loyalty of our dog and the laziness of our cat. When talking about people, we commonly use personality trait terms—words that describe people’s typical styles of experience and action. Apparently, people think that traits are central to personality. Likewise, personality researchers associated with the trait approach consider traits to be the major units of personality. Obviously, there is more to personality than traits, but traits have loomed large throughout the history of personality psychology.
The Trait Concept What, then, is a trait? Personality traits refer to consistent patterns in the way individuals behave, feel, and think. If we describe an individual with the trait term kind, we mean that this individual tends to act kindly over time (weeks, months, maybe years) and across situations (with friends, family, strangers, etc.). In addition, if we use the word kind, we usually mean that the person is at least as kind as the average person. If one believed that the person was less kind than average, he or she would not be described as “kind.” Trait terms, then, have two connotations: consistency and distinctiveness. By consistency, we mean that the trait describes a regularity in the person’s behavior. The person seems predisposed to act in the way described by the trait term; indeed, traits often are referred to as “dispositions” or “dispositional constructs” (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 1999, 2008) to capture the idea that the person appears predisposed to act in a certain way. The idea of disposition highlights an important fact about trait terms as used by trait theorists of personality. If a trait theorist uses a trait term—for example, sociable—to describe someone, she does not mean that the person always will act sociably, across all settings of life. As the Dutch trait psychologist De Raad (2005) has emphasized, trait terms implicitly refer to behaviors in a type of social context. The trait theorist would expect the sociable person to be consistently sociable across settings that involve other people and in which sociable behavior is allowed by prevailing social norms. There is no expectation that the person would be sociable toward inanimate objects or act sociably when instructed by an authority figure to act otherwise. By the other connotation, distinctiveness, we mean simply that the trait theorist is concerned primarily with psychological characteristics in which people differ—features that therefore make one person distinct compared to others. Trait theorists of personality are interested in traits for which there are significant differences among people. The decision to build a personality theory on trait constructs implies a certain view of the person. It implies that there is substantial consistency to individuals’ lives. Contemporary social life presents many changes: People change schools and jobs, meet new friends, marry, unmarry, remarry, and move to different communities if not different countries. At any one point in time, life may present multiple roles: student, employee, son or daughter, parent, community member. The trait theorist’s fundamental message is that, despite all these variations, there is a consistent personality “in there.” People possess psychological qualities that endure, almost regardless of time and place.
Trait Theory’s View of the Science of Personality The discussion that opened this chapter is revealing of the view of personality science implicit in most trait approaches. As you learned, a paramount interest of trait theorists is measurement. The ability to measure psychological traits reliably and validly is the utterly critical first step in building a science of personality in the trait‐theoretical view. This viewpoint displays a kind of conservatism that is valuable in the sciences. Both Freud and Rogers allowed themselves to create theories that went far beyond their available data; there were no direct, or indirect, measures of the strength of libidinal drives, of self‐actualization motives, and so forth. Trait theorists of the mid‐20th century rejected this sort of theorizing as too speculative. They felt that scientific measurement should constrain, and determine, theorizing. One should posit a personality structure if, and only if, the statistical analysis of carefully constructed measures suggests the existence of that structure. Trait theories of personality are built on careful measurement. Researchers develop standardized personality tests and administer them to large numbers of individuals under identical testing conditions. Scientific Functions Served by Trait Constructs A main question to ask about the trait theory’s view of science is, “Why posit trait constructs?” In other words, “What is it that trait constructs do in a science of personality?” Trait theorists use trait constructs to serve at least two, and sometimes three, scientific functions: description, prediction, and explanation. Description All personality trait theorists use trait constructs descriptively. Traits summarize a person’s typical behavior and thus describe what a person typically is like. Since description is a critical first step in any scientific endeavor, trait theories could be seen as providing basic descriptive facts that need to be explained by any theory of personality. Most trait theorists do not seek just to describe individual people, one at a time; rather, they try to establish an overall descriptive scheme within which any and all persons can be described. They try, in other words, to establish a personality taxonomy. In any science, a taxonomy is a scientist’s way of classifying the things being studied. Since trait constructs refer to consistent styles of experience and behavior, a trait taxonomy is a way of classifying people according to their characteristic, average types of experience, and action.
Prediction One question for a trait theorist is whether these classifications, within a taxonomy of personality traits, are of practical value. What can one do with knowledge of people’s personality trait scores? Throughout the history of the trait theories, a primary answer to this question has been as follows: You can predict things. People with different levels of a given personality trait may differ predictably in their everyday behavior. For example, if one knows college students’ self‐ratings on traits such as extraversion and conscientiousness, one can predict aspects of their personal environments, such as the decorations in, and degree of neatness of, their personal office spaces and dorm rooms (Gosling, Ko, Mannarelli, & Morris, 2002). Often, one can make predictions that have important practical value. Suppose you are running a business and want to hire employees who will be reliable, honest workers. You are faced with a job of prediction: How can you predict which applicants will be good employees? One way of making this prediction is by giving people tests that measure their characteristic personality traits; trait psychologists have been deeply involved in the practical task of predicting on‐the‐job performance (Roberts & Hogan, 2001). More controversially, in a recent US election, measures of personality traits obtained through social media sources were used to predict citizens’ voting and responses to campaign materials, in support of the campaign of Donald J. Trump (Gonzales, 2017).
Explanation In addition to description and prediction, a third scientific task is explanation. If personality psychology aspires to be a science, then it must tackle the most important challenge for a scientific theory, namely, explanation. Note that prediction and explanation are very different things (Toulmin, 1961). For example, in ancient times, Babylonians could describe and predict astronomical events such as lunar eclipses, but they appeared to have no scientific understanding whatsoever of why these events occurred as they did. In an opposite case, Darwin explained how organisms evolved through natural selection, but he did not literally predict the past evolutionary events (Toulmin, 1961). Some trait theorists suggest that trait constructs can be used to explain a person’s behavior. One might say that a student shows up on time for class and takes good lecture notes because the person is high on the trait of conscientiousness. However, not all trait psychologists use trait terms to accomplish this third scientific function: explanation. Some confine themselves to description and prediction. They view a trait taxonomy as being akin to a map. A map of the continents and oceans on Earth does not explain why the continents and oceans have their particular location; for that explanation, one needs additional scientific work (e.g., a theory of plate tectonics). Yet, the map is still a crucial step in scientific progress. As you will see in this chapter and again in Chapter 9, some psychologists try to move from description to explanation by identifying biological factors underlying a given trait. People who obtain high versus low scores on a personality trait test might differ systematically in a neural or biochemical system, which could be interpreted as the causal basis of the trait and trait‐related behavior. This possibility, which many trait theorists pursue, raises another aspect of trait theory’s view of the person. It is strongly biological. Most trait theorists believe that inherited biological factors are a primary determinant of individual differences in traits. We discuss this possibility, and the related scientific evidence, both in the present chapter and in Chapter 9. In sum, trait theorists differ in their claims about the explanatory status of trait constructs. This raises an important point for you to keep in mind. There is no one trait theory. The trait theories are a family of interrelated, but not identical, perspectives. In the next section, we review features that most, if not all, trait theories share.
Trait Theories of Personality: Basic Perspectives Shared by Trait Theorists A set of shared assumptions jointly define the trait approach. The most basic assumption is that people possess broad predispositions, called traits, to respond in particular ways. In other words, it is assumed that personality can be characterized in terms of an individual’s consistent likelihood of behaving, feeling, or thinking in a particular way (e.g., the likelihood of acting in an outgoing and friendly manner, or of feeling nervous and worried, or of being reliable and conscientious). People who have a strong tendency to behave in these ways are described as being high on these traits, whereas people with a lesser tendency to behave in these ways are described as low on the traits. The person who frequently is outgoing would be called high on extraversion, whereas the unreliable, forgetful individual might be low on conscientiousness. All trait theorists agree that these generalized tendencies to act in one versus another manner are the fundamental building blocks of personality. A related assumption is that there is a direct correspondence between the person’s performance of trait‐related actions and his or her possession of the corresponding trait. People who act (or report that they act) in a more extraverted or conscientious manner than others are thought, by the trait theorist, to possess more of (to be higher on) the corresponding traits of extraversion and conscientiousness. This point may seem so obvious that it isn’t even worth stating. You may be thinking, “Of course people who display more of the trait‐related behavior have more of the trait.” But note how this thinking contrasts with an earlier theory we covered, namely, psychoanalysis. To the psychoanalyst, someone who reports being more “calm and at ease” than other people may not, in reality, possess more of the psychological characteristic of calmness. Instead, such persons may be so anxious that they are repressing their anxieties and merely saying that they are calm. Psychoanalysis, as well as other personality theories we will cover later in this text, recognizes that there may be highly indirect relations between overt behavior and underlying personality characteristics. In contrast, the research procedures of trait theory assume that overt behavior and underlying traits are linked in a more direct, one‐to‐one manner. If someone reports a low amount of trait‐related behavior on a test of personality traits, then he or she is said to possess low amounts of the given trait. Another shared assumption is that human behavior and personality can be organized into a hierarchy. A famous hierarchical analysis was provided by Eysenck (Figure 7.1), whose contributions are reviewed in more detail elsewhere in this chapter. Eysenck suggested that, at its simplest level, behavior can be considered in terms of specific responses. However, some of these responses are linked together and form more general habits. Groups of habits that tend to occur together form traits. For example, people who prefer meeting people to reading also generally enjoy themselves at a lively party; this bit of information suggests that these two habits can be grouped together under the trait of sociability. Finally, at the highest level of organization, various traits may be linked together to form what Eysenck called secondary, higher‐order factors or superfactors (which also are traits, but at the highest, most abstract level of generalization). In sum, trait theories suggest that people display broad predispositions to respond in certain ways, that these dispositions are organized in a hierarchical manner, and that the trait concept can be a foundation for a scientific theory of personality. FIGURE 7.1 Diagrammatic representation of hierarchical organization of personality: extraversion–introversion (E). (Note: extraversion is one end of the E‐I dimension. The other end, I, is not represented here.) Adapted from Eysenck (1970, 1990).
The Trait Theory of Gordon W. Allport (1897–1967) A figure of great historical importance to the development of trait theory, and personality psychology in general, was the Harvard University psychologist Gordon W. Allport. History remembers Allport as much for the issues he raised and the principles he emphasized than for a particular theory he created. Throughout his long and influential career, Allport highlighted the healthy and organized aspects of human behavior. This emphasis contrasted with other views of the time that emphasized the animalistic, neurotic, tension‐reducing, and mechanistic aspects of behavior. Allport criticized psychoanalysis in this regard; he was particularly fond of telling the following story. While traveling through Europe at age 22, Allport decided it would be interesting to visit Freud. When he entered Freud’s office, he was met with expectant silence as Freud waited to learn of Allport’s mission. Finding himself unprepared for silence, Allport decided to start an informal conversation with the description of a four‐year‐old boy with a dirt phobia, whom he had met on the train. After he completed his description of the boy and his compulsive mother, Freud asked, “And was that little boy you?” Allport describes his response as follows: Gordon W. Allport. Flabbergasted and feeling a bit guilty, I contrived to change the subject. While Freud’s misunderstanding of my motivation was amusing, it also started a deep train of thought. I realized that he was accustomed to neurotic defenses and that my manifest motivation (a sort of rude curiosity and youthful ambition) escaped him. For therapeutic progress, he would have to cut through my defenses, but it so happened that therapeutic progress was not here an issue. This experience taught me that depth psychology, for all its merits, may plunge too deep and that psychologists would do well to give full recognition to manifest motives before probing the unconscious. Source: Allport (1967, p. 8).
A particularly amusing aspect of this episode is that Allport personally was very meticulous, punctual, neat, and orderly—possessing many of the characteristics Freud associated with the compulsive personality. Freud’s question may not have been as far off as Allport suggested! Allport’s first publication, written with his older brother Floyd, centered on traits as an important aspect of personality theory (Allport & Allport, 1921). Allport believed that traits are the basic units of personality. According to him, traits actually exist and are based in the nervous system. They represent generalized personality dispositions that account for regularities in the functioning of a person across situations and over time. Traits can be defined by three properties—frequency, intensity, and range of situations. For example, a very submissive person would frequently be very submissive over a wide range of situations. Traits: Personality Structure in Allport’s Theory In a now classic analysis of personality descriptors, Allport and Odbert (1936) differentiated personality traits from other units of analysis in personality research. They defined traits as “generalized and personalized determining tendencies—consistent and stable modes of an individual’s adjustment to his environment” (1936, p. 26). Traits are different from psychological states or behavioral activities that are temporary and induced by external circumstances. Chaplin, John, and Goldberg (1988) replicated Allport and Odbert’s classifications of personality descriptors into three categories: traits, states, and activities. For example, whereas a person may well be gentle throughout his or her lifetime, an infatuation (an internal state) typically does not last and even the most enjoyable carousing (activity) must come to an end. Having distinguished traits from states and activities, the next question is whether there might exist different kinds of traits. Allport addressed this question by distinguishing among cardinal traits, central traits, and secondary dispositions. A cardinal trait expresses a disposition that is so pervasive and outstanding in a person’s life that virtually every act is traceable to its influence. For example, we speak of the Machiavellian person, named after Niccolò Machiavelli’s portrayal of the successful Renaissance ruler; of the sadistic person, named after the Marquis de Sade; and of the authoritarian personality who sees virtually everything in black‐and‐white, stereotyped ways. Generally, people have few, if any, such cardinal traits. Central traits (e.g., honesty, kindness, assertiveness) express dispositions that cover a more limited range of situations than is true for cardinal traits. Secondary dispositions are traits that are the least conspicuous, generalized, and consistent. In other words, people possess traits with varying degrees of significance and generality. Allport did not claim that a trait is expressed in all situations, regardless of a situation’s characteristics. He recognized that “traits are often aroused in one situation and not in another” (Allport, 1937, p. 331). For example, even the most aggressive people can be expected to modify their behavior if the situation calls for nonaggressive behavior, and even the most introverted person may behave in an extraverted fashion in certain situations. A trait expresses what a person generally does over many situations, not what will be done in any one situation. According to Allport, both trait and situation concepts are necessary to understand behavior. The trait concept is necessary to explain the consistency of behavior, whereas recognizing the importance of the situation is necessary to explain the variability of behavior. Functional Autonomy Allport analyzed not only stable traits but also motivational processes. He emphasized the functional autonomy of human motives. This means that although the motives of an adult may have their roots in the tension‐reducing motives of the child, as Freud suggested, the adult grows out of the early motives. In adult life, motives become independent of, or autonomous from, earlier tension‐reducing drives. What originally began as an effort to reduce hunger or anxiety can become a source of pleasure and motivation in its own right. What began as an activity designed to earn a living can become pleasurable and an end in itself. Although hard work and the pursuit of excellence can be motivated originally by a desire for approval from parents and other adults, they can become valued ends in themselves—pursued independently of whether they are emphasized by others. Thus, “what was once extrinsic and instrumental becomes intrinsic and impelling. The activity once served a drive or some simple need; it now serves itself or, in a larger sense, serves the self‐image (self‐ideal) of the person. Childhood is no longer in the saddle; maturity is” (Allport, 1961, p. 229). This of course sets Allport’s work apart from Freud’s, since Freud explained adult behaviors in terms of early childhood drives whose basic motivational force endured throughout adulthood. Idiographic Research A final distinguishing feature of Allport’s contributions is his emphasis on the uniqueness of the individual. Unlike the other trait theorists we will discuss, Allport primarily endorsed an idiographic approach to research. An idiographic strategy, as we explained in Chapter 2, focuses on the potentially unique individual. In‐depth studies of individual persons are viewed as a path for learning about people generally. This approach contrasts with that of other trait theorists, who generally adopt nomothetic procedures in which large numbers of individuals are described in terms of a common, universal set of personality traits. One illustration of Allport’s idiographic procedures was analysis of his use of materials unique to the individual case. For example, Allport published 172 letters from a particular woman. The letters were the basis of a clinical characterization of her personality, as well as for quantitative analysis. This sort of idiographic research highlights the pattern and organization of multiple traits within a person rather than a person’s standing, relative to others, on isolated trait variables. Comment on Allport In personality psychology, Allport generally is revered. A biography (Nicholson, 2002) highlights his contributions not only to trait psychology but also to personality psychology’s emergence as a unique scientific discipline. Nonetheless, Allport’s empirical contributions were limited. He clarified the trait concept but did little research to establish its utility. He believed that many traits were hereditary but conducted no research on their genetic basis. He documented that people display distinctive patterns of trait‐related behavior and that traits interact with situational influences, but provided no detailed processing that could explain these observations (Zuroff, 1986). Furthermore, Allport’s idiographic emphasis partly backfired. Some felt it was antiscientific, thinking that the study of individual idiosyncrasies conflicted with science’s search for general laws. In retrospect, this was a poor reading of Allport’s idiographic efforts. To build an adequate science of human beings, it may be necessary to study individual persons in detail. Idiographic strategies may advance, rather than impair, a general understanding of persons. Allport, like Freud, recognized that detailed case studies may yield insight into general principles that are found across individual cases. Scientists in other human sciences recognize this in a similar fashion; for example, a famed anthropologist who studies, in detail, the meaning systems of particular cultures concludes that, as a general principle of scientific understanding, “the road to the general, to the revelatory simplicities of science, lies through a concern with the particular, the circumstantial, the concrete” (Geertz, 1973, p. 53). This idiographic approach, however, is not the one pursued by most trait theorists other than Allport. Subsequent trait theorists put little stock in idiographic studies. Instead, contrary to Allport’s suggestions, they studied populations of individuals and tried to identify the most important individual differences in the population at large. Before presenting these theories, we will explain (1) the primary scientific problem faced by the trait theorists discussed in the remainder of this chapter, as well as Chapter 8 and (2) the statistical tool they used to solve it, namely, the statistical technique of factor analysis. We then turn to the trait theories of Raymond B. Cattell and Hans J. Eysenck. Identifying Primary Trait Dimensions: Factor Analysis With the exception of Allport, trait psychologists generally have tried to identify a universal set of traits, that is, a set of traits that everyone possesses to a greater or lesser degree. Physically, everyone is more or less tall, heavy or thin, young or old, and so forth; height, weight, and age are universal dimensions that can be used to describe any and all persons. Psychologically, might there be a set of universal trait dimensions that can be used to describe the personality characteristics of any and all persons? If so, how can we identify those traits? Identifying a set of basic, universal traits is a scientific challenge that is fundamental to the history of trait theories of personality. This challenge is made difficult by the fact that there seem to be so many traits. Some people are absentminded. Some people are agreeable. Some are aggressive. Some altruistic. Some antagonistic. Some argumentative. There are so many traits—and we’re still in the A’s! How can one possibly identify a simple yet comprehensive set of basic traits? The key insight required to solve this problem is noticing that some traits go together, that is, that they tend to co‐occur. When talking about physical characteristics, no one is bewildered by the large number of physical features: long left arms, long right arms, long left legs, long right legs, long fingers, and so on. We recognize that these qualities co‐occur and summarize their co‐occurrence with a simple dimension: height (or size). Height, then, is a more basic physical trait than “length of left leg”; the lengths of individual body parts are just manifestations of the person’s overall height. Psychological traits also co‐occur. Consider our list of traits two paragraphs back. More often than not, if one finds someone who is extremely argumentative and extremely aggressive, it is unlikely that he or she will be extremely altruistic and extremely agreeable. Intuition tells us that certain traits co‐occur, which suggests that some traits may be manifestations of other more basic traits. The question, then, is, How can one identify the basic traits? Clearly, one can’t just rely on intuition. What is needed is a precise tool for identifying a basic structure of personality traits. The tool that trait theorists have relied on is a statistical technique. The technique is called factor analysis. Factor analysis is a statistical tool for summarizing the ways in which a large number of variables go together, or co‐occur. As you learned in Chapter 2, a correlation is a number that summarizes the degree to which two variables go together. If there were only two variables in which trait theorists were interested, then the technique of correlation would be sufficient for their purposes. However, the trait theorist is interested in a lot of variables. There seem to be hundreds of possible traits to measure. Once one measures them, there are hundreds and hundreds of correlations between one variable and another. Factor analysis is a statistical method for identifying patterns in this mass of correlations. Ideally, a factor analysis (i.e., a particular application of the general technique of factor analysis) will identify a small number of factors that summarize the intercorrelations among the large number of variables. In a typical factor‐analytic study, a large number of test items are administered to many subjects. Inevitably, some of these items are positively correlated with one another. People who answer a question (e.g., “Do you often go to loud and noisy parties?”) in one way answer other questions (e.g., “Do you enjoy spending time with large groups of people?”) in a similar manner. Some items are negatively correlated (e.g., responses to “Do you prefer to stay home at night rather than going out?” might be negatively correlated with answers to the two previous questions in this paragraph). In principle, large clusters of items might be correlated in this manner. These clusters might reflect the influence of an underlying factor, that is, something that is responsible for the correlations among the items (in the way that height is responsible for the correlations among long leg, long arm, and so on, in our previous example). Factor analysis identifies these patterns, or clusters, or correlations. The technique of factor analysis, then, simplifies the information contained in a large table of correlations by identifying a small set of factors, where each factor represents one cluster of correlations. The factors technically are merely mathematical. Factor analysis is a technique of mathematical statistics, not psychology. However, using their knowledge of personality, psychologists generally attach psychological labels to the factors. The labels are meant to identify the primary psychological content in the test items that correlate with one another. In our example (the one with noisy parties, large groups of people, etc.), factor analysis would identify a mathematical factor that represents the correlations among the items, and the psychologist would give that factor a name such as “sociability.” Factor analysis is of the greatest importance to trait theories. It is the tool they use to identify the structures of personality. To most trait theorists, the factors that are identified in factor‐analytic studies are the structures of personality. If a factor analysis identifies six mathematical factors that summarize correlations among personality test items, then the trait psychologist will usually refer to the resulting six‐dimensional mathematical structure as the “structure of personality.” The use of factor analysis to identify personality structures has some significant advantages as compared to the procedures used by previous theorists. Previously (e.g., in the work of Freud, Jung, or Rogers), theorists relied heavily on their intuition. They observed clinical cases and intuited that certain personality structures were responsible for their clients’ behavior. But human intuition can be faulty (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Rather than relying on intuition to identify personality structures, the trait theorist relies on an objective statistical procedure: factor analysis. Note that the statistical procedure identifies patterns of covariation in test responses. It does not answer the question of why the responses covary. It is the researcher, using his or her knowledge of psychology and relying on his or her theoretical beliefs, who infers the existence of some common entity (the factor) and interprets it. Different psychologists may make different interpretations. For example, in the contemporary field, some researchers conclude that the core of extraversion is reward sensitivity, that is, that extraverts are highly motivated to attain positive, goal‐related rewards (Lucas, Diener, Grob, Suh, & Shao, 2000). Others, using similar correlational and factor‐analytic methods, disagree, concluding instead that the core of extraversion is social attention; extraverts appear to enjoy being the object of attention (Ashton, Lee, & Paunonen, 2002). Also, the exact nature of, and number of, factors one obtains hinges partly on subjective decisions about how exactly to conduct the analysis. Factor analysis is a complex set of techniques, not a simple arithmetic algorithm, and the researcher must choose exactly how to proceed. This is why, as you will now see, different investigators who each rely on factor‐analytic methods end up with somewhat different factors, and different numbers of factors, in their theories of personality. The Factor‐Analytic Trait Theory of Raymond B. Cattell (1905–1998) Raymond B. Cattell was born in 1905 in Devonshire, England. He obtained a B.Sc. degree in chemistry from the University of London in 1924. Cattell then turned to psychology, obtaining a Ph.D. degree at the same university in 1929. Cattell did personality research and acquired clinical experience in Britain, then moved to the United States in 1937. He spent much of his career as professor and director of the Laboratory of Personality Assessment at the University of Illinois. During his professional career, he was enormously prolific, publishing more than 200 articles and 15 books. Cattell stands as one of the most influential psychological scientists of the 20th century (Haggbloom et al., 2002).
Early in his career, Cattell gained knowledge of the newly developed (in his time) technique of factor analysis. He quickly exploited its potential. Specifically, with his background in chemistry Cattell recognized the importance to scientific advance of having a taxonomy of “basic elements,” such as the periodic table of elements that is foundational to work in the physical sciences. Cattell judged that factor analysis could yield a set of basic psychological elements that would be foundational to personality psychology. Surface and Source Traits: Personality Structure in Cattell’s Theory Cattell provided two conceptual distinctions that are both valuable for distinguishing among the multiplicity of personality traits. One distinction differentiates surface traits from source traits. Surface and source traits represent different levels of analysis; in this regard, Cattell relied on the idea that there are hierarchical relations among trait concepts. Surface traits represent behavioral tendencies that are literally superficial: They exist “on the surface” and can be observed. By examining patterns of intercorrelations among a large number of personality trait terms, Cattell was able to identify roughly 40 groups of trait terms that were highly intercorrelated. Each grouping, to Cattell, represented a surface trait. The psychologist, of course, does not want merely to describe behavior “on the surface.” The psychologist wants to identify psychological structures that underlie observable behavior tendencies. To this end, Cattell sought to identify source traits, that is, internal psychological structures that were the source, or underlying cause, of observed intercorrelations among surface traits. Raymond B. Cattell. To understand this co‐occurrence of traits, Cattell relied on the technique of factor analysis. He developed systematic measures of each of the surface traits, administered these measures of surface traits to large numbers of people, and used factor analysis to identify patterns in the intercorrelations among the surface traits. The factors (i.e., the mathematical dimensions identified via factor analysis) that summarized the correlations among surface traits are, in Cattell’s system, the source traits. These source traits that are revealed through factor analysis are the core personality structures in Cattell’s theory of personality. And what exactly are these source traits? Cattell identified 16 source traits. He grouped the 16 source traits into three categories: ability traits, temperament traits, and dynamic traits. Ability traits refer to skills and abilities that allow the individual to function effectively. Intelligence is an example of an ability trait. Temperament traits involve the emotional life and the stylistic quality of behavior. The tendency to work quickly versus slowly, to be calm versus emotional, or to act impulsively or only after deliberation are all qualities of temperament. Finally, dynamic traits concern the striving, motivational life of the individual. Individuals who are more or less motivated differ in dynamic traits. Ability, temperament, and dynamic traits are seen as capturing the major stable elements of personality. Sources of Evidence: L‐Data, Q‐Data, and OT‐Data How did Cattell identify these traits? What exactly was his scientific database? A great virtue of Cattell’s work is that there was no one database. Cattell relied on three different types—or three different sources—of data about personality. His distinctions among three different types of data are enduringly valuable to personality science. Cattell’s distinctions, presented here, should seem familiar; they are a basis of the LOTS classification of data sources we presented in Chapter 2. Cattell distinguished among (1) life record data (L‐data), (2) self‐report questionnaire data (Q‐data), and (3) objective‐test data (OT‐data). The first, L‐data, relates to behavior in actual, everyday situations such as school performance or interactions with peers. These may be actual counts of behaviors or ratings made on the basis of such observations. The second, Q‐data, involves self‐report data or responses to questionnaires, such as the Eysenck personality inventory discussed later in this chapter. The third, OT‐data, involves behavioral miniature situations in which the subject is unaware of the relationship between the response and the personality characteristic being measured. Cattell himself developed a large number of these mini‐situations; for example, a tendency to be assertive could be expressed in behaviors such as long exploratory distance on a finger maze test, fast tempo in arm–shoulder movement, and fast speed of letter comparisons. Ideally, the same factors or traits should be obtained from the three kinds of data. Originally, Cattell began with the factor analyses of L‐data and found 15 factors that appeared to account for most of an individual’s personality. He then set out to determine whether comparable factors could be found in Q‐data. Thousands of questionnaire items were written and administered to large numbers of people. Factor analyses were run to see which items went together. The main result of this research is a questionnaire known as the Sixteen Personality Factor (16 P.F.) Questionnaire. Initially, Cattell made up neologisms, such as “surgency,” to name his personality trait factors, hoping to avoid misinterpretations of them. Nonetheless, the terms given in Table 7.1 roughly capture the meanings of these trait factors. As can be seen, they cover a wide variety of aspects of personality, particularly in terms of temperament (e.g., emotionality) and attitudes (e.g., conservative). In general, the factors found with Q‐data appeared to be similar to those found with L‐data, but some were unique to each kind of data. Illustrative L‐data ratings and Q‐data items for one trait are presented in Figure 7.1. TABLE 7.1 Cattell’s 16 Personality Factors Derived from Questionnaire Data Reserved Outgoing Less intelligent More intelligent Stable, ego strength Emotionality/neuroticism Humble Assertive Sober Happy‐go‐lucky Expedient Conscientious Shy Venturesome Tough minded Tender minded Trusting Suspicious Practical Imaginative Forthright Shrewd Placid Apprehensive Conservative Experimenting Group dependent Self‐sufficient Undisciplined Controlled Relaxed Tense Cattell was committed to the use of questionnaires, in particular, those derived from a factor‐analytic perspective, such as the 16 P.F. Questionnaire. At the same time, he expressed concern about the problems of motivated distortion and self‐deception in relation to questionnaire responses. He also felt that the questionnaire is of particularly questionable utility with mental patients. Because of problems with L‐data and Q‐data, and because the original research strategy itself called for investigations with OT‐data, Cattell’s later efforts were concerned more with personality structure as derived from OT‐data. It is the source traits as expressed in objective tests that are the “real coin” for personality research. The results from L‐data and Q‐data research were important in guiding the development of miniature test situations; that is, the purpose was to develop objective tests that would measure the source traits already discovered. Thus, more than 500 tests were constructed to cover the hypothesized personality dimensions. These tests were administered to large groups of subjects, and repeated factoring of data from different research situations eventually led to the designation of 21 OT‐data source traits. As mentioned, the source traits or factors found in L‐data and Q‐data could, for the most part, be matched to one another. How, then, do the OT‐data factors match those derived from L‐data and Q‐data? Despite the years of research effort, the results were disappointing: Although some relations were found across all three data sources, no direct one‐to‐one mapping of factors was possible. In summary, we have described four steps in Cattell’s research. (1) He set out to define the structure of personality in three areas of observation, called L‐data, Q‐data, and OT‐data. (2) He started his research with L‐data and through the factor analysis of ratings came up with 15 source traits. (3) Based on research findings, he developed the 16 P.F. Questionnaire, which contains 12 traits that match traits found in the L‐data research and four traits that appear to be unique to questionnaire methods. (4) Using these results to guide his research in the development of objective tests, Cattell found 21 source traits in OT‐data that appear to have a complex and low‐level relation to the traits found in the other data. The source traits found in the three types of observations do not complete Cattell’s formulation of the structure of personality. However, the traits presented in this section do describe the general nature of the structure of personality as formulated by Cattell. In other words, here we have the foundation for psychology’s table of the elements—its classification scheme. But what is the evidence for the existence of these traits? Cattell (1979) cited the following: (1) the results of factor analyses of different kinds of data, (2) similar results across cultures, (3) similar results across age groups, (4) utility in the prediction of behavior in the natural environment, and (5) evidence of significant genetic contributions to many traits. Stability and Variability in Behavior Cattell did not view persons as static entities who behaved the same way in all situations. Social action depends not only on traits but other factors as well. Cattell highlighted two other determinants: states and roles. State refers to emotion and mood at a particular, delimited point in time. One’s psychological state is partly determined by one’s immediate situation. Illustrative states are anxiety, depression, fatigue, arousal, and curiosity. To Cattell, the exact description of an individual at a given moment requires measurement of both traits and states: “Every practicing psychologist—indeed every intelligent observer of human nature and human history—realizes that the state of a person at a given moment determines his or her behavior as much as do his or her traits” (1979, p. 169). Regarding the concept of role, Cattell noted that certain behaviors are more closely linked to social roles one must play than to personality traits one possesses. Social roles, not personality traits, explain why people shout at football games and not in churches (Cattell, 1979). Two people may act differently toward one another in different settings in which they play different roles. For example, a teacher may respond differently to a child’s behavior in the classroom than when outside the classroom and no longer in the role of teacher. In sum, although Cattell believed that traits foster stability in behavior across situations, he also recognized that a person’s mood (state) and style of self‐presentation in a given situation (role) contribute to behavior: “How vigorously Smith attacks his meal depends not only on how hungry he happens to be but also on his temperament and whether he is having dinner with his employer or is eating alone at home” (Nesselroade & Delhees, 1966, p. 583). Comment on Cattell One cannot help but be impressed with the scope of Cattell’s efforts. His theorizing addressed all major aspects of personality theory, and his systematic research efforts laid a foundation for generations of trait‐based researchers. One observer concluded that “Cattell’s theory turns out to be a much more impressive achievement than has been generally recognized… . Cattell’s original blueprint for personality study has resulted in an extraordinarily rich theoretical structure” (Wiggins, 1984, pp. 177, 190). His primary personality assessment device, the 16 P.F. Questionnaire, continues to be used widely in applied settings that require the assessment of individual differences. Despite this, if Cattell were here today, he would be disappointed with the relative lack of impact his work exerts in contemporary personality science. This lack of impact may result, in part, from issues that are practical as much as they are scientific. Cattell provided a theoretical system with a lot of personality factors: 16. In practice, it is difficult for the basic or the applied psychologist to keep in mind this large number of factors when assessing the personality of individuals. Cattell would argue that this range of factors is necessary. Yet, in comparison to other theories, the approach is not parsimonious. As you will see in the remainder of this chapter and the next, other theorists tried to establish a simpler structure of personality traits. Deeper problems may lie behind this practical concern. Cattell was fundamentally interested in the problem of measurement. In most respects, that is a very good thing; inadequate measurement impairs a scientific program. However, in Cattell’s work, the measurement process was not used solely for the purpose of measurement. It was used for a second purpose: theorizing. In other words, the basic structure of Cattell’s theory (the number of, and content of, the source traits) was determined entirely by the results of the measurement process (factor analyses of measures of the surface traits). Basing theory on measurement is a risky strategy. The risk is that there may exist important qualities that one should be studying in a comprehensive theory but that are not detected by one’s measurement system. If this happens, the theory lacks coverage of the important topic. As one example, consider the fact that most people have a “life story” (McAdams, 2006). If you ask someone to tell you about themselves, they are likely to provide a narrative or autobiographical story about themselves. It is not at all clear that the numerical measurement of the sort employed by Cattell can capture the content of such stories. If, in a literature class, you are asked to analyze the meaning of a story, we would not suggest that you do so by employing the statistical technique of factor analysis! To the extent that individuals possess psychological attributes, such as a life story, that are not reducible to a set of numbers, these attributes are overlooked by Cattell’s measurement system and, thus, his theory. If Carl Rogers were here today, he surely would think that this was an enormous limitation for a personality theory. The Three‐factor Theory of Hans J. Eysenck (1916–1997) In our concluding comments on Cattell, we noted that his 16‐factor theory had a practical drawback: It is cumbersome in practical applications to track such a large number of factors: 16. There may be a parallel scientific drawback. Sixteen factors may be too many on sheer scientific grounds. It might be that, hidden behind the 16 factors, there is a simpler and even more basic structure of personality traits. If one could identify this simpler trait structure, it might serve as the basis of a scientific model that is parsimonious and also of applications that are simple and practical. This possibility was pursued with unique creativity and energy by one of the giants of 20th‐century psychology, Hans Eysenck. Hans J. Eysenck was born in Germany in 1916 and later fled to England to escape Nazi persecution. Like Cattell, his work was influenced by advances in statistical techniques, especially factor analysis. He also was influenced intellectually by the work of European psychologists who studied personality types (especially Jung and Kretschmer), by research on the heredity of psychological characteristics, and by the experimental work on classical conditioning conducted by the Russian physiologist Pavlov (see Chapter 10). Eysenck led a life characterized by enormous energy and productivity. His work included a broad sampling of both normal and pathological populations. He was an exceptionally prolific writer. In the scientific literature, he is one of the most influential and cited research psychologists of the 20th century (Haggbloom et al., 2002). In the 1980s, he founded and edited the journal Personality and Individual Differences, an international journal devoted primarily to research on personality traits, temperament, and the biological foundations of personality—all issues Eysenck cared about deeply. Eysenck died in 1997, after seeing through the republication of three of his early books and shortly after finishing his last book, Intelligence: A New Look (Eysenck, 1998). Eysenck’s role in the field was both constructive and critical. In addition to constructing a trait theory, he criticized other theories that he found flawed, particularly psychoanalysis. Eysenck, like Cattell, believed that the psychoanalysts’ failure to provide precise, reliable measures of their psychological constructs was a serious shortcoming. In constructing a trait theory, Eysenck sought to avoid this problem through the use of reliable measures of individual differences. He felt that such measures also were necessary to identify the presumed biological foundations of each trait. Hans J. Eysenck. Eysenck’s emphasis on biological foundations of personality traits is particularly noteworthy. He recognized that, without understanding the biology of traits, trait explanations could be circular—explanations that go around in a conceptual circle, with a trait concept being used to explain the very behavior that served as the basis for inferring the existence of the trait in the first place. For example, think of a friend of yours who frequently talks in a friendly and outgoing manner to other people. How would you describe her behavior? You might say that she is “sociable.” Now, consider another question: How would you explain her behavior? You might say that she is acting sociable because she has the trait of sociability. But if you said this, you wouldn’t be providing a very good explanation; indeed, your explanation would violate basic principles of scientific explanation. The problem is that the only reason you know that your friend has the trait of sociability is because you saw her act in a sociable manner. Your explanation thus goes around in logical circles: It uses a word (sociable) to describe a pattern of behavior and then uses that same word to explain the existence of the pattern of behavior that was described. Eysenck recognized that trait theory can break out of such conceptual circles by going beyond the mere use of words and identifying biological systems that correspond to trait. We consider his degree of success in identifying such systems in the following pages. “Superfactors”: Personality Structure in Eysenck’s Theory To construct a personality theory, Eysenck conducted factor analyses of participants’ responses, as did Cattell. But Eysenck also took another step, specifically a secondary application of the factor‐analytic method. He conducted secondary factor analyses. A secondary factor analysis is a statistical analysis of an initial set of factors that are correlated with one another. In other words, when analyzing a broad spectrum of personality traits, an initial factor analysis might indicate the existence of a moderately large number of factors. In Cattell’s case, in analyses of self‐report data, this number was 16. However, these factors are not statistically independent. When one obtains this number of factors, different factors are commonly correlated; people who obtain low (high) scores on one factor tend to obtain low (high) scores on another. (A glance back at Table 7.1 would suggest, on intuitive grounds, that this is true for some of Cattell’s factors, such as “reserved” and “shy.”) Since the factors are correlated, and factor analysis is a tool for identifying patterns in a set of correlations, the intercorrelations among the factors could be factor analyzed. This is what is called a secondary factor analysis. This, then, is what Eysenck did. He used secondary factor analysis to identify a simple set of factors that were independent, that is, not correlated with each other. These secondary factors of course also are traits: They are consistent styles of emotion or behavior that distinguish people from one another, and the superfactors are continuous dimensions, with a high and a low end and with most people falling in the middle. But they are factor‐analytic trait dimensions at the highest level of a hierarchy of traits, and thus Eysenck called them superfactors (“super” in the sense of “high”). Eysenck at first identified two such superfactors, which he labeled (1) introversion–extraversion and (2) neuroticism (alternatively called emotional stability versus instability). The superordinate concept of extraversion organizes lower‐level traits such as sociability, activity, liveliness, and excitability. Neuroticism organizes traits such as anxious, depressed, shy, and moody. An interesting feature of Eysenck’s system is that it captures individual differences identified in ancient times. The Greek physicians Hippocrates (around 400 B.C.) and Galen (around 200 A.D.) proposed the existence of four basic personality types: melancholic, phlegmatic, choleric, and sanguine. These four basic personality types could be represented by where the person falls on the introversion (I), extraversion (E), and stable‐unstable (N) dimensions. For example, the melancholic person would be a combination of moody, anxious, quiet, and unsociable traits, while the sanguine person would be a combination of sociable, outgoing, carefree, and easygoing traits. Ancient Greek theorizing about the causes of personality types have since been repudiated. However, as Eysenck recognized, ancient scholars did validly identify important variations among people. People whom the Greeks saw as being of a particular personality type actually had a high amount of associated personality traits. The fact that these variations in personality were evident in both the ancient world and contemporary society suggests that they might be fundamental features of human nature, with a biological basis that transcends time and place. Eysenck’s initial work, then, identified two dimensions of normal variation in personality, that is, variations readily apparent in the personality qualities of people we know in our everyday life. We all recognize that our friends and family vary in the degree to which they are calm versus anxious, shy versus sociable, and Eysenck’s model organizes these intuitions scientifically. After establishing these two dimensions, however, Eysenck added a third dimension. It organizes personality traits that, in the extreme, we might label as “abnormal”: aggressiveness, a lack of empathy, interpersonal coldness, antisocial behavioral tendencies. This superfactor is called psychoticism. These resulting three factors—psychoticism, extraversion, and neuroticism—comprise Eysenck’s complete model of personality structure. The factors are so well known in personality psychology that they commonly are referenced merely by their first letters: P, E, and N. Measuring the Factors With this model in hand, one then needs an assessment device to measure individual differences in P, E, and N. Eysenck provided this device, too. He developed questionnaire measures (e.g., the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire) that contained simple self‐report items designed to tap each of the factors (Figure 7.2). The typical extravert will answer “yes” to questions such as these: Do other people think of you as very lively? Would you be unhappy if you could not see lots of people most of the time? Do you often long for excitement? The typical introvert will answer “yes” to questions such as these: Generally, do you prefer reading to meeting people? Are you mostly quiet when you are with people? Do you stop and think things over before doing anything? Note that Eysenck also included “lie scale” items to detect individuals who are faking responses in order to look good (Figure 7.2). 1. Do you usually take the initiative in making new friends? Yes No 2. Do ideas run through your head so that you cannot sleep? ______ ______ 3. Are you inclined to keep in the background on social occasions? ______ ______ 4. Do you sometimes laugh at a dirty joke? ______ ______ 5. Are you inclined to be moody? ______ ______ 6. Do you very much like good food? ______ ______ 7. When you get annoyed, do you need someone friendly to talk about it? ______ ______ 8. As a child did you always do as you were told immediately and without grumbling? ______ ______ 9. Do you usually keeps “yourself to yourself” except with every close friends? ______ ______ 10. Do you often make up your mind too late? ______ ______ Note: The above items would be scored in the following way: Extraversion: 1 Yes, 3 No, 6 Yes, 9 No; Neuroticism: 2 Yes, 5 Yes, 7 Yes, 10 Yes; Lie Scale: 4 No, 8 Yes. FIGURE 7.2 Illustrative items for extraversion, neuroticism, and lie scale from the Maudsley Personality Inventory and Eysenck Personality Inventory. An important feature of Eysenck’s work is that, like Cattell, he developed objective measures of traits, that is, measures that did not rely on subjective ratings in questionnaires. One such test, designed to differentiate extraverts from introverts, is Eysenck’s “lemon drop test.” A standard amount of lemon juice is placed on the subject’s tongue. Introverts and extraverts (as identified by questionnaires) differ in the amount of saliva produced when this is done. Why might this be (we hope you are asking yourself)? The idea is that there may be a biological basis to the individual differences. Biological Bases of Personality Traits Eysenck provided specific scientific models of the biological bases of individual differences. Note that, if you are Eysenck, you do need models (plural), not just one model. The traits (P, E, and N) are statistically independent. One therefore needs a separate biological model for each of the three traits. The trait for which Eysenck’s theorizing about underlying biology has proven most successful is extraversion. Personality and the Brain Extraversion and Neuroticism More than a half century ago, Hans Eysenck predicted that people with different scores on extraversion (E) and neuroticism (N) questionnaires would differ neutrally. He anticipated, specifically, that they would differ in brain response when presented with emotionally arousing stimuli. With all the time that’s elapsed, you might guess that this prediction would have been tested extensively, with the relevant brain systems being well understood. But guess again. Here in the contemporary era, authors (Kehoe, Toomey, Balsters, & Bokde, in press) still can state that “the relationship between extraversion and the neural substrates of emotional arousal processing are unknown” (ms, p. 2) and that, until recently, Eysenckian predictions about neuroticism and the brain “have never been investigated using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)” (ms, p. 1), the contemporary neuroscientist’s favored tool. This state of affairs is beginning to change. Kehoe et al. (in press) used fMRI to explore brain activity in a group of 23 women who differed in extraversion and neuroticism. After completing an Eysenck questionnaire that yielded E and N scores, the women participated in a laboratory experiment in which they viewed a series of photos showing faces that depicted varying emotional content. By analyzing brain scans taken while the photographs were viewed, the researchers could determine whether E and N were linked to brain activity, as Eysenck predicted. So how did Eysenck’s theory fare? Let’s look at the two traits one at a time. Eysenck predicted that higher levels of extraversion would be associated with lower levels of cortical arousal—that is, arousal in the cortex of the brain—when people encounter environmental stimuli. This prediction was only partly supported by the fMRI evidence (Kehoe et al., in press). When the researchers examined arousal in the cerebellum (a brain region that influences motor movement but also is involved in emotional response), extraverts displayed lower levels of arousal, in accord with the Eysenckian prediction. But when they examined a different brain region, the insula (which contributes to the subjective conscious experience of emotion), extraverts displayed higher levels of brain arousal, contradicting Eysenck’s theory. fMRI evidence was more consistent with Eysenck’s theory about the other trait, neuroticism. When emotionally arousing stimuli were presented, people higher in neuroticism displayed higher levels of brain activity in a region in the front of the brain, the prefrontal cortex (Kehoe et al., in press). This is not the exact region of the brain that Eysenck had linked to N; he anticipated that neuroticism would be associated with variations in lower‐level regions of the brain, in the limbic system. Nonetheless, since the prefrontal cortex and limbic system are highly interconnected, the results are consistent with Eysenck’s general expectations that the brains of people high in neuroticism would respond more strongly. These findings represent a start in using fMRI to understand E and N. One would hope to see them replicated with larger and more diverse samples of participants and with a wider array of experimental stimuli. When it comes to the neural bases of extraversion and neuroticism, there’s still a lot to learn. Eysenck suggested that individual variations in introversion–extraversion reflect individual differences in the neurophysiological functioning of the brain’s cortex. The idea is that introverts are more arousable; they experience more cortical arousal from events in the world. As a result, highly intense social stimuli (e.g., a loud party) make them overaroused—an aversive state that they avoid. The social behavior of introverts, then, is more inhibited because of the relatively greater arousal they experience. Conversely, extraverts experience less cortical arousal than introverts from a given stimulus and therefore seek out more intense social experiences. Research that directly measures the brain activity of introverts and extraverts provides some support for Eysenck’s theorizing (Geen, 1997; also see Personality and the Brain feature, this chapter, and Chapter 9). Eysenck himself generated much relevant evidence on the biology of this dimension, including evidence that introverts are more influenced by punishments in learning, whereas extraverts are more influenced by rewards. Since the trait has a biological basis, individual differences in introversion–extraversion should be at least partly hereditary. (Note that the biological basis does not imply that a trait would be entirely hereditary, since one’s experiences during child development influence one’s biological makeup.) Studies of identical and fraternal twins commonly suggest that heredity does, in fact, play a major part in accounting for differences between individuals in E scores (Krueger & Johnson, 2008; Loehlin, 1992; Plomin & Caspi, 1999). The following are other facts consistent with Eysenck’s biological theorizing: the fact that the dimension of introversion–extraversion is found cross‐culturally, that individual differences are stable over time, and that various indices of biological functioning (e.g., brain activity, heart rate, hormone level, sweat gland activity) correlate with E scores (Eysenck, 1990). Regarding neuroticism, Eysenck hypothesized that the key neural systems are (a) the limbic system, a lower‐level brain region involved in emotional arousal and (b) the autonomic nervous system, the part of the nervous system that influences bodily arousal (e.g., heart rate, sweat gland activity) and that, in turn, is regulated by the limbic system. In particular, Eysenck predicted that, among individuals high on neuroticism, the autonomic nervous system would respond particularly quickly to stress and would be slow to decrease its activity once danger disappears. The neurotic person thus seems “jumpy” and “stressed out.” Unfortunately for Eysenckian theory, research has not consistently supported this physiological theory of neuroticism, as Eysenck himself fully recognized (Eysenck, 1990). Recent work using brain imaging methods unavailable to Eysenck, however, has been more promising (see this chapter’s Personality and the Brain feature). Less is known about the biological basis for the psychoticism (P) dimension. However, here a genetic association is suggested, in particular an association linked with maleness; aggressiveness, a component of (P), is higher in men and may be affected by levels of testosterone (Eysenck, 1990). A more recent suggestion involved a neurotransmitter in the brain, namely, dopamine. Research suggests that people with higher levels of psychoticism have higher levels of dopamine‐based neural activity (Colzato, Slagter, van den Wildenberg, & Hommel, 2009). This result is intriguing in that dopamine also has been linked to the severe mental disorder schizophrenia. Extraversion and Social Behavior Do people who differ in extraversion–introversion scores also differ in their everyday social behavior? A mountain of evidence speaks to this question; extraversion is probably the most extensively studied of all traits, in part because relevant behaviors are relatively easy to observe (Gosling, John, Craik, & Robins, 1998). A review of the dimension presents an impressive array of findings (Watson & Clark, 1997). For example, introverts are more sensitive to pain than extraverts; they become fatigued more easily than extraverts; excitement interferes with their performance, whereas it enhances performance for extraverts; and they tend to be more careful but slower than extraverts. The following additional differences have been found: Introverts do better in school than extraverts, particularly in more advanced subjects. Also, students withdrawing from college for academic reasons tend to be extraverts, whereas those who withdraw for psychiatric reasons tend to be introverts. Extraverts prefer vocations involving interactions with other people, whereas introverts tend to prefer more solitary vocations. Extraverts seek diversion from job routine, whereas introverts have less need for novelty. Extraverts enjoy explicit sexual and aggressive humor, whereas introverts prefer more intellectual forms of humor such as puns and subtle jokes. Extraverts are more active sexually, in terms of frequency and different partners, than introverts. Extraverts are more suggestible than introverts. This last finding is illustrated in a study of a hyperventilating epidemic in England (Moss & McEvedy, 1966). An initial report by some girls of fainting and dizziness was followed by an outbreak of similar complaints, with 85 girls needing to be taken to the hospital by ambulance—“they were going down like ninepins.” A comparison of the girls who were affected with those who were not, demonstrated that, as expected, the affected girls were higher in both neuroticism and extraversion. In other words, those individuals whose personalities were most predisposed to suggestion proved most susceptible to influence by suggestions of a real epidemic. Finally, the results of an investigation of study habits among introverts and extraverts may be of particular interest to college students. The research examined whether such personality differences are associated with differing preferences for where to study and how to study, as would be predicted by Eysenck’s theory. In accord with Eysenck’s theory of individual differences, the following was found: (1) Extraverts more often chose to study in library locations that provided external stimulation than did introverts, (2) extraverts took more study breaks than did introverts, and (3) extraverts reported a preference for a higher level of noise and for more socializing opportunities while studying than did introverts (Campbell & Hawley, 1982). Extraverts and introverts differ in their physiological responses to the same noise level (introverts show a greater level of response), and each functions best at his or her preferred noise level (Geen, 1984). An important implication of such research is that different environmental designs for libraries and residence units might best fit the needs of introverts and extraverts. Where do you like to study? If you are an extravert, you probably prefer studying with a group of friends in a coffee shop to working by yourself in a quiet library. Psychopathology and Behavior Change Eysenck also developed a theory of abnormal psychology and behavior change. A core idea Eysenck espoused is that the type of symptoms or psychological difficulties a person experiences relate to basic personality traits and the nervous system functioning associated with the traits. A person develops neurotic symptoms because of the joint action of a biological system and environmental experiences that contribute to the learning of strong emotional reactions to fear‐producing stimuli. Consistent with this suggestion of Eysenck’s, the vast majority of neurotic patients tend to have high neuroticism and low extraversion scores (Eysenck, 1982, p. 25). In contrast, criminals and antisocial persons tend to have high neuroticism, high extraversion, and high psychoticism scores. Such individuals show weak learning of societal norms. Despite the genetic component of personality traits and disorders, Eysenck was optimistic about treatment: “The fact that genetic factors play a large part in the initiation and maintenance of neurotic disorders and also of criminal activities is very unwelcome to many people who believe that such a state of affairs must lead to therapeutic nihilism. If heredity is so important, they say, then clearly behavior modification of any kind must be impossible. This is a completely erroneous interpretation of the facts. What is genetically determined are predispositions for a person to act and behave in a certain manner, when put in certain situations” (Eysenck, 1982, p. 29). It is possible for a person to avoid certain potentially traumatic situations, to unlearn fear responses, to learn appropriate social conduct, and thus to achieve a personality style that varies from his or her original predispositions. Eysenck thus was a major proponent of behavior therapy, which is the systematic application of principles of learning and behavior change to therapy (see Chapter 10). CURRENT QUESTIONS Is it Better to be an Introvert or an Extravert? Is it better to have the traits of being sociable, lively, active, and assertive or those of being shy, quiet, reserved, and passive? Most people would rate the former traits, those associated with extraversion, as more desirable than the latter traits, those associated with introversion. And, more objectively, extraversion is associated with leadership and business success. In fact, some go so far as to say that the most important aspect of personality is where we fall on the introversion–extraversion dimension, with introversion considered a second‐class personality trait, “somewhere between a disappointment and a pathology” (Cain, 2012). A recent book, however, questions this view and suggests that there is an introversion ideal as there is an extraversion ideal. In the book Quiet, Cain (2012) suggests that there are advantages and disadvantages to each, and that many successful business leaders are introverts. Indeed, introverts tend to be more sensitive, empathic, creative, and persistent than extraverts, all many would consider to be desirable personality characteristics. In addition, there are cultural differences in what is valued—in Asia, for example, the introvert is not looked down upon but is respected and admired. Ideally, it might be best to be flexible, able to be quiet and reserved or lively and assertive, depending on the situation. Would such flexibility and adaptiveness, however, create problems about the foundation of the introversion–extraversion dimension? Evaluation of Eysenckian Theory In many ways, Eysenck’s contributions to personality science are exemplary. He upheld the highest standards of science while theorizing in a creative manner. He brought diverse forms of evidence to bear on questions of individual differences. His prolific writings delivered his messages about personality not only to fellow scientists but also to a wider intellectual public. If personality psychology had experienced ten Eysencks instead of one, it would today be a much stronger field. Historically, Eysenck was always prepared to swim against the tide. “I have usually been against the establishment and in favor of the rebels (Eysenck, 1982, p. 298). Of course, this is Eysenck’s view of himself. Many contemporary scholars would contend that the Eysenckian strategy of describing individual persons in terms of scores on a small number of universal personality dimensions is itself an establishment procedure against which the humanist might rebel. Yet, one might ask why Eysenck has not been even more influential (see Loehlin, 1982). Some answers involve the social world of scientific activity. Eysenck’s decision to found a new journal (see above) may partly have backfired. When a scientist starts a scientific journal, devotees of the scientist’s position read it carefully, but others may not. Publications thus become isolated from the field’s mainstream. Other answers involve scientific substance. As you will see in the next chapter of this book, some psychologists have judged that more than two personality factors are required to describe individual differences, and others have claimed that even Eysenck’s basic two factors must be modified to align with knowledge of brain systems (Gray, 1990). A recent review by Matthews (2016) argues strongly that, despite the historical significance of Eysenck’s efforts, it is time for personality trait psychologists to abandon his framework. Mathews grounds his argument in a number of critiques of Eysenckian theory; they include the following: Measures did not align with theory. Eysenck’s theory concerned neural factors such as levels of cortical arousal. But his major measurement efforts centered on the development of self‐report questionnaires. Self‐reports are not a good way of measuring brain activity. People cannot directly introspect about the working of their brain, and any behavioral tendencies on which they report may reflect an interaction of biological factors and sociocultural experiences, rather than being a direct indicator of activity in the brain. Eysenckian theory underestimated the complexity of the brain. Contemporary brain science reveals that higher‐level cortical systems and lower‐level perceptual and emotional systems are highly interconnected, and thus interacting, systems. Eysenck’s focus on cortical arousal thus presented too simple a model of the brain and personality. Cognitive factors affect performance. When explaining behavior, Eysenckian theory focused on levels of arousal of a small set of brain systems that are possessed by humans and a wide variety of other mammalian species. Even if we were to presume that this arousal is correct, it is plainly inadequate for explaining individual differences among humans. People think. As Mathews emphasizes, humans are “differentiated from other animals by the use of linguistic representations that support schemas for future events and forward planning” (2016, p. 63). Matthews central argument is that personality traits partly reflect individual’s beliefs about themselves and the social world. This insight, which is foundational to Personal Construct Theory (Chapter 11) and Social Cognitive Theory (Chapters 12 and 13), “is alien to the Eysenckian perspective” (Matthews, 2016, p. 63). MAJOR CONCEPTS Ability, temperament, and dynamic traits Cardinal trait Central traits Extraversion Factor analysis Functional autonomy Introversion L‐data Neuroticism OT‐data Psychoticism Q‐data Role Secondary dispositions Source traits State Superfactors Surface traits Trait
REVIEW The trait concept represents people’s broad dispositions to display a certain type of behavior or to have certain types of emotional experiences. Allport, one of the first trait theorists, differentiated among cardinal traits, central traits, and specific dispositions. He also suggested that some traits could only be identified through idiographic research strategies, that is, research strategies that are sensitive to potentially idiosyncratic qualities of particular individuals. Many trait theorists use the statistical technique of factor analysis to develop a classification of traits. Through this technique, a group of items or responses (factors) are formed, the items in one group (factor) being closely related to one another and distinct from those in another group (factor). Cattell distinguished among ability, temperament, and dynamic traits, as well as between surface and source traits. According to Eysenck, the basic dimensions of personality are introversion–extraversion, neuroticism, and psychoticism. Questionnaires have been developed to assess people along these trait dimensions. Research has focused particularly on the introversion–extraversion trait dimension, where differences in activity level and activity preferences have been found. Eysenck suggests that individual differences in traits have a biological and genetic (inherited) basis
Learning Objectives
· Analyze trait theories of personality
· Evaluate research on personality traits
· Examine issues of ethics in trait research studies
· Review foundational research in personality psychology to prepare a draft of a scholarly literature review
· Analyze how the field of personality psychology and research has evolved over time
· Evaluate how ethical issues in personality psychology research have been addressed historically
Module at a Glance
This is the recommended plan for completing the reading assignments and activities within the module. Additional information can be found in the module Reading and Resources section and in the task list.
1. Read Chapters 7 and 8 in the textbook and watch the video
The Power of Introverts
.
2. Write an initial post in the discussion. Remember to respond to your classmates on the discussion topic later in the week.
3. Submit Final Project Milestone One: Literature Review Draft.
Reading and Resources
Required Resources
Textbook:
Personality: Theory and Research , Chapters 7 and 8
Chapter 7 covers the trait theories of personality, including the theories of Allport, Eysenck, and Cattell. Chapter 8 covers the five-factor model and evaluates the trait theories. In addition to reading these chapters, you may also want to reread pp. 245–248 if you need a refresher on the applications of the Big Five model, which you read about in Module One. These readings support this module’s discussion.
Textbook:
Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association , Sections 1.6, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.27
Section 1.6, “Literature Review Articles,” provides a summary of typical literature review articles. The readings from Chapter 2—Section 2.4, “Title,” Section 2.5, “Author Name (Byline),” and Section 2.27, “Heading Levels”—provide information on the elements of writing a paper in APA format, which you will use in your final project papers. These readings support Final Project Milestone One.
Video: The Power of Introverts
(19:04)
This TED Talk by Susan Cain discusses the importance of the trait of introversion and advocates adopting an attitude in which we value diversity in traits. This resource supports this module’s discussion.
Website: American Psychological Association – Ethics
In addition to the resource you reviewed in the Module 2 discussion, browse this resource to become more familiar with ethical considerations for research. In contrast, the following two examples discuss studies that show experiments that were conducted, but today are recognized as horrific and unethical:
Little Albert
and
The Tuskegee Experiment
.
PDF: Literature Review Basics
This document outlines the requirements of the literature review that you will complete for this course. This resource supports Final Project Milestone One.
PDF: Literature Review Example
This sample literature review will demonstrate how to write your own literature reviews in this module. These will be adapted literature reviews that are more basic than a full literature review. This resource supports Final Project Milestone One.
Document: Literature Review Template
Use this template to write your own literature reviews in this module. This resource supports Final Project Milestone One.
Additional Support (Optional)
Webpage: Purdue OWL Reference Page Information
This webpage from the Purdue Online Writing Lab describes how to properly format references from a variety of sources in proper APA style. This resource is optional but supports Final Project Milestone One as well as the content of the course as a whole.
PSY 216 Final Project: Milestone One Guidelines and Rubric
Prompt: For this milestone, due in Module Three, you will prepare a draft of the literature review due as part of your final research investigation using the
three articles for your track that you selected in Module One. Rather than following the format of a typical lengthier APA literature review, you will instead
prepare three shorter, adapted, individual literature reviews (one for each provided article). Each literature review should be one page in length. The final
literature review will consist of a total of five literature reviews (based on the three articles provided in your track and two more articles found and selected by
you). The final version of the literature review will be submitted in Module Seven as part of Final Project I. The final proj ect is meant for you to propose a
hypothetical study. You are not and should not be conducting human subjects research for this project. It is not necessary for the purposes of this assignment.
All human subjects research requires written approval from the SNHU COCE Institutional Review Board in order to protect the welfare and ensure ethical
treatment of the subjects.
First, read and review the three provided articles for your track. Next, using the questions presented in the Module Two literature review practice
journal assignment as a guide, you will draft three literature reviews of the articles provided in your track. The questions are provided here for your
convenience:
What is the title of the article? Provide a citation for the article in APA format.
What is the purpose of the article?
What is the hypothesis of the study? In other words, what claims do the authors make in the article?
What variables (factors) are being looked at as an influence on personality?
If these variables or the relationship between these variables have been studied before, what have other studies found? This shows historical
significance.
What type of research design is used in the study?
Do you think the research in this article was conducted in an ethical manner? Why or why not?
Use the Literature Review Template to complete this task. Refer to the Literature Review Example to assist you.
Also: Consult the sections of the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association that cover literature reviews: Section 1.6, Literature Review
Articles; Section 2.4, Title; Section 2.5, Author Name (Byline); and Section 2.27, Heading Levels.
Refer to the Academic Support module to assist you in your writing and to the Purdue OWL website for proper APA formatting of sources.
The following elements must be addressed (as also outlined in the Literature Review section of the Final Project I Guidelines and Rubric document):
I. Literature Review: In this part of the assessment, you will analyze foundational research presented in the course for how the field of personality
psychology has changed over time, how researchers have designed research to study personality, and how issues of ethics have been addressed
historically in the field.
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A. Summarize the claims made by the authors of the foundational research presented in the course regarding how personality develops. In other
words, what claims are made by the research about how human personality develops?
B. Summarize the claims made by the authors of the foundational research presented in the course regarding how personality is assessed. In other
words, what claims are made by the research about how personality has been determined by assessments?
C. Explain how the view of personality has evolved over the history of personality psychology. Be sure to support with examples from research to
support your claim.
D. Explain the conclusions you can reach about research in personality psychology. In other words, explain what we know about personality, based
on your review of the research presented in the course. Be sure to support your analysis with examples from research to support your claim.
E. Describe the specific research designs used in the foundational research presented in the course used to address research questions. For
example, what were the specific methods used to address their research question? What type of research design was used?
F. Explain how research designs were used by authors to conduct research in personality psychology. In other words, how did the research designs
used by researchers help in conducting research regarding personality psychology?
G. Discuss how issues of ethics have been addressed in the foundational research presented in the course. For example, how did the authors
inform the participants of what the experiment would entail? How did the authors account for any potential risks to participants associated with
the study?
H. Discuss how issues of ethics in personality psychology have been viewed historically. In other words, how have issues of ethics in the field been
viewed over time? Has this view changed as the field has progressed? Be sure to support your response with examples from research to support
your claims.
Guidelines for Submission: Use the Literature Review Template to complete and submit your literature review draft of the three articles for your track.
Within the template, be sure to use double spacing, 12-point Times New Roman font, one-inch margins, and discipline-appropriate citations in APA
format. Each of the three literature reviews should be one page in length.
Rubric
Critical Elements Proficient (100%) Needs Improvement (70%) Not Evident (0%) Value
Literature Review:
Personality Develops
Summarizes the evidence
presented in the foundational
research explored in the course
regarding how personality
develops
Summarizes the evidence
presented in the foundational
research explored in the course
regarding how personality
develops, but summary is cursory
or contains inaccuracies
Does not summarize the evidence
presented in the foundational
research explored in the course
regarding how personality
develops
12
Literature Review:
Personality Assessed
Summarizes the evidence
presented in the foundational
research explored in the course
regarding how personality is
assessed
Summarizes the evidence
presented in the foundational
research explored in the course
regarding how personality is
assessed, but summary is cursory
or contains inaccuracies
Does not summarize the evidence
presented in the foundational
research explored in the course
regarding how personality is
assessed
12
Literature Review:
History
Explains how the view of
personality has evolved over the
history of the field using
examples from the research
Explains how the view of
personality has evolved over the
history of the field, but
explanation is cursory or lacks
examples from research
Does not explain how the view of
personality has evolved over the
history of the field
12
Literature Review:
Personality Psychology
Explains the conclusions that can
be reached about personality
psychology, based on analysis of
the research presented in the
course using examples from the
research
Explains the conclusions that can
be drawn about personality
psychology presented in the
course, but explanation is
cursory, contains inaccuracies, or
lacks examples from research
Does not explain the conclusions
that can be drawn about
personality psychology
12
Literature Review:
Research Designs
Describes the specific research
designs in the foundational
research presented in the course
used to address research
questions
Describes the research designs in
the foundational research
presented in the course used to
address research questions, but
description is cursory, contains
inaccuracies, or response does
not reference specific research
designs from the research
Does not describe the research
designs in the foundational
research presented in the course
used to address research
questions
12
Literature Review:
Conduct Research
Explains how research designs
were used by authors in the
research presented in the course
to conduct research
Explains how research designs
were used by authors in the
research presented in the course
to conduct research, but
explanation is cursory or contains
inaccuracies
Does not explain how research
designs were used by authors in
the research presented in the
course to conduct research
10
Literature Review:
Issues of Ethics
Discusses how issues of ethics
have been addressed in the
foundational research presented
in the course using examples
from the research
Discusses how issues of ethics
have been addressed in the
foundational research presented
in the course but discussion is
cursory, contains inaccuracies, or
lacks examples from research
Does not discuss how issues of
ethics have been addressed in the
foundational research presented
in the course
10
Literature Review:
V iewed
Discusses how issues of ethics in
personality psychology have been
viewed historically using
examples from the research
Discusses how issues of ethics in
personality psychology have been
viewed historically, but discussion
is cursory, contains inaccuraci es,
or lacks examples from research
Does not discuss how issues of
ethics in personality psychology
have been viewed historically
10
Articulation of
Response
Submission has no major errors
related to citations, grammar,
spelling, syntax, or organization
Submission has major errors
related to citations, grammar,
spelling, syntax, or organization
that negatively impact readability
and articulation of main ideas
Submission has critical errors
related to citations, grammar,
spelling, syntax, or organization
that prevent understanding of
ideas
10
Total 100%
Shivone Smith
PSY 216
Topic
“I am choosing Track 2 (Environmental Influences) and Topic 1 (Childhood Experiences).”
References 1
Meier, M. H., Slutske, W. S., Heath, A. C., & Martin, N. G. (2011). Sex differences in the genetic and environmental influences on childhood conduct disorder and adult antisocial behavior. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 120(2), 377–388.
https://doi-org.ezproxy.snhu.edu/10.1037/a0022303
https://ezproxy.snhu.edu/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=pdh&AN=2011-00354-001&site=ehost-live&scope=site
References 2
Knafo, A., & Plomin, R. (2006). Prosocial behavior from early to middle childhood: Genetic and environmental influences on stability and change. Developmental Psychology, 42(5), 771–786.
https://doi-org.ezproxy.snhu.edu/10.1037/0012-1649.42.5.771
https://ezproxy.snhu.edu/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=pdh&AN=2006-11399-002&site=ehost-live&scope=site
Shivone Smith
PSY 216
Topic
“I am choosing Track 2 (Environmental Influences) and Topic 1 (Childhood Experiences).”
References 1
Meier, M. H., Slutske, W. S., Heath, A. C., & Martin, N. G. (2011). Sex differences in the genetic and environmental influences on childhood conduct disorder and adult antisocial behavior. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 120(2), 377–388.
https://doi-org.ezproxy.snhu.edu/10.1037/a0022303
https://ezproxy.snhu.edu/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=pdh&AN=2011-00354-001&site=ehost-live&scope=site
References 2
Knafo, A., & Plomin, R. (2006). Prosocial behavior from early to middle childhood: Genetic and environmental influences on stability and change. Developmental Psychology, 42(5), 771–786.
https://doi-org.ezproxy.snhu.edu/10.1037/0012-1649.42.5.771
https://ezproxy.snhu.edu/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=pdh&AN=2006-11399-002&site=ehost-live&scope=site
Interlinkages between attachment and the Five-Factor Model of
personality in middle childhood and young adulthood: a longitudinal
approach
Mari Fransson
a
*, Pehr Granqvist
b
, Gunilla Bohlin
a
and Berit Hagekull
a
a
Department of Psychology, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden;
b
Department of Psychology,
Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
(Received 11 January 2012; final version received 18 August 2012)
In this paper, we examine concurrent and prospective links between attachment
and the Five-Factor Model (FFM) of personality from middle childhood to
young adulthood (n ¼ 66). At age 8.5 years, attachment was measured with the
Separation Anxiety Test and at 21 years with the Adult Attachment Interview,
whereas the personality dimensions were assessed with questionnaires at both
time points. The results showed that attachment and personality dimensions are
meaningfully related, concurrently and longitudinally. Attachment security in
middle childhood was positively related to extraversion and openness, both
concurrently and prospectively. Unresolved/disorganized (U/d) attachment was
negatively related to conscientiousness and positively related to openness in
young adulthood. U/d attachment showed a unique contribution to openness
above the observed temporal stability of openness. As attachment security was
also associated with openness, the duality of this factor is discussed together with
other theoretical considerations regarding attachment theory in relation to the
FFM.
Keywords: attachment; Separation Anxiety Test; Adult Attachment Interview;
personality; Big Five
Introduction
The aim of this study was to further our understanding of the interlinkages between
attachment and personality development, more specifically the Five-Factor Model of
personality, from middle childhood to young adulthood. This aim strikes at the core
of some of the fundamental questions raised in developmental and personality
psychology: How does a person become who she is? And what are the constituents of
her personality?
Personality and the Five-Factor Model
An important thread of research in personality psychology has been devoted to
understanding and tapping the dimensions underlying individual differences in
personality ‘‘traits’’. There has been considerable controversy regarding the number
*Corresponding author. Email: Mari.Fransson@psyk.uu.se
Attachment & Human Development, 2013
Vol. 15, No. 2, 219–
© 2013 Taylor & Francis
239, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14616734.2013.754985
(e.g., Block, 1995; Eysenck, 1991), definition (e.g., Zuckerman, Kuhlman, Joireman,
Teta, & Kraft, 1993), and stability (e.g., Mischel, 1969; Pervin, 1994) of such traits as
well as whether the trait concept is to be understood as explanatory (e.g.,
motivational; McCrae & Costa, 2008) or as merely descriptive (e.g., consistency in
functioning; Hogan & DeSoto, 1977; Pervin, 1994). Setting these controversies
aside
1
, the most established model of the structure of personality is presently the
Five-Factor Model (FFM, also named the ‘‘Big Five’’; Digman, 1990; John,
Naumann, & Soto, 2008; McCrae & Costa, 2008). The five dimensions of this model,
gained through factor analyses of trait-descriptive terms across a variety of studies,
are extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness (John
et al., 2008). These factors have also been found in many different cultures, though
deviations in the number and meaning of the factors sometimes occur (McCrae &
Costa, 1997a; McCrae et al., 2005).
Extraversion reflects surgency, energetic and positive emotions, and the tendency
to actively seek, instead of avoiding, the company of others. Agreeableness refers to
the tendency to be compassionate, empathetic, and cooperative towards others
rather than suspicious and antagonistic. Conscientiousness captures socially
prescribed impulse control, the tendency to act in task- and goal-directed ways,
and to be able to delay gratification. Neuroticism reflects the presence and effects of
negative affect such as anger, anxiety, and sadness, as opposed to emotional stability.
Openness to experiences refers to complexity, depth, and quality of a person’s mental
and experiential life, reflecting appreciation for creativity, curiosity, and a variety of
experience (John et al., 2008; Shiner & Caspi, 2003). Openness has been the most
difficult factor to consistently conceptualize across studies and instruments: labels
and their associated contents have varied between, for example, culture, intellect,
and openness to experiences (McCrae & Costa, 1997b).
The development of the five factors from childhood to adulthood
Factor analyses of parent and teacher ratings of children’s personality have
supported the FFM also in childhood (Shiner & Caspi, 2003), although the evidence
for openness is weaker (Lamb, Chuang, Wessels, Broberg, & Hwang, 2002).
Additionally, the predictive validity of the FFM in childhood has been supported by
empirical links to constructs such as cognitive performance and adjustment to school
(John, Caspi, Robins, Moffitt, & Stouthamer-Loeber, 1994; Lamb et al., 2002).
Furthermore, there is at least moderate continuity in personality dimensions across
childhood, adolescence, and adulthood (Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000).
Although personality trait research has been successful in describing the broad
structure of individual differences in personality, less is known about the
developmental trajectories to these five factors of personality from childhood to
adulthood (John et al., 2008). There is, however, growing evidence for a
temperamental core to personality (Caspi, Roberts, & Shiner, 2005), but how
temperament is elaborated into personality dimensions is rather unclear. Empirical
studies have supported a substantial genetic contribution to personality (Bouchard &
Loehlin, 2001), which is in line with the idea of a temperamental origin of
personality. Some researchers even argue that personality traits are largely
independent of environmental influences (McCrae & Costa, 2008), whereas others
stress the importance of both genes and environment in personality development
(Lewis, 2001; Rothbart, Ahadi, & Evans, 2000; Shiner & Caspi, 2003).
M. Fransson et al.220
Attachment theory and personality development
Attachment theory provides a complementary framework for understanding
personality development. Although most research in attachment has been devoted
to understanding socio-emotional aspects of development, Ainsworth and Bowlby
(1991) portrayed attachment theory as a theory of personality development.
Attachment theory, in contrast to most theories of temperament and personality,
emphasizes the importance of caregiving (an aspect of nurture) in development, and
more specifically in the development of individual differences in attachment
organization (i.e., secure, avoidant, ambivalent, and disorganized/disoriented
attachment; Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978; Main & Solomon, 1990).
Because attachment organization has been found to foreshadow a broad repertoire of
developmental outcomes (Sroufe, Egeland, Carlson, & Collins, 2005), attachment
theory may be a suitable theoretical model also for understanding environmental
contributions in the development of personality (Fraley & Shaver, 2008).
According to Bowlby (1969/1982), the attachment system evolved because it
potentiated physical proximity between offspring, who are helpless on their own
early in life, and their protective caregivers in times of threat and potential danger.
Through repeated sequences of interaction with the caregiver, an emotional tie (i.e.,
an attachment) is formed between infants and their caregivers. The quality of this tie
varies depending on aspects of caregiving. For example, sensitive responsiveness in
caregivers foreshadows secure attachment, while insensitive and frightening
caregiving as well as maltreatment are related to insecure (i.e., avoidant and
ambivalent/resistant) and disorganized/disoriented attachment (e.g., Ainsworth
et al., 1978; Carlson, Cichetti, Barnett, & Braunwald, 1989; De Wolff & van
IJzendoorn, 1997; Madigan et al., 2006; Main & Hesse, 1990).
A set of cognitive-affective representations (i.e., internal working models; IWMs)
of self and others, are formed in the context of the infant’s attachment-related
experiences. These IWMs presumably become more generalized over time, and come
to guide the child’s expectations and behavioral inclinations in future relationships.
Securely, unlike insecurely, attached children gain a sense of being worthy of care,
and come to expect others as competent and reliable providers of care (Bowlby, 1973).
People tend to carry forward relational behaviors learned within their family
experiences into their interactions with the broader social world, in turn reconfirming
their mental models of the self, others, and relationships across the life span (e.g.,
Weinfield, Sroufe, Egeland, & Carlson, 2008). Thus, continuity of attachment
patterning over time is generally expectable (Hesse, 2008). However, IWMs are also
susceptible to revision based on, for example, marked changes in contextual
conditions affecting the caregiver’s sensitivity (Bowlby, 1973). Regardless of
continuity or discontinuity in attachment patterning, the attachment system
continues to be of great importance across the life course (Bowlby, 1969/1982).
In early research on individual differences in attachment organization, the main
focus was on the organized forms of attachment (secure, avoidant, and ambivalent/
resistant attachment; Ainsworth et al., 1978). This research led to an extensive
literature on the developmental pathways to and from individual differences in
attachment security. Since the introduction of disorganized attachment (Main &
Solomon, 1990), the importance of attachment disorganization for future
externalizing problems and psychopathology has been emphasized (e.g., Fearon,
Bakermans-Kranenburg, van IJzendoorn, Lapsley, & Roisman, 2010; van IJzen-
doorn, Schuengel, & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 1999).
Attachment & Human Development 221
Attachment theory and the Five-Factor Model
Although described as a theory of personality development by its founders
(Ainsworth & Bowlby, 1991), few empirical investigations have been undertaken
to study the specific interrelations between attachment and the FFM. This is
presumably because attachment theory portrays the mind as inherently relational,
rather than as made up by general traits. Nevertheless, early experiences with
attachment figures may serve as a foundation for the acquisition of a broad range of
future abilities, such as social skills, emotion regulation capabilities, and exploratory
behaviors (e.g., Sroufe et al., 2005; Weinfield et al., 2008), that are presumably linked
to personality development. Also, links between attachment and the specific
dimensions of the FFM can be theoretically substantiated, especially with regard
to attachment security. Presumably through its association with a positive view of
the self as a worthy and capable agent and of others as responsive to the self,
attachment security is linked to aspects of increased sociability, such as a readiness to
establish new relationships, which are in turn core constituents of extraversion (e.g.,
Londerville & Main, 1981; Main & Weston, 1981; Schneider, Atkinson, & Tardiff,
2001). Similarly, along with affirmative caregiver behaviors, a positive view of self
and others facilitates aspects of social skills, such as cooperation and reciprocity,
which are core constituents of agreeableness (e.g., Bohlin, Hagekull, & Rydell, 2000;
Schneider et al., 2001; Sroufe et al., 2005). Also, although conscientiousness partly
refers to higher-order cognitive (rather than emotional, social, or relational)
capacities, secure attachment has been linked to better delay of gratification,
executive capacity, and flexibility of attention (Belsky, Garduque, & Hrncir, 1984;
Jacobsen, Huss, Fendrich, Kruesi, & Ziegenhain, 1997; Main, 2000), suggesting it
might be related to higher conscientiousness as well. This is presumably because a
secure attachment relationship liberates mental resources for efficient information
processing rather than being occupied with defensive strategies (cf. Bowlby, 1973;
Main, 2000). Moreover, conceivably due to a sensitive attachment figure’s reliable
responsiveness and competent assistance during states of distress, secure attachment
is associated with efficient emotion regulation skills (e.g., Cassidy, 1994; Waters
et al., 2010), which are relatively absent for individuals high in neuroticism.
Finally, as secure attachment is characterized by a freedom to explore (initially
using the caregiver as a secure base), security is, not surprisingly, linked to increased
exploration (Belsky et al., 1984; Hazen & Durrett, 1982; Matas, Arend, & Sroufe,
1978; van den Boom, 1994), which may later be expressed in high openness to
experience. However, openness to experience has also been related to different forms
of alterations in consciousness, such as dissociation, absorption, and hypnotizability
(Glisky, Tataryn, Tobias, Kihlstrom, & McConkey, 1991; Ruiz, Pincus, & Ray,
1999). Disorganized attachment, including unresolved/disorganized loss and abuse,
has, in turn, been linked to dissociation and absorption (Carlson, 1998; Granqvist,
Fransson, & Hagekull, 2009; Hesse & van IJzendoorn, 1999), suggesting that
disorganized attachment and openness might also be associated.
In one of few extant studies of the associations between attachment and the
FFM, attachment security in infancy was found to be positively related to
extraversion and openness, and negatively related to neuroticism in middle
childhood (Hagekull & Bohlin, 2003). The only study of which we are aware that
has investigated the relation between a representational measure of adult attachment
(the Adult Attachment Interview [AAI]; Main, Goldwyn, & Hesse, 2003) and the
FFM in adulthood found that attachment security was positively but modestly
M. Fransson et al.222
associated only with conscientiousness and extraversion (Roisman et al., 2007).
None of these studies included information on attachment-related disorganization.
Although social psychological measures of romantic attachment (or adult
attachment styles) tend to be only modestly related to developmental attachment
measures (e.g., Roisman et al., 2007), results from the larger social psychological
literature on romantic attachment and the FFM are conceptually relevant. The most
consistent result in that literature is that attachment security is negatively related
with neuroticism, and positively related to extraversion and conscientiousness
(Noftle & Shaver, 2006).
Missing pieces and the present study
The purpose of the present study was to examine concurrent and longitudinal
relations between attachment and the FFM of personality in middle childhood and
young adulthood. An additional aim was to explore whether attachment, in middle
childhood as well as in young adulthood, made a unique contribution to personality
in young adulthood over and above any observed temporal stability in personality.
To our knowledge, no prior study has investigated the longitudinal relation between
childhood attachment and adult personality (in terms of the FFM), nor between
unresolved/disorganized attachment and personality. The present study addressed
these gaps in the literature, although unresolved/disorganized status was assessed
only in adulthood.
Based on joint considerations of theoretical assumptions and results from
previous studies, we expected concurrent and longitudinal associations between
attachment security and high extraversion, high agreeableness, high conscientious-
ness, low neuroticism, and high openness in middle childhood as well as in young
adulthood. In addition, we expected a concurrent link between unresolved/
disorganized attachment status and high openness in young adulthood. The scarcity
of relevant literature prevented us from making directed predictions regarding
relations between unresolved/disorganized status and the four remaining personality
factors. For the same reason, we did not have expectations regarding the unique
contribution of attachment, beyond stability in personality, to specific adult
personality factors in young adulthood.
Although our expectations regarding associations between attachment and
personality covered all the dimensions of the FFM, we did not expect strong links
between attachment and personality. To the contrary, we expected generally modest
relations on the grounds that attachment organization stems mainly from
interactions with the attachment figure, whereas personality factors are substantially
constitutional in origin.
Method
Participants and procedure
The Uppsala Longitudinal Study (ULS)
The sample for which data will be presented in this article is based on 66 (34 female)
participants (54% continuation rate) of the ULS who took part in relevant data
collections in middle childhood and early adulthood. A restriction of the sample was
undertaken thus that participants who did not partake at either assessment point
Attachment & Human Development 223
were excluded from the analyses so as to obtain comparable statistical power and
results across analyses. One participant who fulfilled this criterion was excluded due
to a serious brain injury, which occurred between the two occasions.
The ULS originally involved 123 children from middle-class families followed
from infant age 6 weeks to child age 9 years (for a more detailed description, see
Hagekull & Bohlin, 2003). The main focus of the ULS was to investigate if and how
attachment, temperament, and family context interact in children’s socio-emotional
development. Educational levels of the parents were fairly high as can be expected in
a university area like Uppsala County. The contacts were intensive during the first
four years (13 data waves). Thereafter, three data collections were undertaken
between ages 8 and 9 years. At the age of 21, a follow-up study was completed.
Reasons for attrition over the years have been illness/death in the family, moving out
of the county, travels abroad, objections to interview/questionnaire content, and
time shortage. The present study concerns attachment and personality at ages 8.5
and 21 years.
Age 8.5 years
When the children were in the second grade of elementary school, 91 participants
visited our department laboratory together with their mothers. As a part of the
procedure, the so called ‘‘Seattle version’’ of the Separation Anxiety Test (SAT;
Slough & Greenberg, 1990; Slough, Goyette, & Greenberg, 1988) was performed
with the children. At the same occasion, the mothers filled out a Five-Factor Model
questionnaire to assess the children’s personality (Lanthier, 1993). The children’s
schoolteachers filled out the same questionnaire some months later when a research
assistant visited the children in their schools. At that time, the majority of the
teachers had known the children for almost two school years.
Age 21 years
Of the original sample, 112 participants, whose addresses could be found through the
Swedish National Tax Board, were invited to participate in a follow-up study.
Ninety-nine persons responded, and 85 agreed to take part. Main attrition causes
were lack of time and living abroad. Some of the participants who agreed to take
part in this assessment had not participated in the 8.5 year data collection. At the
recruitment as well as at the scheduled laboratory visit, confidentiality of
participation was explained.
Two weeks before the visit to the department, questionnaires containing among
other instruments the Big Five Mini-Markers (Saucier, 1994) were sent to the
participants. They were asked to fill it out at least one week before their visit, and
bring their marked questionnaire to the laboratory visit. Eighty-five participants
filled out the questionnaires.
The first task during the full day laboratory visit consisted in the individual
administration of the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI; Main et al., 2003). One
participant denied to be recorded on tape during the AAI, and therefore was not
interviewed, as this would have made coding impossible. The participants received a
compensation of 500 Swedish crowns (US$79) for participating.
For independent validation purposes, permission was obtained during the lab
visit to contact one to three peers in order to send them some of the same
M. Fransson et al.224
questionnaires the participants had filled out with regard to how the peers perceived
the participants. They were instructed to select peers who knew them well, but were
not their partner. Provided that the participant had agreed, peers were contacted by
phone a few weeks after the laboratory visit. They were informed about
confidentiality of participation. If the peers were willing to participate, a
questionnaire was sent to them by mail. They were asked to fill out the questionnaire
and return it by mail. When more than one peer took part, the mean value of their
scores was used. The peers received a cinema gift certificate worth 90 Swedish
crowns (US$14). Ninety friends returned the questionnaires, distributed on 54
participants.
The present sample
The child mean age for the 66 participants comprised in the present study was 8.6
years (SD ¼ 2.9 months) when they visited the laboratory for the SAT and the FFM
measure, and 9.1 years (SD ¼ 2.9 months) when the school teachers filled out the
FFM measure.
At the follow up, mean age of the participants was 21.3 years (SD ¼ 5.4 months).
Regarding occupation, 52% of the sample were students (university 36%, high
school level 8%, professional program 8%), and 51% were in the work force (full-
time 21%, part-time 30%; students often had part-time jobs), and 12% were in
search of work. Forty-six participants had peer ratings on the Big Five Mini-
Markers.
According to t tests, the 66 participants in the present sample did not differ from
the original sample on mother’s or father’s educational level (ps 4 .10). In addition,
there were no differences on the attachment or personality variables at 8.5 years
between the participants who dropped out from the age 21 years assessment and
those who remained in the study (all ps 4 .10). Two-tailed significance tests were
used in these and all remaining analyses reported in this article.
Instruments
The attachment variables were obtained via semi-structured interviews (i.e., the SAT
and the AAI), whereas information regarding personality was obtained via
questionnaires. To rule out shared method variance and self-report biases as
alternative explanations to any observed relations between attachment and
personality, we used independent coders’ representational assessments (not self-
ratings) of attachment and included independent raters’ (teachers and peers) ratings
of personality. In the longitudinal analyses, we controlled for temporal stability in
personality. Measurement characteristics, descriptive statistics, and reliabilities are
shown in Table 1.
Middle childhood instruments
The Seattle version of the Separation Anxiety Test (SAT; Slough & Greenberg, 1990;
Slough et al., 1988) was used to measure attachment at age 8.5 years. This is a
modification of the test originally presented by Hansburg (1972) and adapted by
Klagsburn and Bowlby (1976) and Kaplan (1987). This version consists of six
pictures (photos) showing separations between children and their parents. Three of
Attachment & Human Development 225
the situations are considered severe (e.g., parents leaving for a two-week vacation)
and the rest are considered mild (e.g., mother tucks child in bed for the night and
then leaves the room). The child is presented with the picture together with an oral
vignette explaining the situation. The interviewer then asks what the depicted child
may feel, why he/she may feel that way, and what the child might do. In the Seattle
version, the participating child is first asked about the feelings of the pictured child
and then how the participating child him- or herself would feel in the same situation.
In the present study only answers referring to the pictured child are reported, as
analyses of answers to questions about the child’s own feelings did not change
conclusions.
Verbal answers were transcribed and scored by a person who had not previously
been involved in the project (for inter-rater agreement, see Table 1). In order to
minimize the number of variables, all scales used in the Seattle scoring procedure
(attachment, self-reliance, and avoidance) were not used in the present study.
Instead, a total score reflecting the overall security of attachment representations was
calculated and used in subsequent analyses. Within the SAT system, security is
reflected in an ability to verbalize feelings of vulnerability in relation to separation
and at the same time imagine resources to constructively cope with separations
(Kaplan, 1987). In the coding procedure used in this study, described in Verschueren
and Marcoen (1996; Verschueren, 1996), the 21 Seattle response categories are
organized into three groups: (1) the four most insecure response categories (e.g.,
avoidant or bizarre), which receive a weight of 0, (2) the six fairly insecure categories
(e.g., atypical attachment or atypical self-reliant), which receive a weight of 1, and (3)
the remaining 11 categories considered secure, which receive a weight of 2.
Thereafter, the responses of each child are scored in accordance with these guidelines
Table 1. Measurement characteristics and descriptive statistics for the attachment and
personality scales.
Variable
Scale
range
No. of
Items M SD
Reliability
coefficient
a
Attachment dimensions
SAT security 1–12 1 10.02 2.30 .84
AAI Coherence of transcript 1–9 1 4.46 1.84 .87
AAI Unresolved/disorganized 1–9 1 3.33 1.84 .75
Big Five variables
Age 8.5 years
Extraversion 1–5 9 3.77 0.60 .86
Agreeableness 1–5 13 3.68 0.49 .86
Conscientiousness 1–5 10 3.71 0.77 .92
Neuroticism 1–5 6 2.26 0.80 .89
Openness 1–5 4 4.05 0.58 .80
Age 21 years
Extraversion 1–9 8 6.48 1.45 .90
Agreeableness 1–9 8 7.25 0.74 .68
Conscientiousness 1–9 8 6.01 1.13 .75
Neuroticism 1–9 8 4.25 0.96 .62
Openness 1–9 8 6.18 1.03 .71
Note:
a
Reliability for SAT was computed with Cohen’s kappa, and the AAI dimensions with Pearson
correlations; reliability for the personality variables was computed with coefficient alphas.
M. Fransson et al.226
and added across the six pictures, resulting in a scale ranging from 0 to 12. Validity
of the SAT has been indicated by associations to measures of the quality of the
representation of self (Verschueren, 1996).
The Five Factor Model instrument used in middle childhood was a Swedish
adaptation of a questionnaire developed from Lanthier’s (1993) factor analysis of an
instrument for self- and other ratings of 10–15-year-olds. The questionnaire contains
42 personal descriptors, relating to the five dimensions: extraversion/surgency (9
items), agreeableness (13 items), conscientiousness (10 items), neuroticism (6 items),
and openness to experiences (4 items). In the present measure for children, openness
is focused on creativity and curiosity rather than on culture and intelligence. All
items were rated on scales ranging from 1 (not at all characteristic of my child) to 5
(very characteristic). Mother–teacher agreement across 5 months was: extraversion
r ¼ .51, agreeableness r ¼ .40, conscientiousness r ¼ .38, neuroticism r ¼ .36, and
openness r ¼ .28, all ps 5 .05. To increase reliability and capture the child’s
personality as shown in two important contexts, home and school, individual scale
scores were obtained by averaging mother and teacher item scores, yielding the
internal consistency estimates reported in Table 1.
Young adulthood instruments
Adult attachment was measured with the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI; Main
et al., 2003; translated into Swedish by Broberg, Ivarsson, & Hinde, 1996), a semi-
structured interview containing 20 questions with specific guidelines for follow-up
probes. The participants are asked to describe and evaluate their childhood through
attachment-specific memories. The interviews normally vary in length between 45
and 90 minutes and are coded from verbatim transcriptions. The most important
questions ask participants to select adjectives to describe their childhood relation-
ships with parents, which they are subsequently asked to support by recalling specific
episodes; to describe what happened as a child when they were emotionally upset, ill,
and in pain; to recall feelings associated with physical separation from parents; to
elaborate on experiences of rejection and fear; and to speculate on the effects of
childhood experiences on current personality. Another set of important questions
concerns loss through death and experiences of abuse.
The AAIs were coded according to Main and colleagues’ (2003) scoring and
classification system. The transcripts were coded on three types of 9-point scales: (a)
probable experiences, (b) organized states of mind, and (c) Unresolved/disorganized
(U/d) attachment. Individuals were then classified into one of five categories (i.e.,
autonomous, dismissing, preoccupied, unresolved/disorganized, and cannot classify)
based on their state of mind and U/d scores. However, to retain full scale variance
and maximize statistical power in view of this study’s expected modest associations,
these categories were not used in subsequent analyses.
Scores on the specific organized states of mind scales are reflected in the overall
coherence of discourse. Coherence refers to the extent to which participants are
collaborative, and the transcript provides a credible, internally consistent, free-
flowing picture of the participant’s experiences and feelings regarding attachment.
High coherence may be present regardless of whether participants’ experiences with
parents had been primarily positive or negative. Coherence is directly assessed on
two scales: coherence of transcript and coherence of mind. Coherence of transcript
refers to the speaker’s narrative clarity and internal consistency, and is the
Attachment & Human Development 227
conceptual counterpart of security in the AAI system (Main et al., 2003). Low scores
on coherence of transcript are present for individuals who are scored high on any of
the specific ‘‘negative’’ state of mind scales (i.e., idealization, insistence on lack of
memory, derogation of attachment, involving anger, and/or passivity of thought
processes in relation to attachment). Besides these aspects of coherence, coherence of
mind scores are based on the speaker’s apparent beliefs/belief systems. Unusual
beliefs, especially surrounding trauma or loss, as shown in unresolved/disorganized
(U/d) loss/abuse (below), can be stated coherently but indicate lapses in the
monitoring of reasoning. Thus, coherence of mind scores incorporate signs of U/d
attachment, while coherence of transcript is more independent of U/d considerations
(Main et al., 2003). As U/d scores were assigned in their own right, we report
findings based on coherence of transcript (rather than coherence of mind) in this
article.
Unresolved/disorganized loss–abuse is scored on a separate scale tapping speech
specifically surrounding loss–abuse experiences. A high score refers to discourse
characterized by one or more of three subtypes of unresolved speech: (1) striking
lapses in the monitoring of reasoning (e.g., as implied in statements implying that a
dead person remains alive in the physical sense or via considerable spatial–temporal
confusion surrounding the loss event), (2) striking lapses in the monitoring of
discourse (e.g., visual–sensory images related to the trauma intrude discourse), and
(3) extreme–lingering behavioral reactions to the traumatic event (e.g., the
interviewee is suicidal and this is believed by the person to be due to the loss of a
close loved one). The highest score assigned to any given loss or abuse incident is
used as the overall U/d loss–abuse score.
To minimize the number of statistical analyses, only the continuous coherence of
transcript and U/d scale scores were used in subsequent analyses. The interviews
were conducted by the first author and coded by two certified coders: the second
author and Professor Anders G. Broberg a certified AAI trainer. The coders were
blind to all other data, except sex and age. The reliability and validity of the AAI are
well-established (Hesse, 2008). For reliability of the coherence of transcript and U/d
ratings, see Table 1. Disagreements were resolved through discussion.
As for the FFM in adulthood, participants completed the Big Five Mini-
Markers (Saucier, 1994), which is a shortened version of Goldberg’s unipolar Big-
Five Markers (Goldberg, 1992). This version consists of 40 adjective markers, evenly
distributed over the five scales, instead of 100 as in the original version. These were
rated on a 9-point scale ranging from ‘‘Extremely unlike me’’ to ‘‘Extremely like
me’’ in the self-rated instrument, and ‘‘Extremely unlike my friend’’ to ‘‘Extremely
like my friend’’ for the peer-ratings. The five dimensions are labeled: extraversion,
agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and intellect or openness and are
described above in the Big Five paragraph. For the sake of consistency with the
child scales, the terms neuroticism and openness are henceforth used also for the
adult scales. The internal consistency has been found acceptable (Saucier, 1994), also
in a Swedish population (Ghaderi & Scott, 2000). The peer-ratings were exclusively
used to estimate interjudge agreement. The concordances between self and peer
ratings were: extraversion r ¼ .59, conscientiousness r ¼ .37, neuroticism r ¼ .39,
openness r ¼ .43, all ps 5 .05, and agreeableness r ¼ .28, p 5 .10. These levels of
interjudge agreement conform to those found in other FFM studies (Connelly &
Ones, 2010) and provide further support for the psychometric properties of the
instrument.
M. Fransson et al.228
Results
Descriptive statistics, preliminary analyses, and stability of attachment and personality
Descriptive results are shown in Table 1. Sex differences in personality and
attachment were analyzed. On the Big Five questionnaire at age 8.5 years, one
significant sex difference was found; girls were rated as more agreeable, t(64) ¼ 2.40,
p 5 .05. Two marginally significant differences were also found; girls were rated as
more conscientious, and less neurotic, t(64) ¼ 2.00, p ¼ .050; t(64) ¼ 1.92, p 5 .10.
At age 21, women scored higher on agreeableness, t(64) ¼ 2.97, p 5 .01. These sex
differences were controlled in the relevant analyses. There were no significant or
trend-significant sex differences on the remaining personality dimensions or on the
attachment dimensions at either time point.
The stability of the Big Five factors was studied with Pearson correlations. The
results showed that extraversion and openness were significantly stable from 8 to 21
years (r ¼ .47, p 5 .001; and r ¼ .35, p 5 .01, respectively) whereas the stability of
neuroticism was marginally significant (r ¼ .24, p 5 .10) over the time period.
Agreeableness and conscientiousness did not show significant stability (rs ¼ .16 and
.17, n.s.). Concerning continuity and predictability of attachment, SAT security was
not related to AAI coherence of transcript nor to AAI unresolved/disorganized
attachment (rs ¼ .08 and .20, n.s.).
Tests of hypotheses and research questions
Concurrent relations between attachment and personality
To determine if attachment and personality were related at 8.5 years, SAT security
was correlated with each of the Big Five dimensions at 8.5 years. The results (see
Table 2) showed that children who were rated high on attachment security were also
rated high on extraversion and openness.
The same analyses were performed with the AAI and Big Five variables at 21
years (see Table 2). High values on unresolved/disorganized loss/abuse were
significantly associated with low scores on conscientiousness and high scores on
openness. Coherence of transcript was close to significantly related to extraversion;
those who were coded as more coherent rated themselves as more extraverted.
Prospective relations between attachment at 8.5 years and personality at 21 years
To establish if attachment at 8.5 years was related to the Big Five dimensions at age
21 years, the two sets of measures were correlated. The results (see Table 2) revealed
that children with a high degree of attachment security were significantly more
extraverted and close to significantly more agreeable and open in adulthood.
The unique contribution of attachment to extraversion and openness at 21 years
The overall results indicate that the Big Five dimensions most consistently related to
attachment were Extraversion and Openness. These two Big Five dimensions were
eligible for tests of unique contributions from attachment, as they proved both to be
stable between the two age periods, and to be related to attachment variables at
either time-point. To determine if SAT security at age 8.5 years, AAI coherence of
Attachment & Human Development 229
transcript, and/or AAI unresolved/disorganized at age 21 years contributed uniquely
to these personality dimensions at age 21, when stability of the relevant personality
dimension was controlled, hierarchical regressions were performed. As we were also
interested in the individual contribution of the attachment variables, representing
different age periods and instruments, to adult extraversion and openness, middle
childhood and adult attachment were entered in separate steps.
For each regression analysis, one of the eligible dimensions of the Big Five at 8.5
years (i.e., Openness or Extraversion) was entered in the first step, SAT security was
entered in the second step, and AAI Coherence of transcript and AAI Unresolved/
disorganized were entered as a block in the third step. The results from the regression
for extraversion (see Table 3) revealed that SAT security showed a marginally
significant (p ¼ .06) contribution to Extraversion at age 21, when controlling for
Extraversion at 8.5 years. The results from the regression for Openness (see Table 4)
showed that AAI Unresolved/disorganized had a unique contribution to Openness
at age 21 when the stability of openness was controlled.
Discussion
This study showed that attachment and the FFM of personality are concurrently
interlinked in middle childhood and young adulthood. The results also revealed
longitudinal associations between attachment in middle childhood and personality in
young adulthood. Regarding the relative role of early personality and attachment in
the development of adult personality, unresolved/disorganized attachment in
adulthood made a unique contribution above the effect of stability in personality
between the two age periods. Although neither attachment security nor unresolved/
disorganized status was related to all five factors, and the significant relations
obtained were of modest-moderate strength, the results suggest that attachment and
personality are meaningfully interrelated (cf. Hagekull & Bohlin, 2003; Roisman
et al., 2007).
Table 2. Concurrent and prospective correlations between attachment and personality.
SAT 8.5 years AAI 21 years
Security Coherence of transcript Unresolved/disorganized
Big Five 8.5 years
Extraversion .42** – –
Agreeableness 7.02 – –
Conscientiousness 7.09 – –
Neuroticism 7.02 – –
Openness .25* – –
Big Five 21 years – –
Extraversion .39** .23
þ
.02
Agreeableness .22
þ 7.01 7.09
Conscientiousness 7.09 7.14 7.28*
Neuroticism .06 .05 .19
Openness .22
þ
.10 .34**
Note: Ns ¼ 66 except for correlations with AAI Unresolved/disorganized (N ¼ 64), as two participants
had no experience of loss or abuse, which made U/d scoring inapplicable.
þ
p 5 .10; *p 5 .05; **p 5 .01; two-tailed.
M. Fransson et al.230
Extraversion and Openness were the personality factors most consistently related
to attachment. Securely attached children in middle childhood were concurrently
rated as more extraverted by their parents and schoolteachers. As young adults,
these individuals also rated themselves as relatively high in extraversion compared to
those who were judged less secure at age 8.5 years. These relations are in accordance
with the assumption that securely attached individuals are more confident in taking
place in the social world than insecurely attached children. Stepping outside the
framework of the FFM, similar relations have been found in studies investigating
concepts closely related to extraversion. In these studies, securely (compared to
insecurely) attached children were more socially active and positive toward peers and
non-peers alike (e.g., Bohlin et al., 2000; Schneider et al., 2001). The possibility of
Table 3. Hierarchical regression results for attachment variables predicting extraversion at
21 years
Extraversion at 21 years
DR2 b
Step 1: .22***
Age 8.5 years
Extraversion .46***
Step 2: .05
þ
Age 8.5 years
SAT security .24
þ
Step 3: .03
Age 21 years
AAI Coherence of transcript .15
AAI Unresolved/disorganized 7.10
Note: N ¼ 64.
þ
p 5 .10; *p 5 .05; **p 5 .01; ***p 5 .001; two-tailed.
Table 4. Hierarchical regression results for attachment variables predicting openness at 21
years.
Openness at 21 years
DR2 b
Step 1: .11**
Age 8.5 years
Openness .33**
Step 2: .02
Age 8.5 years
SAT security .14
Step 3: .09*
Age 21 years
AAI Coherence of transcript .00
AAI Unresolved/disorganized .30*
Note: N ¼ 64.
þ
p 5 .10; *p 5 .05; **p 5 .01.
Attachment & Human Development 231
predicting young adult extraversion from middle childhood attachment security was
further supported as the prospective link between the two phenomena remained
marginally significant also when controlling for stability of extraversion. Regarding
the relative contribution of attachment across time and instruments, attachment
security in middle childhood, unlike attachment variables in adulthood, was found
to be predictive of extraversion in young adulthood, though only marginally so when
the stability in personality was taken into account. Nevertheless, to the best of our
knowledge, a prospective link between childhood attachment and the FFM in
adulthood has not been previously established.
Regarding openness, and viewed across developmental periods, the links between
attachment and openness observed in this study are intriguing, as attachment
security in middle childhood was concurrently positively related to openness and
unresolved/disorganized attachment in adulthood was similarly concurrently
positively related to openness. Although both findings were predicted based on
theoretical considerations and previous research, they may at first glance seem
conflicting, and thus should be interpreted with caution until replicated. Notably, the
two classifications are often but by no means always (e.g., Steele, Steele, & Croft,
2008) related to different outcomes, with security generally linked to adaptive
outcomes and disorganization (including unresolved status) to maladaptive ones
(Hesse, 2008).
How can we, then, understand that unresolved/disorganized status in
adulthood and attachment security in middle childhood were both positively
related to openness? A first possibility concerns equifinality (i.e., different pathways
leading to the same outcome) where (in this case) childhood security and adult
unresolved/disorganized status would both set a path leading to high openness to
experience. A second possibility is that unresolved/disorganized status and security
are related to different facets of openness. Notably, openness is the one FFM
factor surrounded by most controversies regarding definition (McCrae & Costa,
1997b). Glisky and colleagues (1991) argued that the openness factor in the FFM
instrument NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1985) could be split into
two facets: absorption and social liberalism/curiosity, because the absorption facet,
but not social liberalism/curiosity, was related to Tellegen’s Absorption Scale
(Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974) and hypnotizability. Based on previous findings
linking unresolved/disorganized attachment to absorption (e.g., Granqvist et al.,
2009; Hesse & van IJzendoorn, 1999), we thus speculate that unresolved/
disorganized attachment is related to aspects of openness associated with
absorption. We also suggest that attachment security might be associated with
the social liberalism/curiosity facet, reflecting freedom to explore social and other
matters in an open, non-defensive manner (cf. Steele et al., 2008). Put differently,
openness can be insistent vigilance and a need to be open in order to control events
and people in one’s world (i.e., as in the case of unresolved/disorganized
attachment) or calm reflective curiosity (i.e., as in the case of security). Although
the FFM instrument employed in the present study does not permit facet-level
analyses, post-hoc correlations between the attachment dimensions and items on
the openness factor were to some degree in agreement with these speculations,
suggesting that this is not a case of equifinality. Briefly, unresolved/disorganized
adult attachment was significantly linked to the items Deep and Complicated, and
marginally linked to Philosophical, whereas secure childhood attachment was close
to significantly linked only to Imaginative.
M. Fransson et al.232
As noted, unresolved/disorganized attachment was concurrently positively
related to openness in young adulthood also when the stability in openness from
middle childhood had been controlled. This unique contribution suggests that
unresolved/disorganized attachment in early adulthood is more important for
openness in young adulthood than is attachment security in middle childhood.
This could naturally be a result of their temporal proximity, but may also suggest
a particular influence of unresolved/disorganized attachment on aspects of
openness.
Unresolved/disorganized attachment was also negatively related to conscien-
tiousness in young adulthood, whereas attachment security was not related to
conscientiousness. Unresolved/disorganized attachment is conceptually character-
ized by an incapability to congruently regulate frightening cognitive-affective
material, related to loss or trauma (Hesse & Main, 2006). If this is generalized to
the organization of more purely cognitive material is unclear. Liotti (1992) has
suggested that due to the exposure of traumatizing experiences with parents, children
with disorganized attachment are more vulnerable for dissociation. Dissociative
tendencies are also apparent in unresolved/disorganized adults, for example by
lapses in the monitoring of reasoning in the AAI, and frightening/frightened parental
behaviors toward offspring (see Hesse & Main, 2006). Hesse and Main (2006) have
suggested that memories of the overwhelming experiences associated with
unresolved/disorganized status might intrude on attentional processes, leading to
decreased functioning of the working memory. As working memory is involved in
organizing and planning of a broad range of behaviors and actions (Baddely, 2007),
this might substantiate why unresolved/disorganized attachment was found to be
negatively related to conscientiousness.
We expected secure attachment to be related to a higher degree of
agreeableness, but the only association between the two in the present study was
a marginally significant bivariate link between attachment security in childhood
and agreeableness in young adulthood. As attachment security is related to higher
quality of children’s friendships in terms of responsiveness, companionship, and
conflict (Kerns, Klepac, & Cole, 2006; Lieberman, Doyle, & Markiewicz, 1999), it
may be surprising that they were not related to a greater extent. Also, in the adult
attachment style literature, attachment security has been associated with
agreeableness (Noftle & Shaver, 2006). However, attachment was not related to
agreeableness in Roisman and colleagues’ study (2007) nor in our previous study
(Hagekull & Bohlin, 2003). One reason for this lack of a clear association in the
present study may be a restriction in range in our measures of agreeableness (see
Table 1).
In contradiction to our expectations, attachment security was not related to
neuroticism. This lack of an association is in accordance with the study of Roisman
and colleagues (2007), but not with our previous study (Hagekull & Bohlin, 2003),
nor with the adult attachment style literature (Noftle & Shaver, 2006). One reason
why this association could not be established in the present study could be that the
attachment security variables we used combined preoccupied and dismissing
attachment on the insecurity pole. Dismissing attachment has been associated with
suspiciously low self-reports of psychopathology and feelings of vulnerability
(Kobak & Sceery, 1988; Pianta, Egeland, & Adam, 1996), and preoccupied
attachment with high levels of distress (Pianta et al., 1996). This is in accordance
with Roisman and colleagues’ study (2007), where deactivation (cf. dismissing
Attachment & Human Development 233
attachment) was associated with lower levels of neuroticism and hyperactivation (cf.
preoccupied attachment) with higher levels.
Methodological considerations and future studies
This study had notable methodological strengths. It is the first study of which we
are aware that has studied the relations between attachment and the Five-Factor
Model of personality with a prospective, longitudinal design, which also allowed
controlling for cross-temporal stability in personality. Additionally, we know of no
previous study that has investigated the relation between unresolved/disorganized
adult attachment and the FFM. Secondly, although this was not the focus of our
study, we emphasize the stability and interjudge agreement of the FFM observed
here. Three factors (i.e., extraversion, openness, and neuroticism) were signifi-
cantly, or close to significantly, stable over the 13-year time span. None of these
correlations were more than moderate in magnitude, but keeping in mind that
there were different raters and instruments at the two age periods, these relations
contribute to the literature showing that personality dimensions tend to be stable
across major developmental periods (e.g., Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000). In
particular, the stability of openness may be surprising, as this factor has been
difficult to obtain in previous child studies (Lamb et al., 2002). Regarding
interjudge agreement, although peer ratings could not be obtained for all
participants in young adulthood (46 out of 66 participants had peer ratings),
most FFM factors displayed significant interjudge (i.e., self vs. peer) agreement,
showing that the self-ratings of personality did not just reflect self-report biases or
impression management.
This study also had some limitations. First, the Seattle version of the SAT
(Slough & Greenberg, 1990; Slough et al., 1988) does not provide a measure of
disorganized attachment. Therefore, we could not investigate links between
disorganization in childhood and the FFM at either time point. Second, the
attachment variables were not related over time, which challenges the notion of
continuity in attachment. One reason for this discontinuity could be that the
attachment variables used in our study reflected different aspects of attachment at
the two time points, preventing the relation from being optimally investigated: the
middle childhood measure incorporates both signs of attachment security and
disorganization, whereas these dimensions were separated into two attachment
variables in young adulthood. Relatedly, although there is some empirical support
for attachment continuity from infancy (using the strange situation) as well as from
the kindergarten period (using the 6th-year reunion procedure [Main & Cassidy,
1988] or Kaplan’s [1987] SAT ) to young adulthood (e.g., Fraley, 2002; Main, Hesse,
& Kaplan 2005), we are aware of no study that has documented a link to adulthood
based on attachment assessments in middle childhood, nor of any study that has
documented such a link based on the Seattle version of the SAT. Finally, lack of
continuity may of course also reflect genuine discontinuity, some of which might well
be lawfully related to attachment at either time-point (e.g., through intervening life-
events).
Future studies aiming to test developmental interlinkages between attachment
and the FFM should include a measure of disorganized attachment in childhood, as
it might add interesting information regarding trajectories to future personality. To
avoid the risk of obscuring a true relation between attachment security and the five
M. Fransson et al.234
factors of personality through combining dismissing and preoccupied attachment on
the insecurity pole, the AAI categories or the AAI Q-Set (Kobak, 1993) may be used
in future studies. As attachment can be considered a one-shot measure of previous
interactions, measures that more directly assess parental behaviors, as sensitivity and
discipline, should also be included to more fully capture relational processes behind
personality development. Finally, in order to investigate the associations between
attachment and the facets of the FFM, we suggest the use of NEO-PI-R (Costa &
McCrae, 1992) in future studies.
Concluding remarks
The present study was an attempt to unify contemporary research on personality, as
guided by the FFM, and the developmental literature on attachment. Overall, the
results suggest that attachment considerations may partially contribute to the
understanding of personality development. In particular, attachment security in
middle childhood and unresolved/disorganized status in adulthood were associated
with personality, especially with extraversion and openness. Attachment security in
young adulthood was, on the other hand, less predictive of personality than might be
expected.
One discussion often raised in the attachment literature is how widely or
narrowly to conceive of the attachment construct. We argue that the relation
between attachment and personality can be understood in terms of relating to others,
exploring the surroundings, and regulating emotions and affects. These concepts are
all attachment-related, but can also be considered as inherent aspects of the FFM.
Shiner and Caspi (2003) have suggested that personality researchers should focus
more on developmental processes behind personality development than on the
constructs (e.g., ‘‘traits’’) per se. Based in part on the results presented here, we
conjecture that personality in adulthood is partially influenced by nurture, as
represented by attachment. However, it is beyond the reach of this study to
disentangle more precisely how genes and environments jointly influence personality
development. We encourage other researchers to fill this important knowledge gap.
Note
1. It is beyond the scope of this paper to resolve these trait-related controversies. In our
understanding, ‘‘traits’’ are merely convenient descriptive summaries of individual (and
thus individual difference) characteristics. To avoid confusion in view of the more
ambitious explanatory connotations that may be attributed to the trait construct, we
prefer to use the purely descriptive terms personality ‘‘factors’’ and ‘‘dimensions’’.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Prof. Anders G. Broberg for assistance with AAI coding. The research
reported in this article was supported by grants to Professors Bohlin and Hagekull from The
Swedish Research Council and The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation.
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Attachment & Human Development 239
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Journal of Research in Personality 39 (2005) 22–45
www.elsevier.com/locate/jrp
Attachment theory and research: Resurrection
of the psychodynamic approach to personality
Phillip R. Shavera,¤, Mario Mikulincerb
a Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis, One Shields Avenue, Davis, CA 95616-8686,
United States
b Department of Psychology, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan 52900, Israel
Available online 5 November 2004
Abstract
Since the rise of the social-behaviorist approach to personality and its elaboration with cog-
nitive concepts following “the cognitive revolution,” psychodynamic theories, usually identi-
Wed with Sigmund Freud, have taken a beating. This makes it easy for mainstream personality-
social psychologists to brush the psychodynamic approach aside. At the same time, researchers
in both developmental and personality-social psychology have made great progress in testing
and elaborating ideas presented by John Bowlby in his famous trilogy on attachment and loss.
What outsiders to that perspective may not realize is that Bowlby was a psychoanalyst who
saw himself as retracing Freud’s steps but with the advantage of new theoretical and empirical
strategies. In this article, we conceptualize attachment theory as a contemporary psychody-
namic approach, show how this theory has helped to bring psychodynamic psychology back to
life, and review empirical evidence from our laboratories that supports many of the psychody-
namic hypotheses advanced by Bowlby.
2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Anyone studying the psychology of personality several decades ago might have
been forgiven for assuming it was an oVshoot of psychoanalysis. In the Wrst edition of
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: prshaver@ucdavis.edu (P.R. Shaver), mikulm@mail.biu.ac.il (M. Mikulincer).
0092-6566/$ – see front matter 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2004.09.002
mailto: prshaver@ucdavis.edu
mailto: prshaver@ucdavis.edu
mailto: mikulm@mail.biu.ac.il
mailto: mikulm@mail.biu.ac.il
P.R. Shaver, M. Mikulincer / Journal of Research in Personality 39 (2005) 22–45 23
the now-classic personality textbook by Hall and Lindsey (1957), separate chapters
were devoted to Freud and Jung and an entire chapter was devoted to more social
and culturally oriented psychoanalysts, such as Adler, Horney, Fromm, and Sullivan.
Even the chapter on learning theory was devoted mainly to Dollard and Miller’s
(1950) recasting of psychoanalytic theory in terms of Hull–Spence drive theory, the
leading theory of animal learning at the time. Humanistic psychology, which played a
role similar to today’s positive psychology (e.g., Aspinwall & Staudinger, 2003), was
“positive” mostly in contrast with Freudian psychoanalysis, which emphasized sex-
ual and aggressive motives, defenses and illusions, and the pessimistic therapeutic
goal of nudging clients upward from extreme distress to ordinary unhappiness. Many
clinicians worked from a psychoanalytic perspective, and many personality research-
ers (e.g., Block, 1971; Blum, 1953; Klein, 1970; SarnoV, 1971) were formulating and
testing psychoanalytic hypotheses.
What happened between then and now? Today, many students specializing in per-
sonality psychology hardly know who Freud was, and most have never read his
work. Some who do know about him think of him as a sex-obsessed theoretical web
spinner who derogated women and turned a blind eye to his clients’ personal narra-
tives of sexual abuse. The once well-known neo-Freudian psychodynamic theorists,
such as Sullivan, Horney, and Fromm, are even less well-known today than Freud.
They do not even warrant speciWc arguments for demotion from the pantheon. More
psychology graduate students know about the “Big Five” personality factors (Costa
& McCrae, 1988) than know about psychodynamic approaches to inner conXict and
personality development, and many students and researchers question whether
defenses—a key part of the psychoanalytic framework—even exist.
There are several reasons for the intellectual sea change. Over time, psychody-
namic theories and research were challenged, Wrst by various forms of behaviorism
(e.g., Dollard & Miller, 1950), and then by cognitive social learning theories and
expectancy-value models (e.g., Atkinson & Raynor, 1974; Bandura, 1977; Mischel,
1973). These approaches continued to focus mainly on mental processes, but after a
while even this commonality with psychoanalytic theory was abandoned. Trait
researchers began to settle on what became the Wve-factor model (e.g., Costa & Mc
Crae, 1988), which is largely descriptive rather than dynamic or process-oriented. In
addition, narrative approaches to personality (e.g., McAdams, 1993), which went
along with emphases in feminist scholarship and deconstructionism in the humani-
ties, were proposed as phenomenological alternatives to theories that emphasized a
dynamic unconscious.
Looking across these many changes, we can discern several causes of the eclipse of
psychodynamic theories. First, it was diYcult to create valid measurement techniques
and obtain unambiguous empirical evidence for psychodynamic propositions. Sec-
ond, both behaviorism and the “cognitive revolution” led to a general neglect of
motivation and other dynamic processes, such as inner conXicts and defenses, as
researchers focused on social learning of attitudes and action patterns, genetic and
experiential underpinnings of traits, and cognitive constructs such as attributions and
expectations. Third, as experimental social psychology joined forces with personality
psychology, there was increased emphasis on proximal rather than distal causes of
24 P.R. Shaver, M. Mikulincer / Journal of Research in Personality 39 (2005) 22–45
mental and behavioral processes. Development was neglected while situational forces
gained increased attention. There were many more brief, one-shot laboratory studies
focusing on attitudes, cognitive aspects of stereotyping and prejudice, and validation
of self-report questionnaires. Fourth, there was an increased preference for parsi-
mony and simplicity over depth. Admittedly, psychoanalytically trained researchers
and clinicians often seemed to pride themselves on the number of hidden twists and
turns they could weave into any single causal story, and there was no way to tell
whether their interpretations were or were not correct. Moreover, as academic psy-
chology, with its emphasis on psychologically normal undergraduate students,
became increasingly dissociated from clinical psychology and psychopathology, the
motivation for probing deep and convoluted defenses, and their social and develop-
mental causes, decreased. Finally, as the research enterprise heated up, fueled by fed-
eral research grants, and pressures to publish quickly or perish, the attractiveness of
atheoretical studies and modest, highly focused mini-theories grew.
While there is much to be said for the progress that occurred in personality
research as a result of these and other historical forces—many useful new measures
were created and validated; the range of practical, real-world topics that got
addressed, such as sex roles, prejudice, and health, increased; the interaction of dispo-
sitional and situational forces was recognized more clearly—it has been encouraging
to see lately a return of deep psychodynamic issues and the creation of broader and
more ambitious theories (e.g., Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1997; Mischel &
Shoda, 1995; Westen, 1994). For example, motivation, including unconscious motiva-
tion, is back at center stage (e.g., Bargh, 1996; Higgins & Kruglanski, 2000); and,
somewhat ironically, the study of cognitive processes has yielded powerful and clever
research techniques that can also be used to study dynamic, unconscious processes
such as thought-suppression (e.g., Wegner, 1994), transference (e.g., Andersen &
Berk, 1998), and defenses against existential threats (e.g., Greenberg, Koole, &
Pyszczynski, 2004). Moreover, important psychodynamic constructs that arose in a
clinical context, such as narcissism and repression, are being studied experimentally
and taken seriously in personality psychology (e.g., Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Wein-
berger, 1995).
Supporting the renaissance of psychodynamic approaches to personality are some
important trends within psychoanalytic theory itself. For example, there is now much
less emphasis on Freud’s mechanistic drive theory, which was rooted in inappropri-
ate analogies to physics (e.g., the psychic energy construct), premature neurologizing
(e.g., the notion of neural “cathexis”), and speculation about human evolution (the
emphasis on sexual and aggressive instincts). The emphasis now is on mental repre-
sentations of self and others, and the importance of close interpersonal relationships
and their developmental residues (e.g., Aron, 2002; Mitchell, 1988). The links between
psychodynamic and neurological processes have been made less speculative by the
advent of neuroscience, which provides a more realistic picture of the ways in which
implicit mental processes, emotions, and emotion regulation work (e.g., Solms &
Turnbull, 2002). Moreover, there has been a move away from fantasy-oriented con-
ceptions of mental processes, such as that of Melanie Klein (1957), toward intersub-
jective perspectives stressing actual social experiences (e.g., Aron, 2002; Mitchell,
P.R. Shaver, M. Mikulincer / Journal of Research in Personality 39 (2005) 22–45 25
1988). There is also a greater emphasis on self-organization, identity, and personal
goals (e.g., Kohut, 1971, 1977), which narrows the distance between psychoanalysis
and mainstream personality and social psychology.
In his impressive review of psychoanalysis, Westen (1998) formalized these trends
and asserted that, although contemporary psychodynamic theories are far from
being monolithic, all of them agree with Wve core postulates. First, a large portion of
mental life is unconscious. Second, cognitive and aVective processes operate in paral-
lel so that people can have conXicting motives, thoughts, and feelings toward the
same situation or person, and often activate psychological defenses to deal with these
conXicts. Third, childhood experiences play a crucial role in the formation of adult
personality. Fourth, mental representations of the self and others are major compo-
nents of personality, and they often explain a person’s behavior in interpersonal and
social settings. Fifth, healthy personality development reXects a move from a socially
dependent state to a mature autonomous one. One important example of contempo-
rary psychodynamic approaches is Bowlby (1982/1969, 1973, 1980) and Ainsworth’s
(1991) attachment theory, which adheres to Westen’s (1998) Wve postulates and has
spawned an enormous amount of research in several diVerent psychological subWelds.
2. Attachment theory as an example of contemporary psychodynamic approaches
Attachment theory is obviously a psychoanalytic theory. Bowlby was trained as a
child psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, and his major colleague, Mary Ainsworth, was
trained in clinical and developmental psychology and coauthored a book about pro-
jective testing. Bowlby and Ainsworth combined key insights from psychoanalysis,
ethology, developmental psychology, and cognitive psychology to create a theory of
emotional bonding and emotion regulation that has been tested and elaborated in
hundreds of studies over the past 25 years (see Cassidy & Shaver, 1999; Mikulincer &
Shaver, 2003; Shaver & Hazan, 1993; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002, for reviews). Like
other psychoanalytic thinkers, they assumed that the explanation of adult behavior
lay somewhere in childhood, but they were dissatisWed with the conventional psycho-
analysis of their time, especially the ideas generated by Anna Freud and Melanie
Klein. Whereas these theories viewed human motivation in terms of drives and
explained a child’s ties to its mother in terms of beneWts associated with feeding and
other forms of drive reduction, Bowlby and Ainsworth viewed human motivation as
guided by innate behavioral systems that facilitate adjustment and survival, and they
explained the infant–mother bond in terms of basic needs for protection and security.
Moreover, although they retained an emphasis on dynamic unconscious processes,
they also paid considerable attention to actual relationship experiences and their cog-
nitive residues as inXuences on later behavior (Fonagy, 2001).
2.1. Basic concepts in attachment theory and research
According to Bowlby (1982/1969), human beings are born with an innate psycho-
biological system (the attachment behavioral system) that motivates them to seek
26 P.R. Shaver, M. Mikulincer / Journal of Research in Personality 39 (2005) 22–45
proximity to signiWcant others (attachment Wgures) in times of need. The set-goal of
the system is the attainment of actual or perceived protection and security; hence, the
system is automatically activated when a potential or actual threat to one’s sense of
security is appraised. Under these conditions, a person tends automatically to turn
for protection and comfort to actual attachment Wgures or to internalized represen-
tations of them, and to maintain actual or symbolic proximity to these Wgures until a
state of protection and security is attained. Whereas Bowlby (1982/1969, 1988)
assumed that age and development result in an increased ability to gain comfort
from symbolic representations of attachment Wgures or self-structures linked to such
representations, he also assumed that no one of any age is completely free of reliance
on actual others and that the attachment system remains active over the entire life
span.
Bowlby (1973) also described important individual diVerences in attachment-sys-
tem functioning depending on the availability, responsiveness, and supportiveness of
attachment Wgures in times of need. Interactions with attachment Wgures who are
available and responsive at such times facilitate optimal functioning of the attach-
ment system and promote a core sense of attachment security—a sense that the world
is generally a safe place, that attachment Wgures are generally helpful when called
upon, and that it is possible to explore the environment curiously and to engage eVec-
tively with other people. During these interactions, a person learns that acknowledg-
ment and display of distress elicit supportive responses from others, that (given the
proven availability of others to help when necessary) one’s own actions are often able
to reduce distress and remove obstacles, and that turning to others when threatened
usually results in enhanced coping. These kinds of experiences increase both self-con-
Wdence and conWdence in attachment Wgures’ willingness and ability to provide eVec-
tive support.
When attachment Wgures are not reliably available and supportive, however, a
sense of security is not attained, serious doubts about one’s self-eYcacy and others’
intentions are formed, and secondary strategies of aVect regulation other than appro-
priate proximity seeking are adopted. These secondary strategies are of two major
kinds: hyperactivation and deactivation of the attachment system. (We reviewed evi-
dence for these strategies in Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003.) Hyperactivation refers to
intense eVorts to attain proximity to attachment Wgures and ensure their attention
and support. People who rely on hyperactivating strategies compulsively seek prox-
imity and protection, are hypersensitive to signs of possible rejection or abandon-
ment, and are prone to ruminating on personal deWciencies and threats to
relationships. Deactivation refers to the inhibition of proximity-seeking inclinations
and actions, and the suppression or discounting of any threat that might activate the
attachment system. People who rely on these strategies tend to maximize distance
from others, experience discomfort with closeness, strive for personal strength and
self-reliance, and suppress distressing thoughts and memories.
Beyond characterizing individual diVerences in attachment-system functioning
during and following speciWc interactions with attachment Wgures, Bowlby (1973)
proposed that such interactions can have enduring, long-term eVects on personal-
ity development which are mediated by mental representations he called “attach-
P.R. Shaver, M. Mikulincer / Journal of Research in Personality 39 (2005) 22–45 27
ment working models.” According to Bowlby (1982/1969), actual interactions
with attachment Wgures are stored in memory in the form of mental representa-
tions of attachment Wgures’ responses (working models of others) as well as
representations of the self’s eYcacy and value (working models of self). These
working models allow a person to predict future interactions with the partner and
design new proximity-seeking attempts without rethinking each one from the
beginning.
Working models of self and others were viewed by Bowlby (1973) as the main
cause of continuity between early attachment experiences and cognitions, feelings,
and behaviors in later relationships. Given a fairly consistent pattern of interactions
with attachment Wgures during childhood and adolescence, the most representative
or prototypical working models of these interactions are solidiWed and become part
of a person’s implicit procedural knowledge. Like other mental schemas, the most
chronically accessible working models become core personality characteristics, tend
to be applied in new situations and relationships, and can aVect the functioning of the
attachment system in general and the course of subsequent social interactions and
close relationships.
In examining a person’s most chronically accessible working models, attach-
ment researchers who study adolescents and adults have focused on attachment
style—the systematic pattern of relational expectations, emotions, and behaviors
that results from a particular history of attachment experiences (Fraley & Shaver,
2000; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002). Initially, research was based on Ainsworth, Ble-
har, Waters, and Wall’s (1978) three-category typology of attachment styles in
infancy—secure, anxious, and avoidant—and Hazan and Shaver’s (1987) concep-
tualization of similar adult styles in the romantic relationship domain. Subsequent
studies (e.g., Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998)
revealed, however, that attachment styles are more appropriately conceptualized as
regions in a two-dimensional space. The Wrst dimension, typically called attach-
ment avoidance, reXects the extent to which a person distrusts relationship part-
ners’ goodwill, strives to maintain self-reliance and emotional distance from
partners, and chronically relies on deactivating strategies for dealing with attach-
ment insecurity. The second dimension, typically called attachment anxiety, reXects
the degree to which a person worries that a partner will not be available in times of
need and chronically relies on hyperactivating strategies. People who score rela-
tively low on both dimensions are said to be secure or to have a strong sense of
security.
Although attachment style is conceptualized as a global orientation toward
close relationships, there are theoretical and empirical reasons for believing that
a person’s global style is just the top node in a hierarchical network of attach-
ment representations, some of which apply only to certain kinds of relationships
and others of which apply only in certain relational contexts (Mikulincer &
Shaver, 2003). These attachment representations can be activated by actual or
imagined encounters with supportive or unsupportive others even if they are
incongruent with a person’s global attachment style (e.g., Mikulincer & Shaver,
2001).
28 P.R. Shaver, M. Mikulincer / Journal of Research in Personality 39 (2005) 22–45
2.2. How has attachment theory helped to bring psychodynamic psychology back to
life?
Attachment theory is useful for bridging contemporary psychodynamic theories
and empirical research on personality, social cognition, and interpersonal relation-
ships. On the one hand, attachment theory adheres to the basic postulates that deWne
contemporary psychodynamic approaches (Westen, 1998). All attachment research-
ers agree that many components of the attachment behavioral system operate uncon-
sciously (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). For example, automatic activation of the
attachment system by appraisals of threats and dangers can occur unconsciously and
can shape a person’s state of mind and behavior before he or she recognizes the acti-
vation in the stream of consciousness (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). In addition, deac-
tivating strategies operate at an unconscious level; avoidant people often seem not to
be aware of suppressing or denying their own otherwise measurable needs for protec-
tion and support and their painful attachment-related memories and thoughts (Cas-
sidy & Kobak, 1988). Thus, although working models can be noticed and discussed
to some extent, with repeated use they can become automatic and may sometimes be
held out of awareness by defensive maneuvers (Bowlby, 1988).
In attachment theory, the basic postulate of contemporary psychodynamic theories
concerning inner conXict and psychological defenses (Westen, 1998) is accepted as a
characterization of the goals and operation of secondary attachment strategies. These
strategies can operate either in tandem or in opposite ways at conscious and uncon-
scious levels, can lead to conXicting tendencies toward the self and relationship part-
ners, and can include psychological defenses against attachment-related insecurities
and distress (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). For example, hyperactivating strategies
reXect a compromise between conXicting, ambivalent tendencies toward attachment
Wgures—overwhelming anger and hostility toward unavailable attachment Wgures
together with an intense need for proximity to these frustrating Wgures (Cassidy &
Kobak, 1988). Deactivating strategies are also associated with conXicting tendencies at
diVerent levels of awareness, with lack of negative emotions and a detached attitude
evident at a conscious level while high levels of tension and unresolved attachment-
related distress are measurable at an unconscious level (Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002).
The postulate of contemporary psychodynamic theories concerning the crucial
role played by childhood experiences in the formation of adult personality (Westen,
1998) is also a basic principle of attachment theory. According to Bowlby (1973), the
dynamics of the attachment system in adulthood reXect past experiences with rela-
tionship partners, especially parents, beginning in infancy. This does not mean, how-
ever, that the developmental trajectory of attachment-system functioning from
infancy to adulthood is simple or linear. Although a person’s ways of relating to oth-
ers and his or her mental representations of self and others may stem from childhood
experiences with parents, they can also reXect a broad array of contextual factors
that moderate or even override the eVects of childhood experiences (Fraley, 2002).
For this reason, we have devoted a great deal of our research to the structure and
dynamics of adult attachment without claiming to know precisely how these features
developed.
P.R. Shaver, M. Mikulincer / Journal of Research in Personality 39 (2005) 22–45 29
Attachment theory also emphasizes the centrality of mental representations of
self and others in personality development and the developmental journey from
social dependence to mature autonomy—the remaining two postulates of
contemporary psychodynamic theories. As explained earlier, the concept of work-
ing models of self and others is used in attachment theory to explain how mental
residues of actual experiences with speciWc relationship partners become building
blocks of a person’s cognitions and behaviors in later interpersonal interactions
and relationships. In the case of the dispositional sense of attachment security,
repeated experiences of attachment-Wgure availability provide a foundation for
increased exploration, self-regulation, autonomy, and a Xexible balance between
self-reliance and other-reliance (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2004). This stands in stark
contrast to the overly dependent, in some ways infantile, position or the rigidly
self-reliant attitude of more anxious and avoidant attachment orientations, respec-
tively.
On the other hand, although adhering to the core postulates of psychodynamic
approaches to personality, attachment theory has been unusual in stimulating exten-
sive and systematic empirical research. Over a period of 25 years, reliable and valid
measures of attachment-related processes have been developed—for example, the
Strange Situation to classify infant’s quality of attachment to mother; the Attach-
ment Q-Sort for assessing young children’s attachment orientations; the Adult
Attachment Interview to measure adult “state of mind with respect to attachment”;
and several self-report scales to measure adult attachment style in peer relationships
(see Crowell, Fraley, & Shaver, 1999; Hesse, 1999; Solomon & George, 1999, for com-
prehensive reviews). The adult measures are now being combined with powerful lab-
oratory techniques borrowed from cognitive psychology (e.g., semantic priming), and
the methods of contemporary neuroscience (e.g., EEG, fMRI) to test central proposi-
tions of the theory and examine unconscious and defensive aspects of attachment-
system functioning (see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2004, for
reviews).
Attachment research has been successful in establishing a broad network of the-
ory-consistent empirical Wndings. SpeciWcally, research has systematically delineated
the mental representations of self and others, psychological defenses, methods of
emotion regulation, and interpersonal behaviors associated with speciWc attachment
styles (see Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003, for reviews).
Research has also provided strong empirical evidence concerning how interactions
with attachment Wgures and working models of self and others contribute to resil-
ience, adjustment, and mental health—or, in some cases, to the development of emo-
tional problems and psychopathology (see Dozier, Stovall, & Albus, 1999;
Greenberg, 1999, for reviews). Attachment theory has also generated studies on a
broad range of social issues, such as intergroup relations, compassion and altruism,
and prejudice (see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003, for a review), without sacriWcing preci-
sion or parsimony. In this way, it is beginning to realize some of the broad potential
claimed by Freud for his original psychoanalytic theory while also re-connecting var-
ious psychological subdisciplines, such as personality, social, developmental, and
clinical psychology.
30 P.R. Shaver, M. Mikulincer / Journal of Research in Personality 39 (2005) 22–45
In the following pages, we summarize empirical evidence from recent studies con-
ducted in our laboratories to explore three basic issues in the psychodynamic
approach to personality: the unconscious nature of attachment-system activation,
defensive biases resulting from deactivating strategies, and the ways in which optimal
functioning of the attachment system contributes to the development of a relatively
autonomous personality. Using these examples, we hope to show that attachment
theory not only adheres to the main propositions of psychodynamic theories, but
also provides reliable and valid tools for empirically examining such propositions
and producing a solid body of empirical evidence that contributes to a resurrection
of the psychodynamic approach to personality.
2.3. Dynamic, unconscious activation of the attachment system
One of the central propositions in psychoanalytic theory is that wishes can be
unconsciously aroused by contextual or intrapsychic stimuli, and this arousal can aVect
subsequent cognitions, emotions, and behaviors (Westen, 1998). In attachment theory,
the basic “wish” is for proximity to an attachment Wgure who can provide comfort in
times of need. This wish can be unconsciously aroused by an encounter with actual or
symbolic threats and can automatically bias a person’s cognitions and behavior. In our
model of attachment-system functioning (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003), unconscious
arousal of the basic attachment “wish” is automatically manifested in heightened acces-
sibility of mental representations of available and responsive attachment Wgures; epi-
sodic memories of supportive and comforting interactions with these Wgures; thoughts
related to proximity, love, and support; and proximity-seeking goals. These cognitive
representations become available for use in information processing and can then shape
a person’s state of mind and aVect his or her behavioral intentions and actual behav-
iors, even before the person experiences the material in the stream of consciousness.
Unconscious activation of the attachment system has been examined in several
recent studies (Mikulincer, Birnbaum, Woddis, & Nachmias, 2000; Mikulincer, Gil-
lath, & Shaver, 2002) in which participants have been subliminally primed with
threat-related words (e.g., failure, death, and separation) or neutral words (e.g., hat)
while performing cognitive tasks (the lexical decision task, the Stroop color-naming
task). Variations in the accessibility of thoughts about attachment themes or mental
representations of attachment Wgures were assessed following the various primes.
These studies examined the eVects of symbolic threats on the readiness of attach-
ment-related thoughts to inXuence cognitive performance without participants hav-
ing to notice or report these thoughts at a conscious level.
In Mikulincer et al.’s (2000) studies, participants performed a lexical decision task
in which they indicated whether a string of letters was or was not a word following
the subliminal priming (20-ms exposure) of threat-related words or neutral words.
The strings included non-words, proximity-related words (e.g., love), separation-
related words (e.g., separation), and positive and negative words that had no
attachment connotation. The Wndings indicated that a threat prime led to faster iden-
tiWcation (higher accessibility) of proximity-related words than a neutral prime. That
is, in line with psychodynamic thinking, a symbolic threat unconsciously activated
P.R. Shaver, M. Mikulincer / Journal of Research in Personality 39 (2005) 22–45 31
attachment-related representations and automatically biased information processing
in a lexical decision task. This eVect did not generalize to neutral words or to aVec-
tively positive words that had no attachment connotations.
Following these studies, Mikulincer et al. (2002) conducted three experiments
focused on the accessibility of the names of people whom participants listed on the
WHOTO scale (Fraley & Davis, 1997) as security-providing attachment Wgures. Partic-
ipants also provided names of close others who were not mentioned in the WHOTO
scale, as well as names of people they knew but with whom they were not close and
names of people (from a provided list) they did not know at all. They then performed
either a lexical decision task or a Stroop color-naming task, in which they were sublim-
inally exposed to threat or neutral primes, and the accessibility of the names of their
own attachment Wgures, close persons, known persons, and unknown persons was
assessed.
The Wndings indicated that participants reacted to symbolic threats with height-
ened accessibility of the names of the people they listed on the WHOTO scale as
attachment Wgures. In the lexical decision task, subliminal priming with threat words
(rather than neutral words) led to faster identiWcation of names of attachment
Wgures. In the Stroop color-naming task, slower reaction times in naming the color of
the printed names of attachment Wgures were observed following subliminal priming
with a threat word (rather than a neutral word). In both cases, fast lexical decision
times and slow color-naming reaction times indicated heightened activation of repre-
sentations of attachment Wgures under threatening conditions. Importantly, the
priming of threat words increased the accessibility of representations of attachment
Wgures but had no eVect on representations of other persons. Thus, heightened acces-
sibility under threatening conditions depends on the extent to which a person is
viewed as a safe haven and secure base. Again, this pattern of Wndings Wts a psycho-
dynamic view of attachment-system activation by which the mind can turn uncon-
sciously to attachment Wgures when threats loom.
The priming studies also documented individual diVerences in unconscious activa-
tion of the attachment system. Securely attached participants, who scored relatively
low on the attachment anxiety and avoidance dimensions (as measured by the Expe-
riences in Close Relationships Scale, ECR; Brennan et al., 1998), exhibited greater
access to thoughts about proximity and to the names of attachment Wgures only after
subliminal priming with threat words but not following subliminal priming with neu-
tral words (Mikulincer et al., 2000, 2002). In addition, Mikulincer et al. (2000) found
that this greater access of attachment-related thoughts following threat primes was
limited to proximity-related words; secure participants had relatively slow access to
words connoting separation and rejection. It therefore seems, in line with theory, that
relatively secure individuals are not unconsciously preoccupied with worries about
rejection, separation, or attachment-Wgure unavailability.
In contrast, people who scored high on the attachment anxiety dimension indi-
cated heightened accessibility of attachment themes and attachment Wgures’ names in
both threat and non-threat conditions as well as heightened access to words connot-
ing separation and rejection (Mikulincer et al., 2000, 2002). This pattern of uncon-
scious activation seems to reXect the underlying action of hyperactivating strategies,
32 P.R. Shaver, M. Mikulincer / Journal of Research in Personality 39 (2005) 22–45
which lead to heightened access to threat-related material, maintain the attachment
system in a chronically activated state, even in non-threatening contexts, and inten-
sify worries about rejection, separation, and attachment-Wgure unavailability. In
other words, these defensive strategies bias the unconscious activation of attachment-
related thoughts, resulting in a less adaptive pattern of attachment-system activation
and leaving the anxious person chronically preoccupied with attachment-related
worries.
The Wndings for people who scored high on attachment avoidance were especially
interesting from a psychodynamic standpoint because they supported the notion of
defensive deactivating strategies. Mikulincer et al. (2000, 2002) observed that, in some
respects, avoidant people’s overall pattern of unconscious activation of attachment-
related mental contents resembled that of secure individuals. Nevertheless, Mikulin-
cer et al. (2000) also found that avoidant participants, as compared with secure ones,
reacted to the addition of a “cognitive load” during the lexical decision task (engag-
ing in an additional cognitively demanding task) with heightened accessibility of sep-
aration-related worries. In this condition, avoidant participants resembled their
anxiously attached counterparts, exhibiting high accessibility of separation-related
thoughts and an automatic spread of activation from attachment-unrelated threats
to attachment-related worries. It seems that the introduction of a cognitive load,
which has been found to interfere with mental suppression (see WenzlaV & Wegner,
2000, for a review), diverted mental resources needed for defensive exclusion of
attachment-related concerns and thereby impaired the eVectiveness of avoidant deac-
tivating strategies.
Mikulincer et al. (2002) also found that whereas secure participants exhibited
heightened access to the names of attachment Wgures following subliminal priming
with the word “separation,” avoidant participants reacted to the same prime with
decreased access. There was no such diVerence when the subliminal prime word was
failure, a threat word not closely related to attachment concerns. This Wnding indi-
cates that both avoidant and non-avoidant people react to attachment-unrelated
threats with unconscious attachment-system activation, but that only non-avoidant
people display this activation following an attachment-related threat (e.g., separa-
tion). The attachment systems of avoidant individuals seem to be capable of activa-
tion under some conditions but are unconsciously inhibited or deactivated when
separation is threatened. This is compatible with child-development research (e.g.,
Ainsworth et al., 1978) suggesting that avoidant children learn not to appeal to
attachment Wgures when they are threatening to leave.
Overall, the Wndings support a psychodynamic approach to personality. Attach-
ment-related representations are unconsciously activated by threats, and this activa-
tion aVects the cognitive processing of attachment-related material. Although this
activation holds across diVerences in attachment style, there are important attach-
ment-style diVerences that are summarized in Fig. 1. Whereas secure people’s
encounters with threats heighten access to positive thoughts about love, support, and
comfort, anxious people react to these encounters with a concomitant heightening of
distressing thoughts about rejection, separation, and abandonment. In addition,
whereas anxious people have their attachment-related thoughts and worries mentally
P.R. Shaver, M. Mikulincer / Journal of Research in Personality 39 (2005) 22–45 33
accessible virtually all the time, even when there is no external threat, avoidant peo-
ple seem to suppress attachment-related worries and inhibit activation of representa-
tions of attachment Wgures when thoughts about separation are activated. These
diVerences in attachment-system activation clearly support a psychodynamic per-
spective.
2.4. Avoidant defenses and the unwanted return of the repressed
One of the central tenets in the psychodynamic approach to inner conXicts and
defenses is that unacceptable or unmanageable thoughts, feelings, and motivational
impulses can be actively suppressed or repressed, yet continue to remain active in the
unconscious and at times resurface in experience and action (Freud, 1936, 1959/
1926). In attachment theory, this kind of defensive suppression is characteristic of
avoidant, deactivating strategies (e.g., Cassidy & Kobak, 1988; Mikulincer & Shaver,
2003), which may sometimes cause problems when the defenses prove insuYciently
strong given other demands on mental resources.
Avoidant deactivating strategies include cognitive maneuvers aimed at minimizing
the experience of stress and distress, such as suppressing thoughts related to rejection,
separation, and loss, repressing painful memories, and deploying attention away
from attachment-related threats (see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003, for a review). These
mental processes are eVorts to create what Bowlby (1980) and George and West
(2001) called “segregated” mental systems, which result in the defensive exclusion of
distressing material from the stream of consciousness. Deactivating strategies are
Fig. 1. Attachment-style diVerences in unconscious activation of attachment-related representations.
34 P.R. Shaver, M. Mikulincer / Journal of Research in Personality 39 (2005) 22–45
also used to block cognitive access to self-relevant sources of distress, inhibiting the
appraisal of negative self-traits, suppressing thoughts about personal weaknesses and
imperfections, and projecting these weaknesses onto others.
In a direct examination of avoidant defenses, Mikulincer (1998) found that, as
compared with securely attached study participants, avoidant participants reacted to
various kinds of threatening experimental situations with an inXation of explicit and
implicit positive self-appraisals. Mikulincer (1998) also noted that introducing con-
textual factors that inhibited defensive tendencies (a “bogus pipeline” device that
measures “true feelings about things” or the presence of a friend who knew the par-
ticipants) inhibited avoidant participants’ self-inXation response to threats. That is,
avoidant people’s positive self-appraisals seemed truly to be strategic defensive
maneuvers aimed at bolstering the experienced strength of the avoidant self.
Avoidant defenses are also likely to bias person perception. Avoidant individuals
want to maintain distance from others and view themselves as strong and perfect.
Therefore, they may strategically stress their own uniqueness and distinctiveness
while devaluing other people. Indeed, Mikulincer, Orbach, and Iavnieli (1998) found
that avoidant individuals were more likely than their secure counterparts to perceive
others as dissimilar to them, and to exhibit a false distinctiveness bias in both trait
and opinion descriptions. Importantly, Mikulincer et al. (1998) also found that avoi-
dant individuals reacted to threats by generating self-descriptions that were less simi-
lar to their partner’s self-description and by forgetting more traits that they and their
partner shared. In a subsequent study, Mikulincer and Horesh (1999) found that avo-
idant people defensively projected their own unwanted traits onto others, which
increased self-other diVerentiation and, by comparison, enhanced their own sense of
self-worth. This defense also resulted in a negative appraisal of others derived from
the projection of negative self-traits.
The question here is whether avoidant deactivating strategies are eVective in main-
taining emotional equanimity in times of stress or are constantly disturbed by the
unwanted resurgence of suppressed thoughts and negative self-representations, a
phenomenon Freud (1959/1926) called “the return of the repressed.” In fact, research
on thought suppression has shown that, for many people, this defensive maneuver
leads, paradoxically, to what Wegner (1994) called a post-suppression rebound
eVect—heightened intrusion into consciousness of unwanted thoughts following sup-
pression of these thoughts. However, with practice, suppression has been found to
decrease the intensity of the post-suppression rebound eVect, allowing a person to be
less perturbed by the previously suppressed thoughts and feelings (e.g., Kelly &
Kahn, 1994). This is likely to be the case with avoidant people, who chronically rely
on mental suppression to manage distress. That is, they are likely to be “experts” in
using this particular defensive maneuver.
There is direct evidence supporting the eVectiveness of avoidant deactivating strat-
egies in preventing the typical post-suppression rebound eVect and the distress elic-
ited by intrusion into consciousness of previously suppressed thoughts. In a related
pair of studies, Fraley and Shaver (1997) asked participants to write continuously
about whatever thoughts and feelings they were experiencing while being asked to
suppress thoughts about a romantic partner leaving them for someone else. In the
P.R. Shaver, M. Mikulincer / Journal of Research in Personality 39 (2005) 22–45 35
Wrst study, the ability to suppress such thoughts was assessed by the number of times
separation-related material appeared in participants’ stream-of-consciousness writ-
ing following the suppression period. In the second study, this ability was assessed by
the level of physiological arousal (skin conductance) during the suppression task—
the lower the arousal, the higher the ability to suppress the thoughts. The Wndings
indicated that attachment avoidance was associated with both less frequent thoughts
following the suppression task and lower skin conductance during the task, suggest-
ing that avoidant defenses are eVective in blocking unwanted thoughts and prevent-
ing the emotional arousal they might otherwise cause.
At the same time, there is evidence that avoidant deactivating strategies sometimes
lead to emotional and adjustment problems. For example, Berant, Mikulincer, and
Florian (2001) found that attachment avoidance on the part of mothers of infants
with congenital heart disease, as assessed at the time of the initial diagnosis of the
infant’s disorder, predicted maternal distress one year later. Moreover, Mikulincer,
Horesh, Eilati, and Kotler (1999) found that attachment avoidance was positively
associated with the severity of psychiatric symptomatology among Israeli Jewish set-
tlers whose lives were chronically endangered because of residing in disputed terri-
tory controlled by the Palestinian Authority. These Wndings imply that, although
deactivating strategies allow avoidant individuals to maintain a defensive façade of
imperturbability, they leave suppressed distress unresolved, which may impair adjust-
ment and mental health during prolonged, highly demanding distress-eliciting experi-
ences.
In two recent laboratory studies, we (Mikulincer, Dolev, & Shaver, in press) exam-
ined attachment-related variations in thought suppression, paying special attention
to conditions that impair the eVectiveness of deactivating strategies aimed at prevent-
ing the rebound of previously suppressed material. In Study 1, participants were
asked to think about a painful separation or relationship breakup and were either
instructed or not instructed to suppress thoughts about this separation. We then
examined the rebound of the suppressed separation-related thoughts under condi-
tions of low or high cognitive load, which allowed us to determine whether deactivat-
ing strategies are capable of inhibiting the post-suppression rebound eVect even when
other cognitive demands draw upon limited psychological resources.
We assessed the implicit activation of previously suppressed thoughts by measur-
ing the extent to which they inXuenced performance on a Stroop color-naming task.
Previous studies had shown that interference with color-naming responses in the
Stroop task indicates implicit accessibility of previously suppressed material (Wenz-
laV & Wegner, 2000). In our study, participants performed a Stroop task under low
or high cognitive load (holding a 1- or 7-digit number in mind), and we assessed
color-naming reaction times for separation-related words.
In Study 2, we examined possible consequences of failed suppression eVorts on
avoidant individuals’ self-concepts. As mentioned earlier, deactivating strategies
include the blocking of access to negative self-representations (Mikulincer & Shaver,
2003). Therefore, if high cognitive load impairs the eVectiveness of deactivating strat-
egies, it may render an avoidant person defenseless against reactivation of negative
self-representations. In examining this possibility, we asked study participants to
36 P.R. Shaver, M. Mikulincer / Journal of Research in Personality 39 (2005) 22–45
recall either a painful breakup with a romantic partner or a more neutral experience
(being at a drugstore) and to perform a 5-minute stream-of-consciousness task. In
this task, participants were either instructed or not instructed to suppress thoughts
about the just-recalled episode. All participants then performed a Stroop task, while
at the same time carrying out a relatively easy or relatively demanding cognitive task.
In the Stroop task, we assessed color-naming reaction times for idiographic negative
self-traits and positive self-traits taken from lists supplied by the participant in a pre-
vious research session.
We found that attachment avoidance was associated with prevention of unwanted
reactivation of previously suppressed thoughts about a painful separation. Under
low cognitive load, avoidant individuals were able to suppress thoughts related to the
breakup, and they evinced lower accessibility of such thoughts and higher accessibil-
ity of positive self-representations following suppression. However, the eVectiveness
of deactivating strategies was signiWcantly impaired when a high cognitive load taxed
the mental resources needed to maintain thought suppression. Under high cognitive
load, avoidant individuals exhibited higher accessibility of thoughts of separation
and negative self-traits following suppression. In other words, their avoidant defenses
collapsed when mental resources were too scarce to maintain them, and this collapse
seemed to be associated with a spread of activation from unwanted attachment-
related thoughts to formerly suppressed negative self-representations.
Overall, the Wndings imply that, under strain, the avoidant mind operates in line
with the psychodynamic conception of defensive suppression. (See Fig. 2 for a sum-
mary of the Wndings.) Evidently, avoidant persons’ attempts to suppress or repress
unacceptable or unmanageable thoughts and feelings concerning separation and
rejection fail to resolve the distress caused by these painful episodes, and the
suppressed material resurfaces in experience and action when high cognitive and
emotional demands are encountered. This vulnerability resembles one that WenzlaV,
Rude, Taylor, Stultz, and Sweatt (2001) documented in the case of individuals at risk
for depression: “High levels of thought suppression may indicate that the individual
Fig. 2. Rebound of suppressed thoughts and the activation of self-representations among avoidant per-
sons under conditions of low and high cognitive load.
P.R. Shaver, M. Mikulincer / Journal of Research in Personality 39 (2005) 22–45 37
has not resolved the negative patterns of thinking that contributed to the previous
depressive episode. These patterns of negative thinking are apt to become evident
when stress undermines mental control eVorts” (pp. 448–449).
2.5. Internalization of attachment interactions and the movement toward autonomy
Another important tenet of both classic and modern psychoanalytic theories is
that healthy personality development involves a move from a socially dependent
state to a maturely autonomous one (Westen, 1998). According to psychodynamic
and object relations theorists (e.g., Kohut, 1971; Schafer, 1968), aVect-regulatory
functions accomplished at Wrst by parents and other interaction partners gradually
become part of the self, allowing a developing individual to perform these functions
autonomously. Kohut (1971, 1977) labeled this process “transmuting internaliza-
tion” and claimed that caregivers’ empathic responses to children’s needs foster the
development of an inner state of stability, security, and self-cohesion, which in turn
makes external regulation less necessary. According to Kohut, the self incorporates
the features and traits of the external Wgure, which allows the person to develop his
or her own self-soothing and self-regulatory capacities and become less dependent on
external sources of regulation. In this way, the individual can relate to others in a
more autonomous and reciprocally interdependent fashion.
In our model of attachment-system functioning in adulthood, we (Mikulincer &
Shaver, 2003, 2004) characterize some ways in which secure attachment, representing
the optimal functioning of the attachment system, contributes to development of an
autonomous self. We propose that security-enhancing interactions with attachment
Wgures, the building blocks of attachment security, facilitate the construction of spe-
ciWc self-comforting and self-soothing processes that operate autonomously. These
security-based self-representations provide real comfort and strength during threaten-
ing events, reducing the need for external or even internally represented distinct
attachment Wgures. In other words, support that was originally provided from out-
side, by another person, can eventually be provided by the self, and be represented
mentally as part of the self.
In our view, security-based self-representations are mental structures derived
from internalization of security-enhancing interactions with attachment Wgures
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2004). These self-representations co-exist in a semantic net-
work with other self-representations, including less secure models of self that result
from internalizing negative interactions with attachment Wgures. Within this
semantic network, the relative strength of security-based self-representations is
thought to be a function of a person’s history of security-enhancing and security-
impairing interactions. Secure persons, who have a history of mainly positive inter-
actions with available and responsive attachment Wgures, have more, and more
readily available, security-based self-representations within their semantic network
than less secure persons, but context can inXuence the degree to which secure or
insecure self-representations are available.
We theorize that security-based self-representations are associated with other
components of the attachment system and are therefore likely to become more
38 P.R. Shaver, M. Mikulincer / Journal of Research in Personality 39 (2005) 22–45
available when the system is activated (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2004). They can then
serve a regulatory, self-soothing function that helps to alleviate stress and distress.
As stated earlier, the attachment system is unconsciously activated by the appraisal
of threatening events and is followed by a search for internalized attachment
Wgures. For secure people, activation of threat-related thoughts is accompanied by
heightened accessibility of representations of security-enhancing attachment
Wgures, which can serve as contextual cues for bringing security-based self-represen-
tations into working memory. These self-representations are presumed to have been
formed originally in connection with threats that were alleviated by security-
enhancing attachment Wgures. As a result, they are mentally associated with
attachment-Wgure representations and positive feelings arising from memories of
interactions with these Wgures. They can be automatically activated in new situa-
tions appraised as threatening, contribute to the arousal of positive feelings, and
serve as a source of comfort.
If these representations are readily available in a person’s semantic memory, they
should easily become activated by relevant contexts, increase a person’s sense of
security, and contribute to a “broaden and build” cycle of security, competence,
and autonomy. However, if security-based self-representations are not accessible,
due to lack of frequent security-enhancing interactions with attachment Wgures, this
regulatory path will be less available, causing an insecure person to rely more
heavily on secondary attachment strategies (i.e., hyperactivating or deactivating
strategies).
On the basis of many psychoanalytic writings, we (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2004)
proposed that security-enhancing interactions with attachment Wgures would be
mentally represented in the form of two closely related aspects of the self: representa-
tions of the self-in-relation-with-an-attachment-Wgure and self-caregiving representa-
tions. One kind of security-based self-representation is organized around self-aspects
encoded during security-enhancing interactions with attachment Wgures. These self-
aspects become integrated into representations of the self-in-relation-with-an-attach-
ment-Wgure and incorporated within a person’s conception of the actual self. They are
expected to become accessible during encounters with threats, have a soothing, com-
forting eVect on the person, and render the pursuit of other defensive strategies
unnecessary.
To test these ideas, we (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2004) conducted a two-session
study. In the Wrst session, participants completed the ECR scale (Brennan et al.,
1998), measuring dispositional attachment-related anxiety and avoidance, and were
asked to think about a security-enhancing attachment Wgure (“a person from whom
you seek and receive support and comfort in times of need and who helps you remain
calm and endure diYcult situations”) and to generate 10 traits that describe their self-
in-relation-with-this-Wgure (traits that describe themselves as they were when they
interacted with that person). In the second session, we exposed participants to either
failure feedback on cognitive tasks (threat condition) or no-feedback (neutral
condition), noted the accessibility of various categories of traits within their self-
descriptions, and assessed their current emotional and cognitive state (e.g., worry,
cognitive interference).
P.R. Shaver, M. Mikulincer / Journal of Research in Personality 39 (2005) 22–45 39
As predicted, securely attached participants reacted to the threat condition with
heightened accessibility of security-based self-representations. They rated traits that
they originally used to describe their self-in-relation-with-a-security-enhancing-
attachment-Wgure as more descriptive of their current self following threatening than
following neutral conditions. This heightened accessibility of security-based self-rep-
resentations under threat was not observed among insecurely attached persons. More
important, security-based self-representations had a soothing eVect: The higher the
accessibility of these self-representations, the more positive was a participant’s emo-
tional state following a threat and the less frequent were task-related worries and
other interfering thoughts. Thus, it appears that securely attached individuals can
mobilize representations of being loved and valued, and these representations can
provide real comfort, allowing one to feel worthy and unperturbed (see Fig. 3). These
representations become more available during stress and are not simply equally acti-
vated or conscious at all times.
Fig. 3. The soothing function of security-based self-representations in threatening conditions.
40 P.R. Shaver, M. Mikulincer / Journal of Research in Personality 39 (2005) 22–45
Another important kind of security-based self-representation is one that includes
internalized characteristics of particular supportive attachment Wgures. We theorize
that during interactions with attachment Wgures, people tend to identify with these
Wgures and to internalize their features and traits in a component or subroutine of the
self that characterizes relation to and treatment of oneself—self-caregiving represen-
tations. Hence, one’s relation to and treatment of oneself during periods of stress
tends to resemble the treatment one has received from key attachment Wgures. In the
case of security-enhancing attachment Wgures, the process of identiWcation fosters the
formation of security-based representations of self-caregiving, which include strate-
gies for being available, sensitive, compassionate, and comforting toward oneself in
times of need. These self-representations are expected to become accessible during
encounters with threats and to comfort a person in the same way helpful attachment
Wgures have done.
Based on this line of reasoning we (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2004) conducted a sec-
ond laboratory study. In the Wrst session, participants completed the ECR scale
and provided 10 traits describing a security-enhancing attachment Wgure. In the
second session, participants received failure feedback on cognitive tasks (threat
condition) or no-feedback (neutral condition). They then described how they felt
and related to themselves during the experimental session (self-caregiving represen-
tations), and completed scales tapping their current emotional and cognitive state.
We found that a threat induction signiWcantly heightened the accessibility of
attachment-Wgure traits within current representations of self-caregiving mainly
among secure participants, but not among participants who scored high on either
anxiety or avoidance. Findings for mood and cognitive interference indicated that
the more accessible the attachment-Wgure traits were within a participant’s self-
caregiving representations, the less intense the reported negative emotion and the
less frequent the occurrence of interfering thoughts. It thus appears to be the case
that secure people react to threats by activating attachment-Wgure traits within
their own self-representations, and these representations facilitate eVective mood
regulation (see Fig. 3).
Overall, our empirical Wndings are in line with the basic psychodynamic
postulate that healthy personality development represents a move from
dependence to autonomy. Secure attachment, which reXects healthy functioning
of the attachment system, seems to be related not only to an increased capacity to
seek external sources of support but also to a heightened capacity for inner regu-
lation that may often make explicit dependence on others less necessary. Attach-
ment-Wgure availability and the development of attachment-related security seem
to be related to the development of speciWc soothing subroutines within the self:
security-based self-representations, which are made accessible during periods of
stress and distress and become an inner source of comfort and relief. That is, secu-
rity-enhancing interactions with attachment Wgures are reproduced within a
person’s self-representations, with some parts of the self being represented as sen-
sitive and caring toward other parts, and the latter parts being represented as
secure, calm, and able to deal with threats. This, again, is a familiar psychoanalytic
notion.
P.R. Shaver, M. Mikulincer / Journal of Research in Personality 39 (2005) 22–45 41
3. Concluding remarks
Beyond the studies reviewed in this article, which were selected to Wt within a tight
space limit, there is accumulating evidence concerning other attachment-related pro-
cesses that Wt with a psychodynamic approach to the human mind. For example,
Sohlberg and Birgegard (2003) found long-term mood eVects of subliminal exposure
to symbiotic messages such as “Mommy and I are one” over a period of several
weeks. We have also systematically documented the positive eVects of priming with
security-related representations on cognitive openness, compassion, altruism, and
tolerance of out-groups—eVects that cannot be explained in terms of associative
priming or positive mood induction (see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003, for a review).
There is also empirical evidence concerning the dynamics of anxious attachment,
such as projective identiWcation (projecting one’s own traits onto others and feeling
closer as a result) and ironic negative reactions to positive mood inductions—eVects
that cannot be explained by correlated variables such as neuroticism, self-esteem, or
trait anxiety (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). These examples Wt with classic psychoana-
lytic descriptions of neurosis and hysteria. There are also empirical studies showing
theory-consistent correspondence between attachment anxiety and avoidance, on the
one hand, and measures of constructs in Kohut’s psychoanalytic self-theory (e.g.,
needs for mirroring, idealization, and twinship) and scores on clinical tests such as
the TAT and Rorschach, on the other hand (Banai, Mikulincer, & Shaver, in press;
Berant, Mikulincer, Shaver, & Segal, in press; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2004).
Research on adult attachment provides persuasive evidence for many of the
unconscious processes discovered and described by psychoanalysts. This does not
mean, however, that attachment theory can be simply equated with psychoanalysis.
In fact, attachment theory oVers a unique perspective on the developmental trajec-
tory of working models and the role played by contextual factors in shaping cogni-
tions and behaviors in adulthood. While contemporary psychoanalysis still views
mental representations of self and others in adulthood as mental residues of child-
hood experiences, Bowlby (1988) believed that these mental representations can be
updated throughout life and can be aVected by a broad array of contextual factors,
such as current interactions with a relationship partner, the partner’s attachment
style and dynamics, and a person’s current life situation. Indeed, longitudinal studies
have shown only a moderate level of stability in attachment orientations from
infancy to adolescence, while indicating that life events (e.g., parental death) can sub-
stantially alter a person’s working models (see Fraley, 2002, for a review and meta-
analysis of these studies).
The changing nature of attachment styles and underlying mental representations
is also evident in several experimental studies showing that positive eVects of
contextual priming of security-enhancing representations are found even among
chronically insecure people (e.g., Mikulincer et al., 2001; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001).
The possibility and nature of change are further revealed in two recent studies docu-
menting the role of subjective appraisal of person-environment transactions in regu-
lating changes in attachment orientation (Davila & Cobb, 2004; Simpson, Rholes,
Campbell, & Wilson, 2003). For example, Simpson et al. (2003) observed changes in
42 P.R. Shaver, M. Mikulincer / Journal of Research in Personality 39 (2005) 22–45
attachment orientations during the transition to parenthood and found that prenatal
appraisals of partner support and anger inXuenced the change process. SpeciWcally,
women who perceived less spousal support and more spousal anger during preg-
nancy became more anxiously attached across the transition, whereas husbands who
perceived themselves as providing more spousal support during pregnancy became
less avoidant across the transition to parenthood. These Wndings imply that attach-
ment orientations are most likely to be changed if people construe life events as dis-
conWrming their chronically accessible working models.
Attachment researchers have beneWted from psychoanalytic insights as well as
methods developed by cognitive and social-cognitive researchers. A similar kind of
synergy may be about to occur between psychodynamic insights and methods devel-
oped by cognitive and aVective neuroscientists. If researchers in the Welds of personal-
ity and social psychology adopted a strategy of remaining open to psychodynamic
insights, wedding these insights with a range of creative, contemporary methods, and
working toward comprehensive, integrative theories, psychology might attain some
of the ambitious goals, including psychological depth, that motivated theorists such
as Freud and Bowlby.
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Introduction
Attachment theory as an example of contemporary psychodynamic approaches
Basic concepts in attachment theory and research
How has attachment theory helped to bring psychodynamic psychology back to life?
Dynamic, unconscious activation of the attachment system
Avoidant defenses and the unwanted return of the repressed
Internalization of attachment interactions and the movement toward autonomy
Concluding remarks
References
Birth Order Effects on Personality and Achievement within Families
Author(s): Delroy L. Paulhus, Paul D. Trapnell and David Chen
Source: Psychological Science , Nov., 1999, Vol. 10, No. 6 (Nov., 1999), pp. 482-488
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the Association for Psychological
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https://www.jstor.org/stable/40063474
BIRTH ORDER EFFECTS ON PERSONALITY AND
ACHIEVEMENT WITHIN FAMILIES
Delroy L. Paulhus,1 Paul D. Trapnell,2 and David Chen1
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
Research Article
1 University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, and2 Ohio State University at Mansfield
Abstract – We investigated birth order effects on personality and
achievement in four studies (N = 1,022 families) including both stu-
dent and adult samples. Control over a wide range of variables was
effected by collecting within-family data: Participants compared their
siblings (and themselves) on a variety of personality and achievement
dimensions. Across four diverse data sets, first-borns were nominated
as most achieving and most conscientious. Later-borns were nominat-
ed as most rebellious, liberal, and agreeable. The same results
obtained whether or not birth order was made salient (to activate
stereotypes) during the personality ratings. Overall, the results sup-
port predictions from Sulloway’s niche model of personality develop-
ment, as well as Zajonc ‘s confluence model of intellectual
achievement.
The notion that birth order has an influence on personality fell into
disrepute with the publication of Ernst and Angst (1983). Although
they conceded small effects on intellectual achievement (e.g., Zajonc
& Markus, 1975), Ernst and Angst disputed any link between birth
order and personality traits. Recently, however, a reconsideration has
been provoked by the publication of Sulloway’s (1996) book, Born to
Rebel. In applying his new theoretical perspective, Sulloway reaf-
firmed the view that adult personality differs systematically across
birth order. According to Sulloway, the source of these differences is
not, as traditionally argued, a differential parental treatment of chil-
dren of different birth orders (e.g., Hilton, 1967). Instead, Sulloway’s
thesis was that birth order effects derive from a competition among
siblings as they fight for a family niche.
First-borns (FBs), having the first choice of niche, attempt to please
their parents in traditional fashion via success in school and responsi-
ble behavior. But, as other siblings arrive, FBs must deal with threats
to their natural priority in the sibling status hierarchy. The resulting
adult character is conscientious and conservative. Later-borns (LBs)
must resist the higher status of FBs, while seeking alternative ways of
distinguishing themselves in the eyes of their parents. Accordingly,
they develop an adult character marked by an empathic interpersonal
style, a striving for uniqueness, and political views that are both egal-
itarian and antiauthoritarian. In short, they are “born to rebel.”
Sulloway’s (1996) book resonated on a personal level with the gen-
eral public while offering two forms of data to readers more persuaded
by empirical evidence. One form was the systematic documentation of
the social attitudes of historical figures as a function of their birth order.
The second form of empirical support was a meta-analysis of the large
number of studies on personality and birth order (see also Sulloway,
1995, in press). To great advantage, Sulloway organized the studies
within the influential Five-Factor Model of personality, or “Big Five”
(Goldberg, 1990). Using this organizational system, Sulloway’s meta-
analysis of the apparently chaotic literature exposed the predicted pat-
terns. In particular, FBs were more conscientious but less agreeable and
open to experience than LBs. Sulloway (in press) has followed up those
analyses with new data that are consistent with his predictions.
Recent studies from other quarters vary from supportive (Davis,
1997; Salmon & Daly, 1998) to nonsupportive (Parker, 1998; Phillips,
1998). Jefferson, Herbst, and McCrae (1998) found mixed support:
The few significant birth order differences obtained in the peer-rating
data fell in the direction predicted by Sulloway. Self-ratings and
spouse ratings on the same individuals, however, showed none of the
predicted effects.
All these studies used between-family designs; that is, the individ-
uals being compared with respect to birth order came from different
families. Among the known confounds of between-family birth order
data are social class,1 parental personality, and sibship size. Unfortu-
nately, a full range of appropriate controls is seldom available. Within-
family data would provide a natural control procedure for all
between-family differences, including their largest contributor –
genetics (Dunn & Plomin, 1990). Therefore, within-family analyses
should be more powerful (Sulloway, in press), as well as more valid
(Rodgers, 1988). We expected they would confirm the following pre-
dictions: FBs would be perceived as more conscientious and achieving,
and LBs would be perceived as more agreeable, liberal, and rebellious.
Our prediction of superior FB achievement was also consistent with
the well-known confluence model (e.g., Zajonc & Markus, 1975).
We collected four within-family data sets by asking respondents to
compare themselves and their siblings on various personality and
achievement dimensions. In Study 1 , undergraduates from the Univer-
sity of California were asked to nominate the “rebel” and the “achiev-
er” in their families. Study 2 applied the same methodology to a
sample of undergraduates from the University of British Columbia
while evaluating an alternative hypothesis. Study 3 extended the crite-
rion variables to include the Big Five personality traits. Finally, Study
4 replicated Study 3 in a large sample of Vancouver adults.
STUDY 1: PRELIMINARY DATA FROM UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA STUDENTS
Method
In fall 1996, a large, intact class (N = 164) was asked several ques-
tions as part of a class demonstration. Participation was voluntary.
First, the students were asked to write down the birth order of the boys
and girls in their family, including themselves (e.g., B-G-G). Then,
Address correspondence to Del Paulhus, Department of Psychology,
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Z4; e-mail:
dpaulhus@cortex.psych.ubc.ca.
1. Moreover, controlling for socioeconomic status has the side effect of
removing some ability variance. As a result, it is difficult to demonstrate corre-
lations between ability-related variables (e.g., achievement, conscientiousness)
and birth order. In short, between-family data entail an intractable confound.
482 Copyright© 1999 American Psychological Society VOL. 10, NO. 6, NOVEMBER 1999
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PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
Delroy L. Paulhus, Paul D. Trapnell, and David Chen
Table 1. Proportion of families with first-borns nominated as the achiever and later-borns nominated as the rebel
(American students)
First-born achievers Later-born rebels
Significance Effect size Significance Effect size
Sibship Observed- Difference Odds Observed- Difference Odds
size n expected (O – E) Phi ratio expected (O – E) Phi ratio
2 66 .65-.50 .15* .30 3.48 .61-.50 .11* .21 2.37
3 38 31-33 .04 .05 1.26 .71 -.67 .04 .07 1.35
4 29 .35-.25 .10 .13 1.89 .83-.75 .08 .10 1.83
5-8 15 Varies .10 .13 2.29 Varies .09 .11 2.97
Combined 148 .11** .19 2.28 .08* .14 2.00
Note. N = 164 families; the 16 one-child families are not included in the table. The mean difference for sibship size 5-8 was
calculated by weighting the difference for each sibship size by its frequency. Similarly, the combined values were weighted by
frequency. Fisher r-z transformations were applied before combining phi’s, and natural logs were applied before combining odds
ratios. Significance tests were based on binomial approximation.
*p < .05, one-tailed. **p < .01, one-tailed.
they were asked to “put a square around the sibling who is most
scholastically achieving, for example, gets the highest grades at
school.” School grades were cited so that young siblings could be rea-
sonably compared with siblings of college age or older. Next, partici-
pants were asked to put a circle around the “rebel” in the family. “Use
your own definition of the term rebel,” they were told. It was empha-
sized that the same person could be nominated for both categories.
Finally, participants were asked to indicate their own birth order.
Participants were not warned in advance that the topic of birth
order was to be addressed in the course. Nor was it covered in the
course textbook. Sulloway’s (1996) book was not yet available. In
short, there was no reason to believe that they had been influenced by
the recent birth order research.
Results and
Discussion
The results are presented in Table 1, separately for each sibship
size but with sizes 5 to 8 pooled because of small frequencies. The 16
sibships of size 1 (i.e., only-children) were not used.
Significance tests
Note from Table 1 that, for every sibship size, the observed proba-
bility of an FB being nominated as the achiever was higher than
expected by chance (i.e., the rate of FBs in that family size). Similar-
ly, for every sibship size, the probability of an LB being nominated as
the rebel was higher than expected by chance. Unfortunately, binomi-
al tests reached significance only for sibship size 2; for other sibship
sizes, the samples were too small to confirm the cell differences. When
significance levels were combined (see Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991, p.
504) across the four sibship sizes, however, the hypothesis was con-
firmed for both FB achievers (combined z = 2.40, p < .01) and LB
rebels (combined z = 1.87, p < .05).
Effect sizes
For each cell of Table 1, effect size was calculated by constructing
a 2 x 2 table of proportions (birth order by outcome). The rows of each
2×2 table corresponded to dichotomous birth order (FB vs. LB), and
the columns to outcome (achiever vs. nonachiever or rebel vs. non-
rebel). Calculation of the LB values required a correction for number
of LBs in each sibship size. Consider, for example, the rate of achiev-
ers in sibship size 3. The rate for FBs was .368 (rounded to .37 in Table
1), and therefore an LB was the achiever in .632 (1.00 – .368) of the
families. Because there are 2 LBs in this sibship size, however, the rate
of achievers among LBs was .316 (.632/2). The values for the
nonachiever column of the 2 x 2 table were the complements of .316
and .368, namely, .684 and .632.
From such 2×2 tables, we computed our first effect-size index, phi,
the product-moment correlation for two dichotomous variables (see
Table I).2 This index is intuitively appealing because it represents the
correlation between birth order and nomination as achiever (or rebel).
Averaged over all birth orders, the mean phi was .19 between birth order
(favoring FBs) and nomination as the achiever. Similarly, the mean phi
was .14 between birth order (favoring LBs) and nomination as the rebel.
Although intuitively appealing, phi coefficients are not ideal for
combining across conditions (Fleiss, 1994). An alternative effect
size – one that remains constant under changes in marginal
frequencies – is the odds ratio, also included in Table 1. The combined
odds ratio for achievement can be interpreted as meaning that the rel-
ative proportion of achievers to nonachievers is 2.28 times higher
among FBs than among LBs. Similarly, the mean odds ratio for rebels
(2.00) indicates that the proportion of rebels to nonrebels is twice as
high in LBs as it is in FBs.
FBs in the class
Recall that we had also asked participants to indicate what their
own birth order was. The rate of FBs in our sample (.44) was signifi-
cantly higher than the rate expected by chance (.34), %2(1, N = 164) =
7.0, p < .01 . The chance rate refers to the proportion of FBs that would
be expected in our sample of participants had they been randomly
selected from the families they reported on.
2. In this type of table, phi corresponds to the binomial effect-size display
(see Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991, p. 281). The values may be interpreted as the
differences in rates of nominations of FBs and LBs.
VOL. 10, NO. 6, NOVEMBER 1999 483
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PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
Birth Order and Personality
Discussion
Overall, our results are consistent with previous evidence that FBs
are more achieving and that LBs are more rebellious. One might won-
der, though, whether the effects we found are limited to the highly
selected student body at the University of California, Berkeley, cam-
pus. Another potential limitation of this study was the susceptibility to
contamination by stereotypes about birth order; that is, our respon-
dents may have had preconceived notions about birth order and per-
sonality that influenced their nominations of achievers and rebels.
STUDY 2: SALIENCE STUDY WITH UNIVERSITY OF
BRITISH COLUMBIA STUDENTS
These potential limitations were addressed in Study 2 by collecting
a data set that differed in several respects from the set in Study 1 . First,
the data were collected at a less selective university in another coun-
try, namely, the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada.
Second, the salience of birth order during the personality ratings was
manipulated. Although some participants were questioned exactly as
in Study 1, others were asked to make their nominations by initial
only, and only afterward were asked to specify the birth order of the
nominees.
Method
Data were collected in four intact classes (total N = 395). As in
Study 1, participants were asked to nominate the “scholastic achiever”
and the “rebel in the family.” They were advised that the same person
could be nominated for both. In two classes, birth order was made
salient during nominations (high-salience condition); in two other
classes, the topic of birth order was not made salient during nomina-
tions (low-salience condition). To control for possible differences in
morning and afternoon classes, we counterbalanced the salience con-
ditions across time of day. As in Study 1, none of the classes was
warned in advance that the topic of birth order would be covered in the
course.
High-salience condition
As in Study 1, participants (n = 217) were asked to write down the
birth order of the boys and girls in their family (e.g., B-G-G). They
were then asked to indicate which of the children was the scholastic
achiever and which was the rebel.
Low-salience condition
Participants (n = 178) were asked to write down the initials of the
scholastic achiever and the rebel among the children in the family.
Then they were asked to write down the birth order of each of the
nominees and the total number of children. In this condition, there was
no particular reason for participants to reflect on birth order and its
effects while they were doing the nominations.
Results and Discussion
The proportions of nominees for each category were again calcu-
lated within each family size. The two salience conditions were com-
pared cell by cell using z tests for proportions. There were no
significant differences on either dependent variable between the high-
and low-salience conditions (all zs < 1.40). The pooled results, dis-
played in Table 2, closely resemble those from Study 1 . In particular,
the effect sizes in Table 2 are remarkably similar to those in Table 1.
In terms of phi coefficients, the mean effect size for FB versus LB
achievers was .19 (identical to the value in Study 1). The comparable
figure for LB versus FB rebels was .18 (compared with .14 in Study
1). The odds ratios were also similar across the two studies.
This consistency suggests that the results of Study 1 were not an
artifact of an idiosyncratic sample. The predicted pattern emerged just
as clearly at the Canadian university as at the American university.
Because the sample sizes were larger than those in Study 1, however,
seven of eight cells reached significance (p < .07) on a binomial test.
Combined across sibship size, the effects were significant for both FB
achievers (p< .01) and LB rebels (p < .01). In terms of effect sizes, the
two weakest associations appeared for sibship size 3 (phi coefficients
of .10 and .07).
Table 2. Proportion of families with first-borns nominated as the achiever and later-borns nominated as the rebel
(Canadian students)
First-born achievers Later-born rebels
Significance Effect size Significance Effect size
Sibship Observed- Difference Odds Observed- Difference Odds
size n expected (O – E) Phi ratio expected (O-E) Phi ratio
2 165 .63-.50 .13** .26 2.91 .64-.50 .14** .27 3.06
3 115 .40-.33 .07* .10 1.56 .71-.67 .05 .07 1.38
4 64 .39-.25 .14** .19 2.52 .88-.75 .13** .17 2.88
5-8 25 Varies .12* .15 2.49 Varies .12* .14 5.27
Combined 369 .11** .19 2.31 .11** .18 2.45
Note. N = 395 families; the 26 one-child families are not included in the table. The mean difference for sibship size 5-8 was
calculated by weighting the difference for each sibship size by its frequency. Similarly, the combined values were weighted by
frequency. Fisher r-z transformations were applied before combining phi’s, and natural logs were applied before combining odds
ratios. Significance tests were based on binomial approximation.
*p < .07, one-tailed. **p < .01, one-tailed.
484 VOL. 10, NO. 6, NOVEMBER 1999
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PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
Delroy L. Paulhus, Paul D. Trapnell, and David Chen
STUDY 3: STUDENT TAKE-HOME PACKAGE
The two dependent variables studied up to this point –
rebelliousness and intellectual achievement – capture a rather limited
range of human personality. Broad trait taxonomies typically reveal
the five-dimensional personality space known as the Big Five, or the
Five-Factor Model (see Goldberg, 1990; Trapnell & Wiggins, 1990).
Indeed, Sulloway (1995, in press) profited considerably from orga-
nizing his findings in terms of the Big Five. He was able to show that FBs
were higher on Conscientiousness and LBs were higher on Openness to
Experience and Agreeableness. Accordingly, in Study 3, we expanded
our range of questions to tap four of the Big Five traits. Neuroticism was
omitted because it has the weakest effects (Sulloway, in press).
We asked participants to rank themselves and their siblings on
seven variables. The terms rebellious and scholastically achieving were
included to correspond to the variables used in Studies 1 and 2. Factor
1 of the Big Five (Extraversion) was represented by socially confident,
one of its highest loading items (Trapnell & Wiggins, 1990). Factor 2
(Agreeableness) was represented by agreeable, and Factor 3 (Consci-
entiousness) by conscientious. Factor 5 (Openness to Experience) was
represented by rebellious, creative, and liberal (see Trapnell, 1994).
Based on the literature cited, we predicted that FBs would be rated
as more achieving and conscientious. We also predicted that LBs
would be perceived as more liberal, rebellious, and agreeable. Cre-
ativity (despite its association with Openness) and extraversion have
shown weak or mixed results in the literature (Sulloway, 1996), so we
made no predictions about those two variables.
Method
The data collection (N = 203) differed from the procedure in Stud-
ies 1 and 2 in that (a) rather than answering questions in class, students
took questionnaire packages home to complete and (b) rather than
nominating one family member for each variable, students ranked all
family members on each variable.
Results
The results are summarized in Table 3. Data for the 9 only-children
are not included in the table. For simplicity and consistency with ear-
lier tables, we retained our dichotomous scoring of all dependent vari-
ables. On agreeableness, for example, we assigned a score of 1 to the
individual who was nominated as highest in the family; all others were
assigned a score of 0.
The asterisks in the row showing mean differences in Table 3 indi-
cate that all hypotheses were supported. Moreover, the pattern is con-
sistent across sibship sizes. That is, FBs were nominated as most
conscientious as well as most achieving more frequently than expect-
ed by chance. In contrast, LBs were more frequently nominated as
most liberal, agreeable, and rebellious. The combined significance lev-
els were significant for all predicted outcomes. Neither of the variables
for which we made no predictions (creativity and extraversion),. how-
ever, showed significance in either direction. Effect sizes, as indexed
by phi coefficients, were highest for conscientious (.20) and liberal
(.18).
Discussion
Two additional potential artifacts must be considered as explana-
tions of the observed birth order differences in Studies 1 through 3.
The finding that LBs were more likely to be nominated as rebels may
be an artifact of the age range of the raters. The youngest siblings in
families of students 19 to 21 years old are likely to be teenage or
younger. In other words, the LBs are likely to be of an age for which
rebelliousness is commonplace. As teenagers grow out of this period,
Table 3. Proportion of families consistent with each hypothesis: Study 3
Favor first-borns Favor later-borns No prediction
Scholastic
Sibship size n achiever Conscientious Liberal Rebellious Agreeable Extraverted Creative
2 107 .54 .65 .61 .56 .59 .52 .51
(.04) (.15)* (.11)* (.06) (.09) (.02) (.01)
3 61 .43 .34 .77 .74 .74 .34 .69
(.09) (.01) (.10)* (.07) (.07) (.01) (.02)
4 18 .39 .39 .78 .78 .78 .33 .67
(.14) (.14) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.08) (-.08)
5 4 .25 .25 1.00 .50 .50 .00 .50
(.05) (.05) (.20) (-.30) (-.30) (-.20) (-.30)
6 4 .25 .50 1.00 1.00 .75 .25 1.00
(.08) (.33) (.17) (.17) (-.08) (.08) (.17)
Mean difference
from chance (.07)* (.11)* (.10)* (.06)* (.07)* (.02) (.00)
Mean effect
size (phi) .11 .20 .18 .10 .13 .04 .01
Note. N = 203 families; the 9 one-child families are not included in the table. Differences from chance are shown in parentheses. They were
calculated so that positive values indicate differences consistent with the hypotheses. The column means were derived after weighting the
entries by sample size. Some of the differences from chance may appear faulty because the values in the table are rounded off.
*p < .05, one-tailed.
VOL. 10, NO. 6, NOVEMBER 1999 485
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PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
Birth Order and Personality
Table 4. Proportion of adult families consistent with each hypothesis: Study 4
Achievement Big-Five-related traits
Favor first-borns Favor later-borns No prediction
Sibship size n Scholastic Financial Prestige Conscientious Liberal Rebellious Agreeable Extraverted
2 55 .55 .55 .53 .60 .56 .60 .58 .55
(.05) (.05) (.03) (.10) (.06) (.10) (.08) (.05)
3 60 .38 .45 .40 .50 .88 .78 .77 .33
(.05) (.12)* (.07) (.17)* (.21) (.11)* (.10) (.00)
4 48 .25 .33 .29 .31 .83 .73 .83 .23
(.00) (.08) (.04) (.06) (.08) (-.02) (.08) (-.02)
5 33 .36 .27 .30 .24 .92 .94 .82 .21
(.16)* (.07) (.10) (.04) (.12) (.14)* (.02) (.01)
6 44 .39 .23 .32 .25 1.00 .93 .82 .11
(.22)* (.06) (.15)* (.08) (.17) (.10)* (-.02) (-.05)
Mean difference
from chance (.09)* (.08)* (.07)* (.10)* (.14)* (.09)* (.06)* (.00)
Mean effect
size (phi) .12 .11 .10 .15 .24 .13 .10 .01
Note. N = 260 families; the 20 one-child families are not included in the table. Differences from chance are shown in parentheses. They were calculated
so that positive values indicate differences consistent with the hypotheses. Column means were derived after weighting the entries by sample size.
*p < .05, one-tailed.
maturity-related birth order differences should wane (see Harris,
1998). Although such a maturity artifact is plausible in student data, it
would be an implausible explanation if similar differences appeared in
adult data.
Similarly, the finding that FBs are more scholastically achieving
than LBs may follow from the age range of our raters. The LBs that
were rated, being teenagers or younger, may have had little opportu-
nity to exhibit intellectual achievement – at least, they may not have
had as much opportunity as the FBs. Measurements taken later in life
might not show the FB advantage. Study 4 was designed to over-
come these possible artifacts in the student samples of Studies 1
through 3.
STUDY 4: VANCOUVER ADULT TAKE-HOME
PACKAGE
Questionnaires were administered to a large sample of adults who
were older than 40 years of age. These adults were asked to provide
personality rankings of their own families of origin. Because of the
age restriction, the possible artifacts attributable to student samples
should have been eliminated. For one thing, all the rated individuals
were well beyond the “rebellious” teenage years and were, therefore,
more comparable. And by age 30, an individual’s intellectual achieve-
ment (as well as other forms of achievement) should be evident. The
replication of our findings in this older generation would boost our
confidence in the robustness of these birth order effects.
Method
A sample of 309 adults was solicited by asking university students
to take home a questionnaire package to be completed by their parents
or other adults over 40. A returned questionnaire was excluded from
analysis if any of the participant’s siblings were less than 30 years of
age. A total of 260 questionnaires was usable. Ages of siblings ranged
from 30 to 61 (M = 44.2, SD = 9.9). Education ranged from 6 years to
20 years, with a median of 12 years.
The package of questionnaires was similar to that used in Study 3.
One change was the inclusion of three forms of achievement (scholas-
tic, financial, prestige) instead of one. The term extraverted was used
to represent Factor 1 (Extraversion), and the term reliable was used to
represent Factor 3 (Conscientious). Finally, creative was dropped. It
was made clear that respondents were to rate the siblings in their fam-
ilies of origin, not their own children.
Results and Discussion
The results are summarized in Table 4. They appear remarkably
similar to the data obtained with college students. All three forms of
achievement showed the predicted pattern, and the findings for the
other variables replicated earlier studies. The combined significance
levels for the seven predictions were all significant. Note from Table 4
that the largest mean effect sizes were .15 for conscientious (favoring
FBs) and .24 for liberal (favoring LBs).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
As a whole, the studies reported here confirm the birth order dif-
ferences predicted by the family-niche model of personality develop-
ment (Sulloway, 1996), as well as the confluence model of intellectual
development (e.g., Zajonc & Markus, 1975).3 Given the mixed support
from recent between-family studies, our success likely derives from
3. Of course, our data are mute with respect to the dynamics of these mod-
els, and are consistent with other theories (Rodgers, 1988).
486 VOL. 10, NO. 6, NOVEMBER 1999
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PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
Delroy L. Paulhus, Paul D. Trapnell, and David Chen
our use of the powerful within-family methodology. This additional
power follows from the built-in control over a variety of between-fam-
ily differences, namely, social class, family size, and, especially,
genetics.
Big Five Personality Traits
The results for the personality traits largely followed the birth order
pattern emerging from Sulloway’s (1995) meta-analysis. The weakest
effects were for Extraversion, one of the two weakest factors in Sul-
loway’s summary. Clear differences were found, however, in Consci-
entiousness, Agreeableness, and two of our indicators of Factor 5
(Openness to Experience), namely, liberalism and rebellion. Another
indicator of Openness, creativity, did not show significant differences.
This null finding is consistent with Sulloway’s (1996) historical data,
as well as data he has collected on contemporary samples (Sulloway,
in press). Because intelligence is confounded with openness in person
perception (Trapnell, 1994), attributions of creativity combine one
trait favoring FBs with another trait that favors LBs. This combination
has a null relation with birth order.
Intellectual Achievement
Our finding that FBs are perceived as more intellectually achieving
than LBs is consistent with previous work using concrete indicators
(e.g., Paulhus & Shaffer, 1981; Zajonc & Markus, 1975). The results
held whether intellectual achievement was operationalized as school
grades or ratings on intellectual achievement. This effect was not
restricted to intellectual achievement, but extended to financial and
prestige achievement. Future research showing a similar pattern for
unconventional forms of achievement would support Zajonc ‘s claims
for a general intellect advantage in FBs. Finding that this pattern
reversed (or at least diminished) for unconventional forms of achieve-
ment would support Sulloway’s theory that LB achievement typically
has a radical flavor.
Needless to say, perceptions of intellectual achievement are not
equivalent to concrete indicators (Davis, 1997; Paulhus, Lysy, & Yik,
1998). The former incorporate perceptions of conscientiousness,
which may inflate the association with FBs (Sulloway, in press).
Controlling Artifacts
We dealt with several threats to internal validity in Studies 2
through 4. Study 2 revealed no differences between an administration
condition in which birth order was made salient and a condition in
which birth order was not mentioned until after the sibling nomina-
tions had been made. Even without the direct activation of stereotypes,
the predicted effects still obtained.
Perhaps the stereotypes run deeper than that: They may have
already had a permanent impact on the way our subjects perceived
their brothers, their sisters, and themselves. If so, this impact must
endure, because our adult sample showed the same pattern and size
of birth order effects as much younger samples, despite (presumably)
living apart from siblings for many years. Yet the very stability of
these perceptions across the life span undermines the accusation that
they are artifactual and makes a stereotype perspective difficult to
distinguish from standard conceptions of personality. The stereotype
argument implies that the birth order differences reported by our par-
ticipants develop from false attributions that, nevertheless, have a
permanent, substantial impact on self-conception akin to a self-
fulfilling prophecy. The argument further requires that, throughout
their lives, siblings systematically ignore bona fide evidence of their
brothers’ and sisters’ traits in favor of erroneous impressions fostered
by maturity-related or age-related roles and stereotypes within their
families. To us, it seems far more reasonable to believe that such
stereotypes exist because they are true – that is, birth order does
influence personality development – rather than to believe that the
stereotypes, the self-perceptions, and the peer perceptions are all
faulty.
The achievement results seem least assailable for two reasons.
First, the facts about which adult sibling achieved the most or which
child sibling received the best grades should be relatively concrete and
objective. We can see no self-serving motivation for our participants to
have named the FB as the achiever. Only a fraction were nominating
themselves, so allegations of self-serving responding cannot be sus-
tained (Paulhus, 1991). Second, these nominations are backed up by a
concrete indicator in Study 1: The proportion of FBs (44%) was sig-
nificantly higher than chance (34%). Although this comparison is vul-
nerable to the usual confounds of between-family designs (Rodgers,
1988), this concrete indicator converges with the within-family indi-
cators to provide mutual support.
The age restriction in our first three studies raised the possibility of
two artifacts: The first was that LB siblings of college students were
less achieving because they had less opportunity to display achieve-
ment behavior. The second was that these LBs were perceived as
rebellious because many were experiencing the (notoriously rebel-
lious) teenage years. This limitation was overcome in Study 4 by sam-
pling respondents age 40 and up. Given that the lowest reported
sibling age was 30, even the youngest LBs in this study had lived suf-
ficiently long to display intellectual achievement. Moreover, these
LBs were well past the inherently rebellious teenage years.
Effect Sizes
Effect sizes for the FB-versus-LB comparisons varied in a coher-
ent fashion across the dimensions we assessed. Averaged over all four
studies, the effect size for liberalness was strongest (phi = .21). The
comparable figure for intellectual achievement was .16. These figures
are likely to be underestimates because we used only single-item indi-
cators for all our variables. For an index combining all five predictions
in Study 3, the effect size was .24 – a substantial figure on a par with
that reported by Sulloway (in press).
Some critics might argue that our within-family design is too pow-
erful in the sense that it detects birth order differences that are trivial
in daily life (Ernst & Angst, 1983; Harris, 1998; Jefferson et al., 1998).
The between-family studies, which found weak results at best, are said
to be more representative of life beyond the family of origin. But even
those critics concede the likelihood that birth order has an impact (a)
during the developmental years and (b) during continuing interactions
with one’s family of origin. These effects alone are reason to take our
birth order effects seriously. Certainly, we can rule out the claim that
birth order effects are “parent-specific” (Ernst & Angst, 1983),
although they may be “family-context-specific.”
Another reason for taking our results seriously is the emerging con-
sensus (e.g., Bouchard, 1997; Dunn & Plomin, 1990; Jang, McCrae,
Angleitner, Riemann, & Livesley, 1998; Rowe, 1997) that (a)
between-family differences in personality and intellect are dominated
VOL. 10, NO. 6, NOVEMBER 1999 487
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PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
Birth Order and Personality
I by genetic variance and (b) the environmental variance is largely with-
in family. It follows that social scientists interested in intervention
must turn their attention to processes that operate to differentiate the
children within the same family.
Note, finally, that any single within-family source, such as birth
order or peer effects (Harris, 1998), may seem modest relative to the
between-family genetic variance. Yet even modest effect sizes can
translate into dramatic social consequences (Rosenthal & Rosnow,
1991; Sulloway, in press). And it is precisely the within-family effects
that are most amenable to the benevolent tools of psychology.
Acknowledgments – We thank Jeff McCrae, Dan Ozer, Dave Shaffer, and
Frank Sulloway for comments on an earlier draft. Thanks to Jennifer Beer,
Paul Wehr, and Kim Barchard for assistance with the analyses. This
research was supported by a grant to the senior author from the Social Sci-
ences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
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(Received 7/9/98; Accepted 1 1/24/98)
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Psychological Science, Vol. 10, No. 6 (Nov., 1999), pp. i-ii, 465-548
Volume Information
Front Matter
Special Sections: The End of Psycological Science?
William James and Sigmund Freud: “The Future of Psychology Belongs to Your Work” [pp. 465-469]
The Undiscovered Mind: How the Human Brain Defies Replication, Medication, and Explanation [pp. 470-474]
Changing Trends in Doctoral Training Programs in Psychology: A Comparative Analysis of Research-Oriented versus Professional-Applied Programs [pp. 475-481]
Research Articles
Birth Order Effects on Personality and Achievement within Families [pp. 482-488]
Carrot-Eaters and Creature-Believers: The Effects of Lexicalization on Children’s Inferences about Social Categories [pp. 489-493]
Neural Recruitment and Cognitive Aging: Two Hemispheres Are Better than One, Especially as You Age [pp. 494-500]
The Mystery Spot Illusion and Its Relation to Other Visual Illusions [pp. 501-507]
Metacontrast Masking and Attention [pp. 508-515]
“What” Effects on “Where”: Functional Influences on Spatial Relations [pp. 516-521]
Research Reports
Behavioral Goals Constrain the Selection of Visual Information [pp. 522-525]
Learning about Categories in the Absence of Training: Profound Amnesia and the Relationship between Perceptual Categorization and Recognition Memory [pp. 526-530]
The Relation between Implicit and Explicit Learning: Evidence for Parallel Development [pp. 531-534]
Unconscious Unease and Self-Handicapping: Behavioral Consequences of Individual Differences in Implicit and Explicit Self-Esteem [pp. 535-539]
Books Received since April 1, 1999 [p. 540-540]
Back Matter
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