Homework help for On Point II, Combat Studies Institute Press, (5 Pages).In this case study, GEN Franks (CENTCOM Commander) addresses PH IV (Stability Operations) of the campaign plan and uses his operational art and command experience to describe his vision of how this phase will be accomplished. GEN Franks stated that “Phase IV would be relatively short,” obviously he made this assumption based on the speed in which the forces accomplished PH III.Use the “Case Study Final” document only as a guide and introduction to completing a case study analysis (do not use the outline in this document, it is designed as a practical exercise to help you develop your content and position).The intent of this homework is not to complete a case study review or a book report. The intent is to conduct a case study analysis of the case study and address the questions identified in the homework instructions. The references, quoted material, and citations that you decide to use should support your perspective and position; not just regurgitating the information in the case study. Remember to use Joint Publications regarding doctrine as this is JIIMO; Joint/Strategic. After reading this case study answer the following questions (Analysis):
Case studies provide a form of experiential learning that exposes you to real-world scenarios and challenge your thinking as an organizational-level leader. The cases present ideas, issues, and problem-solving dilemmas you could face in your
career. The objective of studying cases is not to second-guess decisions from the past but to provide a cognitive framework for solving problems in the future. In its basic form, the case study methodology consists of two parts: problem framing and analysis.
Framing is the reasoning process used to gain understanding of the context of the case in order to make better decisions. For complex cases, framing is typically done first to set the conditions for the analysis. The detailed analysis begins by examining the decision-making within the case and actions you would take in similar
circumstances. This is followed by an examination of the implications and consequences of the decision making, an attempt to make meaning for future application.
The below prompts will help you frame your case study and address specific questions that are required (when reading your case study take notes according to the below prompts):
·
Key Players and Interests: Who are the key players and what are their interests? Interests include needs, wants, desires, concerns, and fears.
·
Facts and Assumptions: What are the key facts and assumptions necessary for understanding this case study? Facts include key events that impact decision making. Assumptions are the best guess about the current or future situation that is assumed to be true in the absence of facts.
·
Paradigms: What are the paradigms or mental models of the key players? Paradigms are generally accepted models or patterns that have had repeated validation (“conventional wisdom”). They may be rooted in doctrine or tradition and are often reinforced by ideology and dogmatic belief systems. Many paradigms are rooted in cultural background and are not visible to the owner of them.
·
Problem Identification: What are the main issues or problems facing the key players?
Format of your case study (the case study contain at minimum the four elements below
):
1
.
Introduction: Identify the key issues of your case study and try to formulate a thesis/ purpose statement and summarize the outcome of your analysis in up to two sentence.
2.
Background: Provide background information (facts and assumptions)
3.
Analysis: Here is where you will conduct your analysis/
answer the specific questions
associated with the case study
(this should be a level 1 header and write each question and then add your response after each question).
4.
Recommendations: Address what could have been done different using a sergeant major’s perspective and how can you develop members of your organization to prevent these types of actions (this is a key component of the case study).
5. Citations and references: As with any type of research paper you may write, ensure to cite and list the references you may have used to present your evidence. Ensure that your citations and references are consistent with APA7th edition standards.
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5. Do not forget to proof your final document for submission (also check against SafeAssign). As part of your finalization always look at the evidence and determine whether you have answered the questions associated with your analysis.
The case study responses should focus on more than just providing doctrinal definitions. You should demonstrate your knowledge of the concepts and theories that you read about during the module. Your understanding of its applicability through an analysis will help determine your grade (i.e., how these facts affect a period of history, how the introduction of this organism into the ecosystem affects the environments, how this sequence of events led to the development of …).
Your case study should be well written. We will look for specific elements when reading a paper. Refer to the prompts below and the grading rubric for details.
A.
Focused: Your case study address all parts of the questions without many random ideas, which have little or nothing to do with the focused-area questions. Students often think that adding random factor or ideas will help improve their grade because they know them. The opposite is true – adding random, unrelated ideas or facts usually result in the reduction of points from your grade.
B.
Structured: You know what you want to write, but your ability to communicate that knowledge to your instructor depends on how well you structure your paper. Take the time to make a rough outline of what you want to write and in what order you want to present it. Stream of consciousness writing (putting things on paper as you think of them) will result in a mediocre grade at best.
C.
Documented: Contrary to the True/False or Multiple Choice Questions, your paper must go beyond a simple statement of act. The instructor is looking for the correct content, yes, but more importantly, for your understanding of the content. So, always include relevant facts, figures, examples, and tests (the phosphate test showed a ph. of
…), etc. With the writing assignment, how well you document your content will often make the difference between an A and B grade.
D.
Well Presented: Students who do not use the accepted rules of English are often thought to be less competent or knowledgeable than those who do. If you have all of the elements of a well-written paper, but your use of language, sentence structure, or spelling make it difficult to read or understand what you are trying to say, your grade will suffer. Make sure you use good sentence structure, grammar, and spelling.
This assignment target ELO-400-SMC-1012.25 (J601: Transitioning from a Division/Corps (G) Staff to a Joint (J) Staff), 400-SMC-1012.26 (J604: Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment), 400-SMC-1012.19 (J605: Joint Planning Process),400-SMC-1012.27 (J606: Mission Analysis)
Assignment Instructions:
Analyze the concepts and theories you read about in J601; utilizing key language and terms from these concepts and theories, read the case study
“On Point II, Combat Studies Institute Press, (5 Pages)” (Located in BB, J530A).
In this case study, GEN Franks (CENTCOM Commander) addresses PH IV (Stability Operations) of the campaign plan and uses his operational art and command experience to describe his vision of how this phase will be accomplished. GEN Franks stated that “Phase IV would be relatively short,” obviously he made this assumption based on the speed in which the forces accomplished PH III.
· What is your opinion of GEN Frank’s statement?
· Did this line of thinking add to the difficulty of planning for Stability Operations?
· How did this unexpected transition affect personnel requirements for the newly designated CJTF-7?
· How would the JIPOE analysis assist the commander during the transition to Phase IV? (J604)
· What were the strategic and operational situations that led to General Franks’ statement that “Phase IV would be relatively short” (J605, J606)
* Note as you write this case study it is imperative that you discuss concepts and theories that you read about and demonstrate your ability to analyze a situation and apply the relevant leadership competencies and attributes.
Assignment Instructions: The case study paper will be in APA 7e format, a title page, a reference page, and 800-1250 words (double spaced). Do not try to cover everything. The best way to tackle this case study is to write out each question and respond to the question and then package it into a properly prepared APA paper. (You are not writing an essay). See 1009W for general writing assessment requirements.
Introduction
Provide an introduction of the case study and what are some of the issues/ problems associated with the case study (key palyers, etc). The goal of this case analysis is to highlight/ frame
… (Here you should be looking at the central topics of what you are analyzing (ELOs)
and write up a purpose or thesis).
Background Information
Address some key facts based upon your reading and analysis and link them to the ELOs associated with the case study.
Analysis
A suggested method is to write the questions and then compose your response after each question.
Question 1. Describe xxxxxxxxxxx Answer xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Question 2 Identify xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Answer xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Recommendation
Address what could have been done different using a sergeant major’s perspective and
how
can you develop members of your organization to prevent these types of actions
(this is a key component of the case study).
* Adhere to APA 7e formatting standards
J600: Coalition/Joint Force Land Component Command Operations Lesson J601
Transitioning from a Division/Corps (G) Staff to a Joint (J) Staff Reading A
On Point II (Excerpt)
Please return to Blackboard to download the readings under the J30A assignment folder. This will provide you with the questions associated with the case study (the questions are located within the learner guide also).
This assignment is supported by ELO-400-SMC-1012.25 (J601: Transitioning from a Division/Corps (G) Staff to a Joint (J) Staff)
Reading: On Point II, Combat Studies Institute Press , (5 Pages).
In this case study, GEN Franks (CENTCOM Commander) addresses PH IV (Stability Operations) of the campaign plan and uses his operational art and command experience to describe his vision of how this phase will be accomplished. GEN Franks stated that “Phase IV would be relatively short,” obviously he made this assumption based on the speed in which the forces accomplished PH III.
After reading and analyzing this case study answer the following questions:
· What is your opinion of GEN Frank’s statement?
· Did this line of thinking add to the difficulty of planning for Stability Operations?
· How did this unexpected transition affect personnel requirements for the newly designated CJTF-7?
· How would the JIPOE analysis assisted the commander during the transition to Phase IV? (J604)
· What were the strategic and operational situations that led to General Franks’ statement that “Phase IV would be relatively short” (J605, J606)
Assignment Instructions: The paper will be in APA 7e format, a title page, a reference page, and must be between 800-1250 words (does not include the cover and reference pages). Do not try to cover everything. The best approach to this case study after reading is to write the questions and answer them and then package it into a properly formatted APA paper (You are not writing an essay). See 1009W for grading requirements.
Use the “Case study Final” attached above as your guide
Joint II
Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM May
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–January 2005
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During the 6 weeks following the toppling of the Saddam regime, as the CPA arrived and ORHA departed, Coalition military forces quickly established their presence in the capital city and throughout Iraq, preparing for what came next. Still, the role of the United States’ and the United Kingdom’s military forces in the next stage of the campaign remained unclear. During the initial planning that led to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), General Tommy Franks, the CENTCOM commander, tasked Third Army/CFLCC to lead the postinvasion phase of the campaign known as Phase IV, Transition, in joint doctrine terminology, which CENTCOM believed would be relatively short. Once CENTCOM concluded its postconflict operations, CFLCC would pass responsibility for the longer, more complex reconstruction and stabiliza- tion effort to a combined joint task force (CJTF). The DOD gave this joint task force a vari- ety of names, designating it first as Combined Joint Task Force–Iraq and later as Combined Joint Task Force–7 (CJTF-7). However, planners at the DOD and CENTCOM had focused on Phase III, Decisive Operations, of the campaign and, consequently, had invested only a limited amount of time and resources in the organization and manning of this joint task force.
In April the Third Army had been serving as the CFLCC, the headquarters responsible for Coalition land forces in Iraq under CENTCOM. General Franks told his subordinate leaders during a 16 April visit to Baghdad to be prepared to conduct an abbreviated period of stability operations and then to redeploy the majority of their forces out of Iraq by September 2003. In line with the prewar planning and general euphoria at the rapid crumbling of the Saddam regime, Franks continued to plan for a very limited role for US ground forces in Iraq.
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Following Franks’ intent, CFLCC planners started preparations to redeploy, and soon the 3d Infantry Division (3d ID) and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (1st MEF) received orders to begin their own preparations for leaving Iraq. In fact, the desire to reduce US forces in Iraq was so strong that after listening to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld voice con- cerns about deploying the 1st Cavalry Division (1st CAV), already loading its equipment in the United States for movement to Iraq, Franks recommended to the Secretary in late April that the division stay stateside.5 This decision stemmed from the belief, at the national level, that 1st CAV’s Soldiers would not be needed to stabilize Iraq.6
Overview of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: May 2003 to January 2005
Chapter 1
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Figure 8. General Tommy Franks.
Photo Courtesy of
www.MedalofFreedom.com
Franks also wanted the Third Army/CFLCC out of Iraq as soon as possible and returned to its normal role in support of land operations throughout the CENTCOM area of operations (AO), which included Afghanistan. By the second week of May, V Corps commander Lieutenant General William Wallace received confir- mation that his headquarters would serve as the core of CJTF-7, the Phase IV military headquarters tasked to replace Third Army/CFLCC in Iraq.7 In late April Wallace learned that he would be replaced as com- mander of V Corps by Major General Ricardo Sanchez, then commanding the 1st Armored Division (1st AD), heading to Iraq from Germany. No new CJTF headquar- ters would be coming to Iraq after all. V Corps, which would not be officially designated as CJTF-7 until 15 June, was to operate under the political guidance of ORHA and Jay Garner. ORHA also expected to have a short lifespan, turning over political power to a new Iraqi Government by the end of the summer.
In late April CFLCC remained in charge of Coalition ground forces, but was beginning to transfer responsibility to V Corps and preparing to redeploy to the United States. It provided only limited guidance to the tactical units that fanned out across Iraq. Even without a detailed mission and guidelines on how to conduct the next phase, by the beginning of May US Army divisions took positions across the country and began executing a variety of operations. The 101st Airborne Division (101st ABN) established itself in the northwest of the country around the city of Mosul. To its southeast, the 173d Airborne assumed responsibility for the city and environs of Kirkuk. In the area between Kirkuk and Baghdad, a region known as the Sunni Triangle, the 4th Infantry Division (4th ID) set up a sprawling presence. In Al Anbar province, to the west of the Sunni heartland, the 3d ID and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (3d ACR) began operating in cities such as Fallujah and Ramadi. The 1st AD, soon to be augmented by the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (2d ACR) and the 2d Brigade Combat Team (2d BCT) of the 82d Airborne Division (82d ABN), moved into Baghdad to begin its operations in the Iraqi capital. (See Appendix C, Map of Unit Areas of Responsibility, 2003–2004.) Across these areas of responsibility (AOR), the special operations Soldiers of the newly established Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP), created when CJSOTF- North and CJSOTF-West were combined, began conducting reconnaissance, psychological operations, and the hunt for high-value targets.
Of course the US Army was not alone in this early stage of postinvasion operations. To the south of Baghdad, the 1st MEF took up positions in the region around Karbala and An Najaf. In the southeastern corner of Iraq, centered in the city of Basrah, the British 1st Armoured Division established its AOR. At the end of May 2003, approximately 160,000 Coalition troops had spread out across Iraq to begin postconflict efforts.8 Eventually, as more Coalition troops entered Iraq in the summer of 2003, CJTF-7, the Coalition military headquarters established in June 2003, redesignated all areas of operation as multinational division AORs. By the fall of 2003, CJTF-7 had divided Iraq into six AORs: Multi-National Division–North (MND-N),
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Multi-National Division–North Central (MND-NC), Multi-National Division–Baghdad (MND-B), Multi-National Division–West (MND-W), Multi-National Division–Central South (MND-CS), and Multi-National Division–Southeast (MND-SE). (See Appendix D, Map of Theater Structure, 2003–2005.)
In June 2003 the United States made a dramatic change in the Coalition’s command structure. This transition began informally in late May when General Franks told both Lieutenant General Wallace, the outgoing V Corps commander, and the newly promoted Lieutenant General Sanchez, the inbound commander of V Corps, that CFLCC was pulling out of Iraq to refocus on its theater-wide responsibilities. Franks ordered V Corps to become the nucleus of the senior military command in Iraq designated as CJTF-7. This move was sudden and caught most of the senior commanders in Iraq unaware. Sanchez and V Corps (an Army headquarters focused on ground operations at the tactical level) would now have to become a joint and combined headquarters, responsible for the theater-strategic, operational,
and tactical levels of war.
Sanchez assumed command of V Corps on 14 June 2003. On 15 June this informal transi- tion became formal with the activation of CJTF-7. The process was complicated because the V Corps staff was not configured for the types of responsibilities it received. In retrospect, Lieutenant General Wallace stated:
You can’t take a tactical headquarters [V Corps] and change it into an opera- tional [level] headquarters [CJTF-7] at the snap of your fingers. It just doesn’t happen. Your focus changes completely, and you are either going to take your eye off the tactical fight in order to deal with the operational issues, or you are going to ignore the operational issues and stay involved in the tactical fight.9
To lead at all these levels, Sanchez designed a new staff that incorporated officers from the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, as well as from the various Coalition forces. He also needed to add more Army officers to his staff if he hoped to guide postinvasion operations at all levels. Many of the military units in Iraq prepared to redeploy to their home sta- tions, which complicated the task of bringing new officers into CJTF-7. CENTCOM and CFLCC quickly took their staffs back to Kuwait, Qatar, and MacDill Air Force Base in Florida. Within the V Corps staff, many officers received orders transferring them to new units and scheduled Army training courses. Sanchez found this transition to be particu- larly problematic for the staffing and support of his new orga- nization. He stated, “CENTCOM had pretty much shut down its operations [in Iraq]. Most of the key people were back in
DOD Photo by LCpl Andrew Williams, USMC
Figure 10. Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Commander, CJTF-7.
CENTCOM [headquarters] in Tampa, Florida. For CFLCC, the barn door had been opened and everybody was in a mad dash to get back home. So we . . . knew, even by that point, that we had an issue.”10 Although CJTF-7 gradually added
officers from the four American military services as well as from Coalition nations, the pro- cess moved slowly and posed significant challenges to command and control in the summer of 2003.
While Sanchez struggled to create a viable combined and joint staff immediately after taking command of CJTF-7, he issued broad guidance to his tactical commanders who were dealing with practical challenges across Iraq. Each commander was then free to develop and implement specific plans, particular to their AOR, within this general framework. By July 2003 Sanchez articulated that guidance in the form of the following mission statement:
Conduct offensive operations to defeat remaining noncompliant forces and neutralize destabilizing influences in the AO in order to create a secure envi- ronment in direct support of the Coalition Provisional Authority. Concurrently conduct stability operations to support the establishment of government and economic development in order to set the conditions for a transfer of opera- tions to designated follow-on military or civilian authorities.11
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